154 research outputs found
Experiments to investigate particulate materials in reduced gravity fields
Study investigates agglomeration and macroscopic behavior in reduced gravity fields of particles of known properties by measuring and correlating thermal and acoustical properties of particulate materials. Experiment evaluations provide a basis for a particle behavior theory and measure bulk properties of particulate materials in reduced gravity
False-Name Manipulation in Weighted Voting Games is Hard for Probabilistic Polynomial Time
False-name manipulation refers to the question of whether a player in a
weighted voting game can increase her power by splitting into several players
and distributing her weight among these false identities. Analogously to this
splitting problem, the beneficial merging problem asks whether a coalition of
players can increase their power in a weighted voting game by merging their
weights. Aziz et al. [ABEP11] analyze the problem of whether merging or
splitting players in weighted voting games is beneficial in terms of the
Shapley-Shubik and the normalized Banzhaf index, and so do Rey and Rothe [RR10]
for the probabilistic Banzhaf index. All these results provide merely
NP-hardness lower bounds for these problems, leaving the question about their
exact complexity open. For the Shapley--Shubik and the probabilistic Banzhaf
index, we raise these lower bounds to hardness for PP, "probabilistic
polynomial time", and provide matching upper bounds for beneficial merging and,
whenever the number of false identities is fixed, also for beneficial
splitting, thus resolving previous conjectures in the affirmative. It follows
from our results that beneficial merging and splitting for these two power
indices cannot be solved in NP, unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses,
which is considered highly unlikely
Nearly optimal solutions for the Chow Parameters Problem and low-weight approximation of halfspaces
The \emph{Chow parameters} of a Boolean function
are its degree-0 and degree-1 Fourier coefficients. It has been known
since 1961 (Chow, Tannenbaum) that the (exact values of the) Chow parameters of
any linear threshold function uniquely specify within the space of all
Boolean functions, but until recently (O'Donnell and Servedio) nothing was
known about efficient algorithms for \emph{reconstructing} (exactly or
approximately) from exact or approximate values of its Chow parameters. We
refer to this reconstruction problem as the \emph{Chow Parameters Problem.}
Our main result is a new algorithm for the Chow Parameters Problem which,
given (sufficiently accurate approximations to) the Chow parameters of any
linear threshold function , runs in time \tilde{O}(n^2)\cdot
(1/\eps)^{O(\log^2(1/\eps))} and with high probability outputs a
representation of an LTF that is \eps-close to . The only previous
algorithm (O'Donnell and Servedio) had running time \poly(n) \cdot
2^{2^{\tilde{O}(1/\eps^2)}}.
As a byproduct of our approach, we show that for any linear threshold
function over , there is a linear threshold function which
is \eps-close to and has all weights that are integers at most \sqrt{n}
\cdot (1/\eps)^{O(\log^2(1/\eps))}. This significantly improves the best
previous result of Diakonikolas and Servedio which gave a \poly(n) \cdot
2^{\tilde{O}(1/\eps^{2/3})} weight bound, and is close to the known lower
bound of (1/\eps)^{\Omega(\log \log (1/\eps))}\} (Goldberg,
Servedio). Our techniques also yield improved algorithms for related problems
in learning theory
Am empirical comparison of the performance of classical power indices
Power indices are general measures of the relative voting power of individual members of a voting body. They are useful in helping understand and design voting bodies particularly those which employ weighted voting, in which different members having different numbers of votes. It is well known that in such bodies a member's voting power, in the sense of their capacity to affect the outcomes of votes called, rarely corresponds to the actual number of votes allocated to him. Many voting bodies for which this is an important consideration exist: examples include international organisations (notably the World Bank, the IMF, the European Union), the US presidential Electoral College and corporations in which votes are proportionate to stockholdings.
Two classical power indices dominate the literature: the Shapley-Shubik index and the Banzhaf index (also known by other names). Both are based on the idea that a member's power depends on the relative number of times they can change a coalition from losing to winning by joining it and adding their vote. They may be defined in probabilistic terms as the probability of being able to swing the result of a vote, where all possible outcomes are taken as equiprobable. The indices differ however in the way they count voting coalitions. In probabilistic terms they use different coalition models and therefore differ in precisely what is meant by equiprobable outcomes.
