The governance of the World Bank : analysis and implications of the decisional power of the G10

This article discusses the World Bank's formal rules of governance. It states that theoretically, each of the World Bank's member states is represented within the decision making process but in practice it is otherwise. Indeed, we demonstrate that in reality the democratic imbalance in favor of the Most Developed Countries (MDCs), caused by the voting system of the WB, is much stronger than it appears. In the first place, our analysis of the formal decision making process demonstrates that the voting system is such that a coalition of particularly coordinated countries - the eleven countries of the G10 - can, on its own, constitute a majority permitting them to vote decisively on all issues. This implies that the remaining 174 members have no influence on voting results. Thus, this minority coalition alone is in position to approve loans and their attached conditions. In the second place, four features of the World Bank's governance which protect and re-enforce the power of this coalition are found. On the one hand, this analysis provides some explanations to the failure of various initiatives made to increase the voice of the Less Developed Countries (LDCs). On the other hand, it identifies several means susceptible of increasing the power of these countries in the institution. The main interest of this study shows that the democratic imbalance caused by the voting system is more important than it seems. Indeed, not only do the World Bank's formal rules of governance give the G10 the voting weight at all three levels of decision making but several governing features also permit the G10 to protect and re-enforce the power that they already have. Due to their right of veto, the MDCs can notably block any reform proposals.World Bank, governance, decision-making power, decision-making authorities, conditionality.

The governance of the World Bank : analysis and implications of the decisional power of the G10

URL des Documents de travail :http://ces.univ-paris1.fr/cesdp/CESFramDP2008.htmDocuments de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 2008.07 - ISSN : 1955-611XThis article discusses the World Bank's formal rules of governance. It states that theoretically, each of the World Bank's member states is represented within the decision making process but in practice it is otherwise. Indeed, we demonstrate that in reality the democratic imbalance in favor of the Most Developed Countries (MDCs), caused by the voting system of the WB, is much stronger than it appears. In the first place, our analysis of the formal decision making process demonstrates that the voting system is such that a coalition of particularly coordinated countries - the eleven countries of the G10 - can, on its own, constitute a majority permitting them to vote decisively on all issues. This implies that the remaining 174 members have no influence on voting results. Thus, this minority coalition alone is in position to approve loans and their attached conditions. In the second place, four features of the World Bank's governance which protect and re-enforce the power of this coalition are found. On the one hand, this analysis provides some explanations to the failure of various initiatives made to increase the voice of the Less Developed Countries (LDCs). On the other hand, it identifies several means susceptible of increasing the power of these countries in the institution. The main interest of this study shows that the democratic imbalance caused by the voting system is more important than it seems. Indeed, not only do the World Bank's formal rules of governance give the G10 the voting weight at all three levels of decision making but several governing features also permit the G10 to protect and re-enforce the power that they already have. Due to their right of veto, the MDCs can notably block any reform proposals.Cet article porte sur les règles formelles de gouvernance de la Banque Mondiale. Nous montrons que théoriquement, chaque Etat membre de la BM est représenté au sein des instances décisionnelles et participe au processus de prise de décision mais qu'en réalité, la pratique est autre. En effet, cet article démontre scientifiquement qu'en réalité le déséquilibre démocratique en faveur des PID, causé par le système de vote au poids, est plus important qu'il ne le semble. En premier lieu, notre analyse au processus formel de décision montre que le système de vote est tel qu'une coalition très minoritaire et particulièrement unifiée et coordonnée - les 11 pays du G10 - peut à elle seule constituer une majorité de circonstance et peser de façon décisive sur tous les votes. Les voix des 161 autres membres de la BM n'ont donc aucune incidence sur le résultat des votes. Cette coalition est ainsi en mesure de déterminer à elle seule l'attribution des financements et les clauses de conditionnalité qui s'y attachent. En second lieu, nous mettons en évidence quatre caractéristiques de la gouvernance de la BM qui pérennisent et renforcent le pouvoir de décision de cette coalition. Cette analyse nous permet d'une part, d'expliquer pourquoi les récentes initiatives visant à renforcer la voix des PED au sein de la BM et du FMI ont échoué et, d'autre part, d'identifier des moyens susceptibles d'accroître le pouvoir des PED. L'intérêt de cette étude est de montrer que le déséquilibre démocratique impliqué par le système de vote au poids de la BM est plus important qu'il ne le semble. En effet, non seulement, les règles de gouvernance formelles octroient aux PID (G10) le pouvoir décisionnel au sein des instances de décision de la Banque, mais, par surcroît, plusieurs caractéristiques de la gouvernance permettent aux PID (G10) de pérenniser et de renforcer le pouvoir dont ils disposent déjà. Du fait de leur droit de veto, les PID (G10) peuvent notamment s'opposer à toute proposition de réforme de la gouvernance

