Moral incentives in credit card debt repayment: evidence from a field experiment

We study the role of morality in debt repayment, using an experiment with the credit card customers of a large Islamic bank in Indonesia. In our main treatment, clients receive a text message stating that \non-repayment of debts by someone who is able to repay is an injustice." This moral appeal decreases delinquency by 4.4 percentage points from a baseline of 66 percent, and reduces default among customers with the highest ex-ante credit risk. Additional treatments help benchmark the effects against direct financial incentives, and rule out competing explanations, such as reminder effects, priming religion, and provision of new information

Clinical and virological findings in the ongoing outbreak of West Nile virus Livenza strain in northern Italy, July to September 2012.

Binary file ES_Abstracts_Final_ECDC.txt matche

Essays in Behavioral Economics

This dissertation is comprised of three essays in behavioral economics. These essays share common empirical methodologies and intellectual themes. First, each essay uses randomized controlled trials, in the form of natural field experiments or online lab experiment. Second, each paper attempts to measure economically important but difficult-to-observe determinants of behavior – moral considerations in Chapter 1, social status concerns in Chapter 2, and social norms in Chapter 3.In Chapter 1, coauthors Leonardo Bursztyn, Daniel Gottlieb, Martin Kanz and I study the role of morality in debt repayment using an experiment with credit card customers of a large Islamic bank in Indonesia. In our main treatment, clients receive a text message stating that “non-repayment of debts by someone who is able to repay is an injustice.” This increases the share of customers meeting their minimum payment by 15%, which is more than the effect of substantial financial incentives. Additional treatments help understand the underlying mechanisms and rule out competing explanations, such as reminder effects, priming religion, signaling the lender’s commitment to debt collection, and provision of new information.In Chapter 2, coauthors Leonardo Bursztyn, Bruno Ferman, Martink Kanz, Gautam Rao and I provide novel field-experimental evidence on status goods. We work with an Indonesian bank that markets platinum credit cards to high-income customers. In a first experiment, we show that demand for the platinum card greatly exceeds demand for a nondescript control product with identical benefits, suggesting demand for the pure status aspect of the card. Transaction data reveal that platinum cards are more likely to be used in social contexts, implying social image motivations. Combining price variation with information on the use of the card sheds light on the magnitude of the demand for social status. In a second experiment, we provide evidence of positional externalities from the consumption of these status goods. The final experiment shows that increasing self-esteem causally reduces demand for status goods. We infer that part of the demand for status is psychological in nature, and that social image is a substitute for self-image.Social norms are typically thought to be persistent and long-lasting, sometimes surviving through growth, recessions, and regime changes. In some cases, however, they can quickly change. In Chapter 3, coauthors Leonardo Bursztyn, Georgy Egorov and I examine the unraveling of social norms in communication when new information becomes available, e.g., aggregated through elections. We build a model of strategic communication between citizens who can hold one of two mutually exclusive opinions. In our model, agents communicate their opinions to each other, and senders care about receivers’ approval. As a result, senders are more likely to express the more popular opinion, while receivers make less inference about senders who stated the popular view. We test these predictions using two experiments. In the main experiment, we identify the causal effect of Donald Trump’s rise in political popularity on individuals’ willingness to publicly express xenophobic views. Participants in the experiment are offered a bonus reward if they authorize researchers to make a donation to an anti-immigration organization on their behalf. Participants who expect their decision to be observed by the surveyor are significantly less likely to accept the offer than those expecting an anonymous choice. Increases in participants’ perceptions of Trump’s popularity (either through experimental variation or through the “natural experiment" of his victory) eliminate the wedge between private and public behavior. A second experiment uses dictator games to show that participants judge a person less negatively for publicly expressing (but not for privately holding) a political view they disagree with if that person’s social environment is one where the majority of people holds that view

Reporting peers’ wrongdoing: evidence on the effect of incentives on morally controversial behavior

