Zelfverwondend gedrag in detentie : prevalentie, risicofactoren en preventie

ACHTERGROND: Hoewel zelfverwondend gedrag (ZVG) internationaal een ernstig probleem vormt bij gedetineerden, zijn hieromtrent geen empirische gegevens beschikbaar in de Belgische detentiecontext. DOEL: De prevalentie van, en risicofactoren voor, ZVG nagaan in de Vlaamse gevangenissen. METHODE: Dwarsdoorsnedeonderzoek bij een representatieve steekproef van 1326 gedetineerden (1203 mannen en 123 vrouwen), willekeurig gerekruteerd uit 15 Vlaamse gevangenissen. RESULTATEN: Van alle gedetineerden gaf 17,3% aan zichzelf ooit in het leven opzettelijk verwond te hebben. Eén op twaalf (8,6%) rapporteerde ZVG tijdens de detentieperiode, wat significant geassocieerd was met zowel statische risicofactoren (jongere leeftijd, een definitieve veroordeling en gewelddadige delicten) als dynamische risicofactoren (psychiatrische stoornissen, distress en copingstrategieën). CONCLUSIE: De omvang van ZVG bij gedetineerden in Vlaanderen is aanzienlijk. De geïdentificeerde risicofactoren vormen belangrijke aanknopingspunten voor preventie en interventie in detentie.BACKGROUND: Although non-suicidal self-injury (NSSI) is a serious health concern among prisoners worldwide, no empirical data on this issue are currently available specifically for Belgium. AIM: To investigate the prevalence rates of, and risk factors for, NSSI in Flemish prisons. METHOD: A cross-sectional study based on a representative sample of 1326 prisoners (1203 men and 123 women), randomly selected from 15 Flemish prisons. RESULTS: Overall, 17.3% of prisoners self-reported a lifetime history of NSSI. One in 12 prisoners (8.6%) engaged in NSSI whilst incarcerated; this was significantly associated with both static (younger age, sentenced status, and violent offending) and dynamic (psychiatric disorders, distress, and coping strategies) risk factors. CONCLUSION: The extent of NSSI among prisoners in Flanders is considerable. The identified risk factors present important targets for prevention and intervention in a custodial setting

Rule-Makers or Rule-Takers? Exploring the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership

The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is an effort by the United States and the European Union to reposition themselves for a world of diffuse economic power and intensified global competition. It is a next-generation economic negotiation that breaks the mould of traditional trade agreements. At the heart of the ongoing talks is the question whether and in which areas the two major democratic actors in the global economy can address costly frictions generated by their deep commercial integration by aligning rules and other instruments. The aim is to reduce duplication in various ways in areas where levels of regulatory protection are equivalent as well as to foster wide-ranging regulatory cooperation and set a benchmark for high-quality global norms. In this volume, European and American experts explain the economic context of TTIP and its geopolitical implications, and then explore the challenges and consequences of US-EU negotiations across numerous sensitive areas, ranging from food safety and public procurement to economic and regulatory assessments of technical barriers to trade, automotive, chemicals, energy, services, investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms and regulatory cooperation. Their insights cut through the confusion and tremendous public controversies now swirling around TTIP, and help decision-makers understand how the United States and the European Union can remain rule-makers rather than rule-takers in a globalising world in which their relative influence is waning

Attention à la marche! L'importance des dispositions transitoires pour les traités d'investissement bilatéraux conclus entre les États membres de l'UE et les États tiers

Compte tenu de l'opposition du public au règlement des différends entre investisseurs et États (RDIE) et en tenant compte de l'avis 2/15 de la Cour de justice de l'UE précisant que tous les États membres doivent être parties à tous nouveaux accords internationaux, y compris la protection des investissements étrangers autres que directs et le RDIE, il faudra beaucoup de temps pour que les accords à l'échelle de l'UE remplacent le réseau existant de traités bilatéraux d'investissement (TBI). La protection des investissements étrangers dans l'UE continuera donc, dans un avenir prévisible, à être réglementée par les TBI des différents États membres avec les pays tiers. De ce point de vue, l'importance du règlement 1219/2012, en tant que mécanisme transitoire permettant à la Commission d'exercer un contrôle sur les politiques de TBI des États membres pendant la période extrêmement longue avant l'entrée en vigueur des accords européens, ne peut être sous-estimée. Le présent article aborde la question de savoir si ce mécanisme transitoire répond à la nécessité pour les États membres de poursuivre leurs politiques individuels de TBI, tout en laissant à la Commission une marge de manœuvre suffisante pour influencer - mais non de dicter - la protection des investissements et le règlement des différends dans l’UE. In light of the public opposition to investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS), and bearing in mind Opinion 2/15 of the Court of Justice of the EU stating that all Member States must be party to any new international agreements including non-direct foreign investment protection and ISDS, it will take a considerable amount of time for EU-wide agreements to replace the existing network of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs). Foreign investment protection in the EU will hence continue, for the foreseeable future, to be regulated by individual Member States’ BITs with third countries. From this perspective, Regulation No. 1219/2012’s importance as a transitory mechanism allowing the Commission a measure of control over Member States’ BIT policies during the exceedingly long ‘gap’ period before EU-wide agreements enter into force, cannot be underestimated. The present article addresses the question whether this transitory mechanism meets the need for EU Member States to continue their individual BIT policies, while allowing the Commission sufficient manoeuvring space to influence – but not dictate – investment protection and dispute settlement in the EU. © 2017 Bruylan

Nationality-based discrimination in public international law with specific focus on human rights, trade and investment law

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Judicial Review of International Adjudicatory Decisions: A Cross-Regime Comparison of Annulment and Appellate Mechanisms

The call for an appellate mechanism in international investment arbitration is located within a broader debate concerning judicial review of international adjudicatory decisions. Existing avenues of setting aside, refusal of enforcement and annulment offer little solace because grounds for intervention generally do not extend to the merits. This article compares three international review mechanisms: the ad hoc annulment procedure of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization and the Optional Appellate Rules of the American Arbitration Association. Against this cross-regime background, the potential of a (multilateral) appellate tribunal in investment disputes, as advocated by the European Commission in its proposal for an Investment Court System, is evaluated. Notwithstanding potential disadvantages in terms of additional cost and length of proceedings, an appellate mechanism could nonetheless enhance the coherence, consistency, and, ultimately, (the public perception of) the legitimacy of international awards

No Deal is Better Than a Bad Deal? The Fallacy of the WTO Fall-Back Option as a post-Brexit Safety Net

The terms and conditions of the WTO fall-back option and the extent to which the WTO could act as a safety net for the UK’s future economic relations depend, to a great extent, on successful negotiations with all other WTO Members. There are significant differences between EU and WTO Membership, in terms of the applicable trade rules and their economic impact, as well as compliance and dispute settlement procedures. Imposing new regulations and processes will inevitably entail additional costs and delays, regardless of any mitigation agreements. Finally, the EU-UK relationship covers much more than trade so the WTO fall-back option will in any case leave major legal vacuums. Thus, the mantra ‘no deal is better than a bad deal’ is misleading; the WTO fall-back option falls far short of providing an adequate safety net, even for trade matters