La gouvernance de la Banque mondiale accorde-t-elle le pouvoir décisionnel aux PID membres de l'OCDE ?

URL des Documents de travail :http://ces.univ-paris1.fr/cesdp/CESFramDP2007.htmDocuments de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 2007.25 - ISSN : 1955-611XThis article concerns the governance of the World Bank (WB) and tries to determine if it grants the decision-making power to Most Developed Countries (MDC) of the OECD. First of all, we demonstrate that these countries have effectively the decision-making power within three authorities of decision of the Bank. They are so capable of determining on their own the allocation of WB lending and conditionality. In this way, our study contributes to the literature relative to the governance of the international financial institutions (IFI) by wondering about the concrete implications of the distribution of votes within the WB. In a second time, we show that several characteristics of the governance of the WB, allow to maintain and to strengthen the power of the MDC (OECD) within the institution. The interest of this study is to show that if, not only the system of vote of the WB in proportion to the financial contributions is actually widely favourable to the MDC (OEDC), moreover, the formal rules of governance grant them the decision-making power within three authorities of decision of the Bank. This study joins in the debate concernig the legitimacy of the World Bank. If the MDC (OECD) have the decision-making power within the decision-making authorities of the WD, the multilateral character of this institution can be questioned.Cet article porte sur la gouvernance de la Banque mondiale (BM) et cherche à déterminer si elle accorde le pouvoir décisionnel aux Pays Industrialisés et Développés (PID) membres de l'OCDE. Tout d'abord, nous démontrons que ces pays disposent effectivement du pouvoir décisionnel au sein des trois instances de décision de la Banque. Ils sont ainsi en mesure de déterminer à eux seuls l'attribution des financements ainsi que les clauses de conditionnalité qui s'y attachent. Notre étude contribue de cette façon à la littérature relative à la gouvernance des institutions financières internationales (IFI) en s'interrogeant sur les implications concrètes de la répartition du poids de vote au sein de la BM. Dans un second temps, nous montrons que plusieurs caractéristiques de la gouvernance de la BM, permettent de pérenniser et de renforcer le pouvoir des PID (OCDE) au sein de l'institution. L'intérêt de cette étude est de montrer que si, non seulement le système de vote de la BM au prorata des contributions financières est, de fait, largement favorable aux PID (OCDE), par surcroît, les règles de gouvernance formelles leur octroient le pouvoir décisionnel au sein des trois instances de décision de la Banque. Cette étude s'inscrit dans le débat portant sur la légitimité de la Banque mondiale. Si les PID (OCDE) disposent du pouvoir de décision au sein des instances décisionnelles de la BM, le caractère multilatéral de cette institution peut être remis en question

Explaining the G7 and G10's influence on World Bank decisions: The role of formal and informal rules of governance