I show that offering monetary rewards to whistleblowers can backfire as a moral aversion to being paid for harming others can reverse the effect of financial incentives. I run a field experiment with employees of the Afghan Ministry of Education, who are asked to confidentially report on their colleagues’ attendance. I use a two-by-two design, randomizing whether or not reporting absence carries a monetary incentive as well as the perceived consequentiality of the reports. In the consequential treatment arm, where employees are given examples of the penalties that might be imposed on absentees, 15% of participants choose to denounce their peers when reports are not incentivized. In this consequential group, rewards backfire: only 10% of employees report when denunciations are incentivized. In the non-consequential group, where participants are guaranteed that their reports will not be forwarded to the government, only 6% of employees denounce absence without rewards. However, when moral concerns of harming others are limited through the guarantee of non-consequentiality, rewards do not backfire: the incentivized reporting rate is 12%

Corruption and legislature size: evidence from Brazil

This paper studies whether and how legislatures affect political corruption. Using a regression discontinuity design in the context of Brazilian municipalities, we find a positive causal impact of council size on corruption levels, as detected by random federal audits. This indicates that an extra councilor represents an additional political actor potentially interested in diverting public resources, which we define as a rent extraction effect. However, we find further evidence that, in some contexts, larger councils enhance the representation of opposition parties and effectively increase monitoring over the executive, attenuating the rent extraction effect. Namely, in municipalities where opposition parties are typically underrepresented, the additional seat in the council is absorbed by the opposition and corruption outcomes do not worsen. In addition, only in such context, mayors are more commonly sentenced for misconduct in office by judicial authorities, whose investigations anecdotally often originates from councilors denouncing mayors to local courts. Overall, our findings show that legislature size is detrimental to corruption outcomes but less so where the representation of opposition parties improves with the enlargement of the legislature

From extreme to mainstream: the erosion of social norms

Social norms, usually persistent, can change quickly when new public information arrives, such as a surprising election outcome. People may become more inclined to express views or take actions previously perceived as stigmatized and may judge others less negatively for doing so. We examine this possibility using two experiments. We first show via revealed preference experiments that Donald Trump’s rise in popularity and eventual victory increased individuals’ willingness to publicly express xenophobic views. We then show that individuals are sanctioned less negatively if they publicly expressed a xenophobic view in an environment where that view is more popular. (JEL D72, D85, Z13

Status goods: experimental evidence from platinum credit cards

This article provides field-experimental evidence on status goods. We work with an Indonesian bank that markets platinum credit cards to high-income customers. In a first experiment, we show that demand for the platinum card exceeds demand for a nondescript control product with identical benefits, suggesting demand for the pure status aspect of the card. Transaction data reveal that platinum cards are more likely to be used in social contexts, implying social image motivations. In a second experiment, we provide evidence of positional externalities from the consumption of these status goods. A final experiment provides suggestive evidence that increasing self-esteem causally reduces demand for status goods, indicating that social image might be a substitute for self-image

It Is Not Just a Matter of Noise: Sciaena umbra Vocalizes More in the Busiest Areas of the Venice Tidal Inlets

Boat noise is known to have a detrimental effect on a vulnerable Mediterranean sciaenid, the brown meagre Sciaena umbra. During summer 2019, two acoustic surveys were conducted at 40 listening points distributed within the inlet areas of Venice (northern Adriatic Sea). Two five-minute recordings were collected per each point during both the boat traffic hours and the peak of the species’ vocal activity with the aims of (1) characterizing the local noise levels and (2) evaluating the fish spatial distribution by means of its sounds. High underwater broadband noise levels were found (sound pressure levels (SPLs)50–20kHz 107–137 dB re 1 μPa). Interestingly, a significantly higher background noise within the species’ hearing sensibility (100–3150 Hz) was highlighted in the afternoon (113 ± 5 dB re 1 μPa) compared to the night (103 ± 7 dB re 1 μPa) recordings due to a high vessel traffic. A cluster analysis based on Sciaena umbra vocalizations separated the listening points in three groups: highly vocal groups experienced higher vessel presence and higher afternoon noise levels compared to the lower ones. Since the species’ sounds are a proxy of spawning events, this suggests that the reproductive activity was placed in the noisier part of the inlets