GORUĆA GRANICA. Komaprativna studija tršćanskog pitanja i drugih teritorijalnih problema s kojima se Italija suočila nakon poraza u Drugome svjetskom ratu (Sažetak)

The article describes why the Trieste issue is the only one of the territorial disputes Italy had with neighbouring countries at the end of the Second World War that still influences Italian public opinion and policy. The first part of the work briefly describes the problem that Italy had with its former colonies, and with France, Austria and Yugoslavia. While the topic is not discussed in detail for the sake of brevity, emphasis has been placed to the mutual impact each of these territorial issues had on the others during the period when the looming Cold War influenced all of them. The second half of the article explains what made the Trieste issue unique and why it still plays an important role in the Italian national consciousness. The article is based on Italian, Croatian and Slovenian historiography and refers, for specific aspects, to documents from the Office of the Marshal of Yugoslavia (Fond 836 - Arhiv Jugoslavije) and the Political Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia (PA - DAMSP).U članku se objašnjava zašto je, od svih teritorijalnih pitanja koja je Italija imala sa zemljama u susjedstvu na kraju Drugog svjetskog rata, tršćansko jedino koje još uvijek utječe na talijansko javno mnijenje i politiku. U prvom se dijelu članka ukratko opisuje teritorijalni spor koji je Italija imala s Francuskom, talijanskim bivšim kolonijama, Austrijom i Jugoslavijom. Ta su pitanja promatrana u glavnim crtama radi konciznosti, s fokusom na uzajamni utjecaj koji su međusobno imali jedna na druge u fazi kad je početak hladnog rata utjecao na sve njih. U drugom se dijelu članka objašnjava zašto je tršćansko pitanje tako posebno i zašto još uvijek igra važnu ulogu u talijanskoj nacionalnoj svijesti. Članak se temelji na radovima talijanske, hrvatske i slovenske historiografije, a kako bi se bolje objasnilo određene detalje, korišteno je nekoliko dokumenata iz Kancelarije Maršala Jugoslavije (Fond 836 - Arhiv Jugoslavije) te Političkog arhiva Ministarstva vanjskih poslova Republike Srbije (PA - DAMSP)

GORUĆA GRANICA. Komaprativna studija tršćanskog pitanja i drugih teritorijalnih problema s kojima se Italija suočila nakon poraza u Drugome svjetskom ratu (Sažetak)

The article describes why the Trieste issue is the only one of the territorial disputes Italy had with neighbouring countries at the end of the Second World War that still influences Italian public opinion and policy. The first part of the work briefly describes the problem that Italy had with its former colonies, and with France, Austria and Yugoslavia. While the topic is not discussed in detail for the sake of brevity, emphasis has been placed to the mutual impact each of these territorial issues had on the others during the period when the looming Cold War influenced all of them. The second half of the article explains what made the Trieste issue unique and why it still plays an important role in the Italian national consciousness. The article is based on Italian, Croatian and Slovenian historiography and refers, for specific aspects, to documents from the Office of the Marshal of Yugoslavia (Fond 836 - Arhiv Jugoslavije) and the Political Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia (PA - DAMSP).U članku se objašnjava zašto je, od svih teritorijalnih pitanja koja je Italija imala sa zemljama u susjedstvu na kraju Drugog svjetskog rata, tršćansko jedino koje još uvijek utječe na talijansko javno mnijenje i politiku. U prvom se dijelu članka ukratko opisuje teritorijalni spor koji je Italija imala s Francuskom, talijanskim bivšim kolonijama, Austrijom i Jugoslavijom. Ta su pitanja promatrana u glavnim crtama radi konciznosti, s fokusom na uzajamni utjecaj koji su međusobno imali jedna na druge u fazi kad je početak hladnog rata utjecao na sve njih. U drugom se dijelu članka objašnjava zašto je tršćansko pitanje tako posebno i zašto još uvijek igra važnu ulogu u talijanskoj nacionalnoj svijesti. Članak se temelji na radovima talijanske, hrvatske i slovenske historiografije, a kako bi se bolje objasnilo određene detalje, korišteno je nekoliko dokumenata iz Kancelarije Maršala Jugoslavije (Fond 836 - Arhiv Jugoslavije) te Političkog arhiva Ministarstva vanjskih poslova Republike Srbije (PA - DAMSP)