URL des Documents de travail : http://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr/bandeau-haut/documents-de-travail/Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 2013.35 - ISSN : 1955-611XThis paper contributes to the literature examining the role played by donors' interests within International Financial Institutions by showing how the G7 and G10 countries manage to influence World Bank (WB) decisions to satisfy their interests. It demonstrates that the G7 and G10 meets the two conditions required to influence WB decisions: they form a unified group (1) possessing sufficient power (2). The main thrust of the argument is that the G7 and G10 provide opportunity for big countries to come together and unify their preferences regarding WB decisions. Referring to a new dataset I find conjunctions between the G7's declarations and the WB's decisions, primarily reflecting the G7's unity and influence over the WB. Then, relying on interviews with WB officials and an examination of WB formal and informal rules of governance, I show how G7 instructions provided outside the WB through declarations are relayed within to impact decisions.Ce papier contribue à la littérature qui examine le rôle joué par les intérêts des donateurs au sein des institutions financières internationales (IFI) en montrant comment les pays du G7 et du G10 arrivent à influencer les décisions de la Banque mondiale (BM) pour satisfaire leurs intérêts. Il démontre que le G7 et le G10 réunissent les deux conditions requises pour influencer les décisions de la BM : ils forment un groupe unifié (1) qui possède suffisamment de pouvoir (2). L'argument principal est que le G7 et le G10 fournissent à leurs principaux pays membres l'opportunité de se réunir et d'unifier leurs préférences concernant les décisions de BM. L'analyse d'une nouvelle base de données permet de mettre en évidence l'existence de conjonctions entre les déclarations officielles du G7 et les décisions de la BM, reflétant en premier lieu l'unité du G7 et son influence auprès de la BM. Puis, en se reposant sur des entretiens avec des fonctionnaires de la BM et sur un examen approfondi des règles formelles et informelles de gouvernance, l'article montre comment les instructions du G7 fournies à l'extérieur du cadre de la BM, via ses déclarations officielles, sont relayées à l'intérieur et influencent les décisions

La gouvernance de la Banque mondiale accorde-t-elle le pouvoir décisionnel aux PID membres de l'OCDE ?

Cet article porte sur la gouvernance de la Banque mondiale (BM) et cherche à déterminer si elle accorde le pouvoir décisionnel aux Pays Industrialisés et Développés (PID) membres de l'OCDE. Tout d'abord, nous démontrons que ces pays disposent effectivement du pouvoir décisionnel au sein des trois instances de décision de la Banque. Ils sont ainsi en mesure de déterminer à eux seuls l'attribution des financements ainsi que les clauses de conditionnalité qui s'y attachent. Notre étude contribue de cette façon à la littérature relative à la gouvernance des institutions financières internationales (IFI) en s'interrogeant sur les implications concrètes de la répartition du poids de vote au sein de la BM. Dans un second temps, nous montrons que plusieurs caractéristiques de la gouvernance de la BM, permettent de pérenniser et de renforcer le pouvoir des PID (OCDE) au sein de l'institution. L'intérêt de cette étude est de montrer que si, non seulement le système de vote de la BM au prorata des contributions financières est, de fait, largement favorable aux PID (OCDE), par surcroît, les règles de gouvernance formelles leur octroient le pouvoir décisionnel au sein des trois instances de décision de la Banque. Cette étude s'inscrit dans le débat portant sur la légitimité de la Banque mondiale. Si les PID (OCDE) disposent du pouvoir de décision au sein des instances décisionnelles de la BM, le caractère multilatéral de cette institution peut être remis en question.Banque mondiale, gouvernance, pouvoir de décision, instances décisionnelles, conditionnalité.

NANOPHYTOPLANKTON PHYSIOLOGY AND THE CARBON CYCLE

Laboratory experiments on the physiological response of members of the nanophytoplankton to temperature and light limitation and nutrient saturation were conducted in order to investigate if nanophytoplankton conforms to Plankton Functional Types (PFTs) for modelling purposes. This thesis concluded that nanophytoplankton does not follow all of the assumed physiological traits. The Q10 estimates for members of the nanophytoplankton are considerably lower than Eppley, and since nanophytoplankton does not follow the Eppley curve at warmer temperatures, the results suggest that the Eppley assumptions cannot be used to describe nanophytoplankton. μmax0 is used as a temperature physiological modelling parameter (as well as Q10) which are components of the exponential and linear fits. However, nanophytoplankton best fits to an optimum function which uses μopt, Topt and dT as model parameters. These results are in contrast to the Eppley assumptions. Using a dynamic photosynthesis model five phytophysiological parameters were derived including the maximum photosynthesis rate