The indices have been used in a number of empirical applications but their relative performance has remained an open question for many years, a factor, which has hindered the wider acceptance of the approach.
Where both the indices have been used for the same case, they have often given different results, sometimes substantially so, and theoretical studies of their properties have not been conclusive. There is therefore a need for comparative testing of their relative performance in practical contexts. Very little work of this type has been done however for a number of reasons: lack of independent indicators of power in actual voting bodies with which to compare them, difficulties in obtaining consistent data on a voting body over time with sufficient variation in the disposition of votes among members of actual legislatures and the lack of independent criteria against which the results of the indices may be judged. It has also been hampered to some extent by lack of easily available algorithms for computing the indices in large games.
This paper assesses the indices against a set of reasonable criteria in terms of shareholder voting power and the control of the corporation in a large cross section of British companies. Each company is a separate voting body and there is much variation in the distribution of voting shares among them. Moreover reasonable criteria exist against which to judge the indices. New algorithms for the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices are applied to detailed data on beneficial ownership of 444 large UK companies without majority control. Because some of the data is missing, both finite and oceanic games of shareholder voting are studied to overcome this problem.
The results, judged against these criteria, are unfavorable to the Shapley-Shubik index and suggest that the Banzhaf index much better reflects the variations in the power of shareholders between companies as the weights of shareholder blocks vary
Equitable representation in councils: theory and an application to the United Nations Security Council
We analyze democratic equity in council voting games (CVGs). In a CVG, a
voting body containing all members delegates decision-making to a (time-varying) subset
of its members, as describes, e.g., the relationship between the United Nations General
Assembly and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). We develop a theoretical
framework for analyzing democratic equitability in CVGs at both the country and region
levels, and for different assumptions regarding preference correlation. We apply the
framework to evaluate the equitability of the UNSC, and the claims of those who seek to
reform it. We find that the individual permanent members are overrepresented by between
21.3 times (United Kingdom) and 3.8 times (China) from a country-level perspective,
while from a region perspective Eastern Europe is the most heavily overrepresented region
with more than twice its equitable representation, and Africa the most heavily underrepresented.
Our equity measures do not preclude some UNSC members from exercising veto
rights, however
Voting Power in the EU Council of Ministers and Fair Decision Making in Distributive Politics
Forecasting European Union politics: Real-time forecasts in political time series analysis
Clinical utility of tibial motor and sensory nerve conduction studies with motor recording from the flexor hallucis brevis: a methodological and reliability study
<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>Standard tibial motor nerve conduction measures are established with recording from the abductor hallucis. This technique is often technically challenging and clinicians have difficulty interpreting the information particularly in the short segment needed to assess focal tibial nerve entrapment at the medial ankle as occurs in posterior tarsal tunnel syndrome. The flexor hallucis brevis (FHB) has been described as an alternative site for recording tibial nerve function in those with posterior tarsal tunnel syndrome. Normative data has not been established for this technique. This pilot study describes the technique in detail. In addition we provide reference values for medial and lateral plantar orthodromic sensory measures and assessed intrarater reliability for all measures.</p> <p>Methods</p> <p>Eighty healthy female participants took part, and 39 returned for serial testing at 4 time points. Mean values ± SD were recorded for nerve conduction measures, and coefficient of variation as well as intraclass correlation coefficients (ICC) were calculated.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>Motor latency, amplitude and velocity values for the FHB were 4.1 ± 0.9 msec, 8.0 ± 3.0 mV and 45.6 ± 3.4 m/s, respectively. Sensory latencies, amplitudes, and velocities, respectively, were 2.8 ± 0.3 msec, 26.7 ± 10.1 μV, and 41.4 ± 3.5 m/s for the medial plantar nerve and 3.2 ± 0.5 msec, 13.3 ± 4.7 μV, and 44.3 ± 4.0 msec for the lateral plantar nerve. All values demonstrated significant ICC values (<it>P </it>≤ 0.007).</p> <p>Conclusion</p> <p>Motor recording from the FHB provides technically clear waveforms that allow for an improved ability to assess tibial nerve function in the short segments used to assess tarsal tunnel syndrome. The reported means will begin to establish normal values for this technique.</p
How the Fed Reanimated Wall Street: The Low and Extended Lending Rates that Revived the Big Banks
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