Politics of memory for post-ideological times: The Case of Italy

Gdje su izvori i koji su razlozi procesa povijesnog revizionizma koji se od devedesetih sve jače i češće pojavljuje u raznim europskih zemljama i koje bi mogle biti njegove posljedice na odnose između zemalja članica Europske unije? Kako spriječiti sukob oko interpretacije povijesti koji utječe na samu srž pojma europske konfederacije? Članak pokušava dati odgovor na ta pitanja polazeći od analize razloga krize antifašizma, kao i drugih političkih i kulturnih faktora koji su ukorijenjeni u događajima iz devedesetih te s kraja Hladnog rata i rušenja komunističkih režima u srednjoj i istočnoj Europi. Konkretno istraživanje odnosi se na slučaj Italije, gdje se “bitka sjećanja” i revizionizma vodi oko tzv. fojbi, istarskih kraških jama u kojima je stradalo nekoliko stotina Talijana za vrijeme ustanka u jesen 1943. godine. Tijekom zadnjih dvadeset godina taj povijesni događaj, o kojem skoro nitko ništa nije znao i koji je imao marginalnu ulogu u širem kontekstu talijanskog sudjelovanja u Drugom svjetskom ratu, postao je povijesni mit sa svojim službenim “danom sjećanja”, uzdignutim na razinu Dana sjećanja na Holokaust. Budući da je 2007. godine upravo oko sjećanja na fojbe došlo do diplomatskog sukoba između predsjednikâ Italije i Hrvatske, Giorgia Napolitana i Stjepana Mesića, sukoba koji je kasnije riješen potpisivanjem sporazuma o povijesnom pomirenju između Italije, Hrvatske i Slovenije u Trstu 2010. godine, fojbe su predstavljale izvrstan primjer analize “rata” na području interpretacije povijesti koji se nedavno pojavio u više krajeva Europe i koji ugrožava međunarodne odnose, ali i stanja unutar pojedinih država.Where are the sources and what are the reasons for the process of historical revisionism that emerged in many European countries in the beginning of the nineties? Is it possible to avoid conflicts around different interpretations of history that affect the core of the concept of European integration? The article is focused on the crisis of antifascist interpretation of the past in Italy, which is rooted in the events of the nineties. In particular, two events and processes have shaken the dominant discourses: the end of the Cold war and the collapse of communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. The focus of the research is on the Italian case, where the war of memories mainly revolved around the so-called foibe, the Istrian carsic caves in which hundreds of Italians perished in the Autumn of 1943. In the span of twenty years a historic event that only a few knew about and which played a marginal role in the bigger picture of the Italian engagement in WWII has been transformed into a historic myth with its official “Remembrance day” and put at the same level of importance as the memory of the Shoah. The new official politics of remembering the victims of the foibe has triggered a diplomatic crisis between Italy and Croatia, which has later been solved with the signing of a memorandum on historic reconciliation in Trieste in 2010 (jointly with Slovenia). The foibe case is here placed into a wider context of revisionism in interpretation of history of the Second World War and of immediate post-War events, which is currently happening in many parts of Europe – not only former Eastern Europe – and which may complicate bilateral relations between various countries, but also wider international relations

Communists of a different kind: the pro-Yugoslav trend in Italy (1948-1962)

The article aimes to present an overview of the Yugoslavian political influence in Italy from the expulsion from the Cominform till the final discharge of the pro-Yugoslavian Italian party Unione socialista indipendente. The authors based the preparation of the article on the outcomes of the Italian and post-Yugoslavian historiography and in particular on former Yugoslav archive documents. The so far developed researches about the topic have been driven by a special attention on the two members of parliament of the Italian Communist Party (Partito Comunista Italiano) Aldo Cucchi and Valdo Magnani that were expelled from their party and basically supported and funded by the Yugoslavian government. Starting from that, the current work provides a broader overview of the actions that Yugoslavia engaged in Italy and it wants also to reach a final evaluation

Yugoslavia and the issue of Trieste 1945-1954.

