59 research outputs found
Constitutional Reasoning in the European Union and the Charter of Fundamental Rights: In Search of Public Justification
This article argues that the CJEUâs use of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in situations falling within the scope of EU law needs to be supplemented by clearer constitutional reasoning about the role of fundamental rights in the public order of the European Union. The article demonstrates, through an analysis of the Charterâs drafting context, that the primary function of this instrument is to highlight the centrality of a set of public goods in the EU, rather than merely to add to the number of individual rights to which EU law gives rise. It is then argued that, in order for this function to be fulfilled, an interpretation of fundamental rights is required that both acknowledges their constitutional value as distinct from other sources of rights protection in the Union and offers adequate reasons for the application of the Charter standard. The idea of public justification provides a suitable starting point, particularly in situations of conflict with national laws, because it would give rise to a much-needed judicial debate about what the best standard of fundamental rights protection would be for the Union. However, such an interpretation of the Charter is currently lacking from the case law which, instead, utilises problematic forms of constitutional and quasi-constitutional discourse, through continued reliance on a conception of rights as tools of enforcement of EU law, which it had advanced in its earlier case law. While this type of reasoning was well suited to the idea of the EU as a social market economy, it structurally precludes the re-imagination of rights as collectively authored claims about good government under the Charter framework
Brexit and Article 50 TEU: A Constitutionalist Reading
This article considers the constitutional requirements and implications of Article 50 TEU for the European Union. It argues that it is essential to read Article 50 in light of the inherently constitutionalist features of the Treaty of which it forms part together with its drafting context, that of the Convention on the Future of Europe, as well as the substantive protections of EU
constitutional law. The article demonstrates that substantial constitutional constraints are in place in EU law, which can affect four of the most significant debates in the withdrawal process, namely: the manner in which notification to withdraw from the Union is given; the revocability of a decision to withdraw; and the legal basis of the withdrawal agreement.
These debates raise complex matters of EU constitutional law that must be determined in order for the Article 50 process to be conducted in accordance with the joint UK and EU commitment to respect the rule of law
A âright to have rightsâ in the EU public sphere? An Arendtian justification for the application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights
This paper discusses the Courtâs reasoning in interpreting the EU Charter, using recent case law on horizontal effect as a case study. It identifies two possible means of interpreting the provisions of the Charter: firstly, an approach based on common values (e.g. equality or solidarity) and, secondly, an approach based on access to the public sphere. It argues in favour of the latter. Whereas an approach based on common values is more consonant with the development of the case law so far, it is conceptually problematic: it involves subjective assessments of the importance and degree of âsharednessâ of the value in question, which can undermine the equal constitutional status of different Charter provisions. Furthermore, it marginalises the Charterâs overall politically constructional character, which distinguishes it from other sources of rights protection listed in Art 6 TEU. The paper argues that, as the Charterâs provisions concretise the notion of political status in the EU, they have a primarily constitutional, rather than ethical, basis. Interpreting the Charter based on the very commitment to a process of sharing, drawing on Hannah Arendtâs idea of the âright to have rightsâ (a right to access a political community on equal terms), is therefore preferable. This approach retains the pluralistic, post-national fabric of the EU polity, as it accommodates multiple narratives about its underlying values, while also having an inclusionary impact on previously underrepresented groups (e.g. non-market-active citizens or the sans-papiers) by recognising their equal political disposition
Foreword
It is a pleasure to write a foreword for this special issue, which comprises an outstanding selection of submissions arising from the proceedings of the UCL Postgraduate and Early Careers Conference 2017. Having once been involved in the organization of the conference
and editing of the UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence myself, and indeed having had the honour of participating as a discussant in this conference, I could not be happier to see the fruitful coming together of these activities. Yet the rigour displayed in this issue leaves no room for partiality. The silver thread that connects the five articles that make up this publication is the overarching theme of the 2017 conference: âThe art of balancing and the role of law in the reconciling of competing interests.â The contributions provide a new lens through which to approach this perennial debate in law and philosophy. Each in its own way,they offer thoughtful accounts of balancing between civic life, the public interest, and individual rights. Without losing sight of the broader theme, though, the submissions succeed in taking the reader through a variety of legal problems, in line with the generalist outlook that has characterized the journal since its creation
Brexit Transitional Period: The solution is Article 50. CEPS Commentary, 9 September 2017
As the Brexit negotiations labour on, the complexity of what lies ahead is finally, painfully, becoming clear to the UK government. Some Brexiteers, including Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, David Davis, now seem to accept the idea that, although the United Kingdom is due to leave the EU on 29 March 2019, some sort of a transitional phase will be necessar
A âright to have rightsâ in the EU public sphere? An Arendtian justification for the application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights
This paper discusses the Courtâs reasoning in interpreting the EU Charter, using recent case law on horizontal effect as a case study. It identifies two possible means of interpreting the provisions of the Charter: firstly, an approach based on common values (e.g. equality or solidarity) and, secondly, an approach based on access to the public sphere. It argues in favour of the latter. Whereas an approach based on common values is more consonant with the development of the case law so far, it is conceptually problematic: it involves subjective assessments of the importance and degree of âsharednessâ of the value in question, which can undermine the equal constitutional status of different Charter provisions. Furthermore, it marginalises the Charterâs overall politically constructional character, which distinguishes it from other sources of rights protection listed in Art 6 TEU. The paper argues that, as the Charterâs provisions concretise the notion of political status in the EU, they have a primarily constitutional, rather than ethical, basis. Interpreting the Charter based on the very commitment to a process of sharing, drawing on Hannah Arendtâs idea of the âright to have rightsâ (a right to access a political community on equal terms), is therefore preferable. This approach retains the pluralistic, post-national fabric of the EU polity, as it accommodates multiple narratives about its underlying values, while also having an inclusionary impact on previously underrepresented groups (e.g. non-market-active citizens or the sans-papiers) by recognising their equal political disposition
Understanding the implications of article 2 of the Northern Ireland Protocol in the context of EU case law developments
Brexit and Article 50 TEU: a constitutionalist reading
This article considers the constitutional requirements and implications of Article 50 TEU for the EU. It argues that it is essential to read Article 50 in light of the features of the Treaty of which it forms part together with its drafting context, that of the Convention on the Future of Europe, as well as the substantive protections of EU constitutional law. The article demonstrates that important constitutional constraints are in place in EU law, which can affect the most significant debates in the withdrawal process, namely: the manner in which notification to withdraw from the Union is given; the revocability of a decision to withdraw; and the legal basis and content of the withdrawal agreement. Most importantly, a reading of Article 50 informed by key constitutional features of the EU legal order stipulates clear duties for the EU to respect the UKâs constitutional requirements and to protect, in any eventual agreement, acquired rights for EU citizens in the UK and UK citizens in the EU, by emphasizing the illegality of a non-compliant withdrawal agreement from the EU perspective
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