No exit from the euro-rescuing trap?

This paper attempts a normative assessment of the input and output-oriented legitimacy of the present euro-rescuing regime on the basis of policy analyses examining the causes of present crises, the available policy options, and the impact of the policies actually chosen. Concluding that the regime lacks input-oriented legitimacy and that its claim to output-oriented legitimacy is ambivalent at best, the paper explores potential – majoritarian or unilateral – exits from the present institutional constellation that is characterized by the synthesis of a non-democratic expertocracy and an extremely asymmetric intergovernmental bargaining system.Die hier präsentierte normative Bewertung der input- und outputorientierten Legitimität des gegenwärtigen Euro-Rettungs-Regimes stützt sich auf empirisch fundierte Aussagen zu den Ursachen der Eurokrise, den prinzipiell verfügbaren Politik-Optionen und den Wirkungen der gewählten Politik. Im Ergebnis wird eine inputorientierte Legitimation verneint, während die outputorientierte Bewertung höchst ambivalent erscheint. Im Schlussteil untersucht der Text mögliche – majoritäre oder einseitige – Auswege aus einer institutionellen Konstellation, die ein nicht demokratisches Expertenregime mit inem extrem asymmetrischen intergouvernementalen Verhandlungsregime verbindet

Toxic torts: arsenic poisoning in Bangladesh and the legal geographies of responsibility

Tubewells have been so popular in rural Bangladesh that about 12 million have been installed, yielding water that is convenient, free and low in bacteria. But every fourth well is polluted with arsenic, with the result that millions of people are exposed to a severe environmental hazard. We explore this crisis from the viewpoint of legal geographies. The case of Sutradhar v NERC is taken as an exemplar of a debate about 'proximity' between scientific consultants and aid donors on the one hand, and their clients in poor countries on the other. In short, the article is about the desirability of bringing responsibility into line with supposed generosity

Two Conceptions of Democracy in the Council of the EU: Narrow and Broad

Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Council is explicitly understood as a democratic actor in a decision-making system that is legitimated on the basis of a democratic rationale. While this formalisation in the Lisbon Treaty of the Council as a democratic actor is to be welcomed as an important step in a longer-standing process, it remains unclear which normative requirements result from it. This point is illustrated in this paper with reference to the principle of transparency. It discerns the role of transparency in two competing conceptions at the Council level, representing a narrow, and a broad perspective on democracy. It is argued that below a minimal threshold of transparency, Council democracy cannot function. Above this threshold, in turn, transparency is likely to make Council democracy function better

Smoke with Fire: Financial Crises and the Demand for Parliamentary Oversight in the European Union.

The handling of the 2008 financial crisis has reinforced the conviction that the European Union (EU) is undemocratic and that member states are forced to delegate overwhelming power to a supranational technocracy. However, European countries have engaged with this alleged power drift differently, with only a few member states demanding more parliamentary scrutiny of EU institutions. This article develops a political economy explanation for why only some states have enforced mechanisms to monitor the EU more closely. Our theory focuses on the role of the crisis and the impact of fiscal autonomy in countries outside and inside currency arrangements such as the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). We argue that, in the aftermath of a severe economic shock, member states outside the EMU possess more monetary and fiscal resources to handle the crisis. These would then demand oversight of EU decision-making if their fiscal sustainability depends on the Union. By contrast, Eurozone states that need policy changes cannot address the crisis independently or initiate reforms to scrutinize the EU. Hence, we argue that during the heated moments of severe economic downturns, parliaments in Eurozone countries discuss supranational supervision rarely. As these legislatures have nevertheless to give in to the popular demand for EU control, they express support for more EU supervision in the infrequent times of debate. We provide evidence for our theory with a cross-national analysis of EU oversight institutions, and a new original dataset of parliamentary debates during the Eurozone crisis. Our findings highlight the political consequences that financial nosedives have across the diverse membership of a supranational organization

Less Than a state, more than an international organization: The Sui generis nature of the European Union

In this paper, I show that the European Union (EU) is less than a state, but more than an international organization. Although it possesses some characteristics of both, the European Union is, I argue, a sui generis project: Although the EU wields extensive influence in some policy areas (such as competition policy or international trade regulation), its institutions’ powers are quite limited in many areas that remain firmly within the grasp of its Member States’ governments (such as security, justice, tax or redistribution policies). The European Union’s supranational elements – especially the EU laws’ supremacy over the laws of individual Member States – distinguish it, furthermore, from international organizations, such as the United Nations or the World Trade Organization. I conclude that the European Union is really a sui generis project that has not been attempted anywhere else: As such, it could be regarded as a useful case study, or perhaps even a “pilot project,” for regional integration projects elsewhere

Robust image analysis with sparse representation on quantized visual features

10.1109/TIP.2012.2219543IEEE Transactions on Image Processing223860-871IIPR