La presente tesi di dottorato mira a ricostruire finora la strategia diplomatica jugoslava attorno alla questione di Trieste. Prima di affrontare il lavoro di scavo archivistico è stato necessario lo studio intensivo della bibliografia sulla questione di Trieste disponibile nelle tre lingue a me note, italiano inglese e croato. Venendo agli archivi, il lavoro di ricerca si è concentrato per quanto riguarda Belgrado Diplomatski arhiv ministarstva spoljnih poslova, nell’Arhiv Jugoslavije e nel Vojni Arhiv. A Zagabria sono inoltre stati consultati i fondi pertinenti del Državni arhiv, mentre a Lubiana ci si è concentrati sull'Arhiv Republike Slovenije. Dal punto di vista cronologico si è scelto di focalizzarsi sul periodo che va dalla primavera del 1945, quando Trieste viene liberata da truppe jugoslave, all'autunno del 1954, anno della firma del Memorandum di Londra. Nell'impossibilità di procedere ad una divisione tematica senza pesanti interferenze sulla successione cronologica degli eventi, si è optato per una narrazione cronologica al cui interno affrontare i principali nodi tematici. La tesi risulta quindi suddivisa in tre capitoli. Il primo affronta la storia diplomatica della questione di Trieste fino alla risoluzione del Cominform del 1948. Il secondo capitolo prende l'abbrivio dalla risoluzione del 1948 e ricostruisce i tentativi di accordo diretto con l'Italia – tutti patrocinati dalle grandi Potenze – nel 1950 e a cavallo tra 1951 e 1952, oltre al fatto, finora inedito, che la rafforzata posizione internazionale della Jugoslavia abbia portato Tito nel corso del 1953 a ritenere che fosse possibile pervenire ad una soluzione del problema confinario tale che « la Zona A non venga ceduta all’Italia ma invece rimanga, o per meglio dire diventi neutrale e si colleghi alla Jugoslavia». Il terzo capitolo è dedicato integralmente alla ricostruzione delle concitate trattative diplomatiche scaturite dall'emanazione della Decisione dell'8 ottobre (1953), in base alla quale la Zona A sarebbe stata consegnata all'Italia in assenza di garanzie precise sulla Zona B per la Jugoslavia. La tesi principale è che, dopo aver coltivato l'illusione di poter conquistare Trieste alla Jugsolavia ancora nella primavera del 1953, all'indomani della Nota bipartita i vertici jugoslavi abbiano fatto ricorso alla questione triestina per allentare i legami con l'Occidente e avviare una politica di equidistanza tra i due blocchi.In the phase of construction and strengthening of the communist regime, ranging from the last months of the Second World War to the expulsion of the country from the Cominform, Yugoslavia challenged the Western Powers in every possible way. The foreign policy pursued by Tito, especially around territorial issues, was definitively aggressive in nature, This was also due to the support of the Soviet Union, which was soon to be proved less firm than it was initially supposed. The style of Yugoslavia’s foreign policy was certainly meant to look different in style than the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, whose international weakness had been a stable source of discontent. It was clear that by proving successful in defending the national issues the regime wanted to gain the support of the masses, which otherwise looked at communism with skepticism. For this reason Yugoslavia did put every effort to liberate Trieste, Gorizia, most of the Venezia Giulia region and Klagenfurt where a Slovene minority was also present. When the firm attitude of the Anglo-Americans convinced the Soviets to pressure the Yugoslavs to talk, they reluctantly agreed to move their troops beyond the so called “Morgan line”, still hoping to conveniently address the issue with the talks planned in Belgrade and Duino. As the subsequent agreements didn’t meet Yugoslavia’s expectations, every effort was then made to influence the outcome of the Paris Peace conference. Naïve as it may sound, the Yugoslav elite took the challenge quite seriously. Besides trying to address the conference’s proceedings, a big commitment was made to influence the public opinion of the countries involved in the works, especially France where some of the members of the Yugoslav delegation (especially Ambassador Ristić and professor Roglić) retained personal contacts established in the Thirties already. While the works of the Peace conference were still under way, the logic of the Cold war was developing quickly. One can agree with Valdevit’s statement that the Peace conference has been «a stage of secondary importance of the American foreign policy»1 left to the former Secretary of State James Francis Byrnes. This explains why the main outcome of the Conference concerning the issue of Trieste, the creation of the Trieste Free Territory, looked a lot like the solutions for disputed areas, such as Danzig and the Memel territory, which were approved after the end of the First World War. Apart for the Free territory of Trieste Yugoslavia did benefit by the mediation of France, which proposed a compromise between the different border proposals submitted by the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom in order the achieve the Soviet support in the dispute France had with Germany over the Saar region. Soon after the signing of the Peace treaty on February the 10th 1947 it became clear already that the FTT was never to be translated into reality. Announced on March