Association between Iliotibial Band Syndrome Status and Running Biomechanics in Women

Iliotibial band syndrome (ITBS) is common knee overuse injury that is twice as likely to afflict women compared to men. Etiological factors associated with ITBS include atypical biomechanics during running, as well as iliotibial band flexibility and hip abductor muscle weakness. This dissertation implemented a combination of discrete and continuous analyses to identify lower-extremity and trunk movement patterns that may be associated with ITBS injury status in female runners with current ITBS, previous ITBS, and controls. Three studies were conducted. Study 1 examined discrete joint and segment biomechanics during running, iliotibial band mechanics via musculoskeletal modeling and dynamic simulation, and hip physiological measures. Study 2 examined lower-extremity, as well as trunk – pelvis inter-segmental coupling variability using a vector coding technique. Study 3 characterized entire kinematic and kinetic waveforms using a principal components analysis approach. The findings of these studies can be summarized as follows: 1) runners with current ITBS lean their trunk more towards the stance limb than runners with previous ITBS and controls; 2) runners with previous ITBS exhibit less isometric hip abductor strength compared to controls; 3) runners with previous ITBS were more variable in frontal plane pelvis motion relative to the trunk and thigh compared to runners with current ITBS and controls; 4) a more complex movement pattern exists within pelvis and hip motion during running that cannot be explained in the first three principal components. Collectively, this information can be used by clinicians to address hip abductor muscle weakness and atypical pelvis/hip motion during running in female runners with current ITBS and previous ITBS

The effects of seasonal and latitudinal earth infrared radiance variations on ERBS attitude control

Analysis performed in the Flight Dynamics Facility by the Earth Radiation Budget Satellite (ERBS) Attitude Determination Support team illustrates the pitch attitude control motion and roll attitude errors induced by Earth infrared (IR) horizon radiance variations. IR scanner and inertial reference unit (IRU) pitch and roll flight data spanning 4 years of the ERBS mission are analyzed to illustrate the changes in the magnitude of the errors on time scales of the orbital period, months, and seasons. The analysis represents a unique opportunity to compare prelaunch estimates of radiance-induced attitude errors with flight measurements. As a consequence of this work the following additional information is obtained: an assessment of an average model of these errors and its standard deviation, a measurement to determine and verify previously proposed corrections to the current Earth IR radiance data base, and the possibility of a mean motion model derived from flight data in place of IRU data for ERBS fine attitude determination

THE INFLUENCE OF PASSIVE HIP EXTENSION ON RUNNING BIOMECHANICS

J. Stoewer1, E. Foch2, M.B Pohl1 1University of Puget Sound, Tacoma, WA; 2Central Washington University, Ellensburg, WA Restricted passive range of motion (PROM) of hip extension has been anecdotally linked with low back pain. A potential mechanism for this may be that restrictions in passive hip extension prevents the hip from fully extending during running. As a consequence, the pelvis may undergo anterior tilt to allow the thigh to extend, thus, resulting in greater loading of the lumbar spine. However, it is currently unclear whether restricted passive hip extension has any bearing on hip and pelvis biomechanics during running. PURPOSE: To determine whether runners who differ in passive hip extension also demonstrate differences in hip extension and anterior pelvic tilt during running. METHODS: Participants included 9 healthy runners (3 males, 6 females) between the ages of 18-28. Passive hip extension was measured using the Thomas Test. Kinematic data during running was collected using a 3D motion capture system. Subjects were split into three groups (tight, normal, & flexible) using tertiles based on their Thomas Test score. Both hip extension and anterior pelvic tilt during running were then compared between groups using Cohen’s effect sizes (ES). RESULTS: The tight group exhibited the least amount of hip extension during running with a large effect size (ES=0.84) when compared to the flexible group (Table 1). The tight group exhibited the greatest amount of anterior pelvic tilt with large effect sizes when compared to both the normal (ES=0.80) and flexible (ES=2.34) groups. CONCLUSION: Limited passive hip extension was linked with alterations in running biomechanics including reduced hip extension and greater anterior pelvic tilt. These kinematic alterations could potentially place greater loading the lumbar spine