the 12th 1947, the Truman doctrine showed that the Antifascist coalition had definitely come already to an end. For this reason the USA and the UK boycotted the appointment of the Governor, which was the ultimate step towards the activation of the FTT. Their aim was to keep the Territory on hold, which would have given to the Western troops already present in the area the right to police the southern sector of the Iron Curtain. For the opposite reason – to get rid of Western troops at the borders of one of its allies - the Soviet Union supported the appointment of the Governor, a strategy which also Yugoslavia, albeit half-heartedly (it would have lost control over the “B Zone”), also pursued. During this time the Italian communist party was standing at a crossroad between its participation to the government of Italy and its loyalty to Moscow. To get rid of the dilemma Togliatti came up with the idea to solve the border issue through direct talks with Tito. The outcome of such talks, known by the name of the Tito – Togliatti agreement, was the proposal to give Gorizia to Yugoslavia in exchange for Trieste, which would have been immediately transferred to Italy. The proposal had no success in Italy. If accepted, it would have struck a blow to the prowestern orientation of the country’s foreign policy, an event the centre-right could not permit. In any case a similar agreement was presented by Togliatti once again in 19482 , soon after the Western Powers had released a joint statement, the Tripartite Declaration, hoping the handover to Italy of the whole FTT. In Italy the Tripartite declaration – which, without the consent of the Soviet Union, was clearly void – started a trend of exploitation of the Trieste issue in order to gain political support for the political parties of the right. Like the Declaration issued on March the 20th 1948 was meant to influence the outcome of the upcoming general elections, so the negotiations which took place in the years to come were all connected to the domestic policy of Italy. In the end of the day the line followed by De Gasperi embodies the sacrifice of the border issue and relations with Yugoslavia for the sake of political consensus. When, after the expulsion from the Cominform, Yugoslavia’s position on the stage of the Cold War begun improving steadily, Italy took no action to favorably get rid of the Trieste issue, which stood on hold for years. This state of things lasted until the formation of the Pella government in the summer of 1953, a government whose formation was clearly devoted to the finding of a solution to the issue of Trieste after it had become clear that the situation had to be addressed before Yugoslavia’s position was to further strengthen. Coming to Yugoslavia, the comparatively little success at the North was compensated, after the end of the Second World War, by the aggressive foreign policy implemented in the South. At the time the Greek partisans enjoyed full Yugoslav operational support. This happened because if a communist regime was to take power in Greece thank to Yugoslavia, the latter could claim the Greek part of Macedonia. At the same time Albania, or, to put it down as Vladimir Velebit did in an interview released in the late Nineties, «the Albanian communists, [who were] as children fully depending by Yugoslav assistance since the days when Popović, Mugoša and Tempo had created their communist party»3 enjoyed the status of a semi-colony. The country had no full control over its borders. Yugo-Albanian joint companies were also started following the example of the Soviet Union in its satellites. In this context, on August the 1st 1947 it was signed the Bled agreement, also known as the Tito – Dimitrov agreement. It was a pact of friendship and co-operation between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia meant to evolve towards the inclusion of the first in the Yugoslav federation. The plan was that Bulgaria was to cede its part of the geographic region of Macedonia to the Yugoslav republic of the same name. Also Albania had to join such enlarged Yugoslavia. It was to get Kosovo in return for the favor4 . The Yugoslav projects of hegemony in the Balkans, together with the aggressive policy towards the West5 , are the real reason behind the expulsion of the country from the Comintern, which has been formalized on June the 28th 1948. The Tito-Stalin split had obviously important consequences for the internal and foreign politics of Yugoslavia. It was also an event of first importance in the history of the Cold War. Sticking to the Trieste issue, it had important effects both in loco and at the international level. In the Free territory of Trieste the more obvious consequence was the split of the local communist party, which resulted in two communist parties. The first and most influential, pro Italian, was guided by the charismatic figure Vittorio Vidali. The other, pro Yugoslav, was guided by Branko Babič. At the international political level, the exclusion of Yugoslavia from the list of satellites of the Soviet Union had the effect to “freeze” the Tripartite Declaration which had been issued only three months before. The Western Powers needed some time to develop a new and more balanced approach over the issue of Trieste. The move towards the West of Yugoslavia – a move with no viable alternative – begun to show its effects since late 1949, once it was clear not only that the split between Tito a Stalin was not a joke, but also that the first was able to withstand the pressure from the latter’s hostility. Between the end of 1949 and the first months of 1950 Yugoslavia received the first loans granted by world leading banks thank to the intervention of the USA. Economic assistance intensified towards the end of the year, when the Mutual defence aid program was signed. With such a move Yugoslavia became the first socialist country to receive American funding in the frame of the NATO, or, to borrow the title of one of Tvrtko Jakovina’s books, the American socialist ally. The better relations between Yugoslavia and the West, which, besides loans and weapons, also exposed the people of Yugoslavia to western cultural influences, did not concern Italy. Because of the issue of Trieste relations between the two countries mirrored - to a lesser extent - those between Yugoslavia and the East. The atmosphere in the border area stood tense, frequent press campaigns were organized to attack the other country and diplomats worked in total isolation both in Belgrade and Rome. The case of Vladimir Velebit, Ambassador of Yugoslavia in Rome in 1952, stands symbolic. Anyhow, as a consequence of the help received, Yugoslavia made with time some political concessions to the West. Political propaganda was moderated in its anti western tones and also the policy towards the Catholic Church got tempered, so that the Archbishop of Zagreb Stepinac, who was in jail since 1946, was granted house arrest towards the end of 1951. Also in the matter of the Trieste issue it was decided to move some steps in order to meet the desire of the Western powers, which was to see the relations between Italy and Yugoslavia improve. As the two countries were part of the same “side”, it was rational for them to cooperate at least in the military field, in case of a Soviet attack on the West. The first of such “steps” was made in 1949 already, when a Yugoslavia still in state of emergency introduced the idea that the Free Territory of Trieste could be partitioned between the two bordering countries. Things developed in 1950 with a programme of negotiations between the Italian Minister of the Foreign Affairs Sforza and the Ambassador of Italy to Yugoslavia Martino and their Yugoslav counterparts Kardelj and Iveković. The fact that the Western Powers were reluctant to put a strong pressure on the two contenders determined the failure of the talks, which stopped at a very early stage. It is true that while Italy still stuck to the Tripartite Declaration, Yugoslavia at least continued to offer some form of partition of the disputed land. At the same time there are elements which suggest that Yugoslavia just wanted to show that it was “playing its role” and blame only Italy for the breakdown of the talks. In such a game Yugoslavia was helped by Italy’s unwillingness to compromise beyond a shadow of a doubt. The next – and more official - round of talks on Trieste happened in Paris in the months between 1951 and 1952. The negotiators appointed were Bebler and Guidotti, delegate of Italy to the United Nations. Many important international events had strengthened Yugoslavia’s negotiation position in the last year and half. The most important was certainly the outbreak of the Korea war. Because of the dynamics of that conflict, many believed that Yugoslavia would be the next victim of the Soviet Union. For this reason Yugoslavia was admitted to membership in the Mutual defence aid program. As a consequence of the new importance of Yugoslavia, on March 1951 the Western powers issued a statement hoping that the Trieste issue may be solved through direct negotiations between Italy and Yugoslavia, de facto infringing the Tripartite Declaration on the anniversary of its announcement. In the following months both the American and English diplomacies undertook surveys to determine if, instead of dividing the FTT in its zones of occupation, it was possible to address the issue through land exchanges. The move was appreciated by the Yugoslav leadership as an additional tool to jeopardize the diplomatic process around Trieste without carrying any responsibility for its failure. The Yugoslav approach to the negotiations held between 1951 and 1952 was then to show itself open to all of the different approaches the Western Powers had tried so far, proposing now one, now the other. The Paris negotiation stands important because there two new “solutions” made their appearance. The first was the request of an access to the sea for Yugoslavia in the suburbs of Trieste, an idea that would be submitted again in subsequent negotiations. The second solution was the activation of the FTT on condition that instead of by the Governor the Territory would be governed by Italy and Yugoslavia alternating. After the failure of the Paris negotiation Yugoslavia achieved another success. It was managed to resize the placing of Italian employees into the management bodies of the AngloAmerican occupational zone of the FTT as a move meant to solve the Trieste issue with the de facto partition of the FTT. During the summer of 1952 Tito in person circumvented the attempt made by the Western Powers to put pressure on Yugoslavia in order to bring the problem of the border with Italy to an end. After that, the issue was raised once again by the Foreign Secretary of the Unied Kingdom Anthony Eden, during the visit he paid to Yugoslavia in September. The Italian historiography tends to put the focus on the fact that during Eden’s visit Tito and Kardelj accepted the partitioning of the FTT provided the measure would be presented as an imposition of the Western Powers. The extensive research made on Yugoslav documents proves that the Yugoslav leadership agreed to Eden’s proposal only after much insistence. The meeting specifically devoted to the issue was summoned upon his request. It is also to be noted that not later that the very next day Brilej already resurrected the approach based on the access to the sea for Yugoslavia in the suburbs of Trieste when talking with the Ambassador of the United Kingdom to Yugoslavia Dixon. Despite Yugoslavia’s reluctance, it is probably true that if the Western Powers were to impose the solution soon after Eden’s visit, Tito would have accepted it. It was not the case. The United State’s diplomacy was not able to play such a move in the run-up to the 1952 presidential election, which was won by General Dwight D. Eisenhower on November the 4th. The question arises of whether Tito and his comrades ran a bluff to Eden assuming the proposal wouldn't have a future. It was probably the case. At the turn of 1952 and 1953 two major events further strengthened Yugoslavia’s international position. The first was the military talks with the Western Powers which took place in the month of November 1952. Their aim was to harmonize Yugoslavia’s strategic plans with the ones of the NATO. Although unsuccessful, the talks well symbolize the levels achieved in cooperation between Yugoslavia and the West. The second and most important event was the signing, on February the 28th 1953, of the Balkan Pact. This was basically a pact of friendship and cooperation between Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey. Despite the absence of military clauses – Greece and Turkey were NATO members and their defensive plans were a military secret the Pact was significant in its positive impact on the economy of Yugoslavia. Furthermore, the Western Powers gave green light to its ratification despite Italy’s firm opposition. The country’s Prime Minister, Alcide De Gasperi, had also tried – to no effect - to put pressure on Greece to convince it not to sign the Pact. Even assuming that Yugoslavia would have agreed to be bended to the NATO in early 1952 if the West didn’t oppose it, things were to change in a matter of days. Just one week after the signing of the Balkan Pact the death of Stalin came to create fresh opportunities for Yugoslavia’s foreign policy. Despite the Yugoslav elite did its best to reassure its Western partners that no reproaching with the Soviet Union was looming on the horizon, the first steps in the direction of a different and more balanced relationship with Moscow were taken pretty soon. Diplomatic and economic relations were also quickly, although with a certain diffidence and not to full extent, restored. During Tito’s visit to London, two weeks after Stalin’s death, Tito refused to solve the issue of Trieste according to Eden’s proposal of September 1952. He proposed in return the usual mix of inconsistent approaches to the problem, including direct talks with Italy. Another step moved by the American diplomacy during the spring was similarly bypassed. After the Italian general election in June 1953, at a time when Yugoslavia possibly believed it had reached the peak of its international standing, the Yugoslav leadership briefly considered it might be able to get Trieste somehow, perhaps in the form of a joint administration with Italy which had been mentioned for the first time in early 1951. In retrospect, looking at the adverse reactions such proposal prompted by the Western Powers ever since, this hope looks unrealistic. In any case the documents on the issue produced by the Yugoslav state apparatus in the summer of 1953 leave little space for doubt. In one of them it is clearly stated for instance that «in the new phase of the Cold War it is possible for Yugoslavia to address the issue of Trieste successfully, what is like to say so that the A Zone will not be given to Italy but will instead remain, or, more correctly, become neutral and linked to Yugoslavia».It can be assumed that, at least as regards the issue of Trieste, the successes achieved by Yugoslavia on the international stage made the Yugoslav elite suffer from excessive optimism. The consequences in the field of diplomacy of the election of Eisenhower as President of the United States was perhaps not properly assessed. The new Secretary of State John Foster Dulles adopted an approach less sympathetic to Yugoslavia than his predecessor. As Bekić puts it down, for Dulles «it was preferable that Yugoslavia remained what it has been so far. Not the vanguard of Europen communism neither a Trojan horse in the Western block (..) but insted in a position of amoral neutrality»6 . This was the framework when the Bipartite Delcaration of October the 8th 1953 went out to the light. The Declaration was the announcment of the upcoming withdrawal of Western troops from the Anglo-American zone of the Free Territory of Trieste. To make the thing even worse, the Declaration contained no guarantee over the B Zone for Yugoslavia, and was for this reason inter

Yugoslavia and the issue of Trieste 1945-1954.

La presente tesi di dottorato mira a ricostruire finora la strategia diplomatica jugoslava attorno alla questione di Trieste. Prima di affrontare il lavoro di scavo archivistico è stato necessario lo studio intensivo della bibliografia sulla questione di Trieste disponibile nelle tre lingue a me note, italiano inglese e croato. Venendo agli archivi, il lavoro di ricerca si è concentrato per quanto riguarda Belgrado Diplomatski arhiv ministarstva spoljnih poslova, nell’Arhiv Jugoslavije e nel Vojni Arhiv. A Zagabria sono inoltre stati consultati i fondi pertinenti del Državni arhiv, mentre a Lubiana ci si è concentrati sull'Arhiv Republike Slovenije. Dal punto di vista cronologico si è scelto di focalizzarsi sul periodo che va dalla primavera del 1945, quando Trieste viene liberata da truppe jugoslave, all'autunno del 1954, anno della firma del Memorandum di Londra. Nell'impossibilità di procedere ad una divisione tematica senza pesanti interferenze sulla successione cronologica degli eventi, si è optato per una narrazione cronologica al cui interno affrontare i principali nodi tematici. La tesi risulta quindi suddivisa in tre capitoli. Il primo affronta la storia diplomatica della questione di Trieste fino alla risoluzione del Cominform del 1948. Il secondo capitolo prende l'abbrivio dalla risoluzione del 1948 e ricostruisce i tentativi di accordo diretto con l'Italia – tutti patrocinati dalle grandi Potenze – nel 1950 e a cavallo tra 1951 e 1952, oltre al fatto, finora inedito, che la rafforzata posizione internazionale della Jugoslavia abbia portato Tito nel corso del 1953 a ritenere che fosse possibile pervenire ad una soluzione del problema confinario tale che « la Zona A non venga ceduta all’Italia ma invece rimanga, o per meglio dire diventi neutrale e si colleghi alla Jugoslavia». Il terzo capitolo è dedicato integralmente alla ricostruzione delle concitate trattative diplomatiche scaturite dall'emanazione della Decisione dell'8 ottobre (1953), in base alla quale la Zona A sarebbe stata consegnata all'Italia in assenza di garanzie precise sulla Zona B per la Jugoslavia. La tesi principale è che, dopo aver coltivato l'illusione di poter conquistare Trieste alla Jugsolavia ancora nella primavera del 1953, all'indomani della Nota bipartita i vertici jugoslavi abbiano fatto ricorso alla questione triestina per allentare i legami con l'Occidente e avviare una politica di equidistanza tra i due blocchi.In the phase of construction and strengthening of the communist regime, ranging from the last months of the Second World War to the expulsion of the country from the Cominform, Yugoslavia challenged the Western Powers in every possible way. The foreign policy pursued by Tito, especially around territorial issues, was definitively aggressive in nature, This was also due to the support of the Soviet Union, which was soon to be proved less firm than it was initially supposed. The style of Yugoslavia’s foreign policy was certainly meant to look different in style than the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, whose international weakness had been a stable source of discontent. It was clear that by proving successful in defending the national issues the regime wanted to gain the support of the masses, which otherwise looked at communism with skepticism. For this reason Yugoslavia did put every effort to liberate Trieste, Gorizia, most of the Venezia Giulia region and Klagenfurt where a Slovene minority was also present. When the firm attitude of the Anglo-Americans convinced the Soviets to pressure the Yugoslavs to talk, they reluctantly agreed to move their troops beyond the so called “Morgan line”, still hoping to conveniently address the issue with the talks planned in Belgrade and Duino. As the subsequent agreements didn’t meet Yugoslavia’s expectations, every effort was then made to influence the outcome of the Paris Peace conference. Naïve as it may sound, the Yugoslav elite took the challenge quite seriously. Besides trying to address the conference’s proceedings, a big commitment was made to influence the public opinion of the countries involved in the works, especially France where some of the members of the Yugoslav delegation (especially Ambassador Ristić and professor Roglić) retained personal contacts established in the Thirties already. While the works of the Peace conference were still under way, the logic of the Cold war was developing quickly. One can agree with Valdevit’s statement that the Peace conference has been «a stage of secondary importance of the American foreign policy»1 left to the former Secretary of State James Francis Byrnes. This explains why the main outcome of the Conference concerning the issue of Trieste, the creation of the Trieste Free Territory, looked a lot like the solutions for disputed areas, such as Danzig and the Memel territory, which were approved after the end of the First World War. Apart for the Free territory of Trieste Yugoslavia did benefit by the mediation of France, which proposed a compromise between the different border proposals submitted by the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom in order the achieve the Soviet support in the dispute France had with Germany over the Saar region. Soon after the signing of the Peace treaty on February the 10th 1947 it became clear already that the FTT was never to be translated into reality. Announced on March the 12th 1947, the Truman doctrine showed that the Antifascist coalition had definitely come already to an end. For this reason the USA and the UK boycotted the appointment of the Governor, which was the ultimate step towards the activation of the FTT. Their aim was to keep the Territory on hold, which would have given to the Western troops already present in the area the right to police the southern sector of the Iron Curtain. For the opposite reason – to get rid of Western troops at the borders of one of its allies - the Soviet Union supported the appointment of the Governor, a strategy which also Yugoslavia, albeit half-heartedly (it would have lost control over the “B Zone”), also pursued. During this time the Italian communist party was standing at a crossroad between its participation to the government of Italy and its loyalty to Moscow. To get rid of the dilemma Togliatti came up with the idea to solve the border issue through direct talks with Tito. The outcome of such talks, known by the name of the Tito – Togliatti agreement, was the proposal to give Gorizia to Yugoslavia in exchange for Trieste, which would have been immediately transferred to Italy. The proposal had no success in Italy. If accepted, it would have struck a blow to the prowestern orientation of the country’s foreign policy, an event the centre-right could not permit. In any case a similar agreement was presented by Togliatti once again in 19482 , soon after the Western Powers had released a joint statement, the Tripartite Declaration, hoping the handover to Italy of the whole FTT. In Italy the Tripartite declaration – which, without the consent of the Soviet Union, was clearly void – started a trend of exploitation of the Trieste issue in order to gain political support for the political parties of the right. Like the Declaration issued on March the 20th 1948 was meant to influence the outcome of the upcoming general elections, so the negotiations which took place in the years to come were all connected to the domestic policy of Italy. In the end of the day the line followed by De Gasperi embodies the sacrifice of the border issue and relations with Yugoslavia for the sake of political consensus. When, after the expulsion from the Cominform, Yugoslavia’s position on the stage of the Cold War begun improving steadily, Italy took no action to favorably get rid of the Trieste issue, which stood on hold for years. This state of things lasted until the formation of the Pella government in the summer of 1953, a government whose formation was clearly devoted to the finding of a solution to the issue of Trieste after it had become clear that the situation had to be addressed before Yugoslavia’s position was to further strengthen. Coming to Yugoslavia, the comparatively little success at the North was compensated, after the end of the Second World War, by the aggressive foreign policy implemented in the South. At the time the Greek partisans enjoyed full Yugoslav operational support. This happened because if a communist regime was to take power in Greece thank to Yugoslavia, the latter could claim the Greek part of Macedonia. At the same time Albania, or, to put it down as Vladimir Velebit did in an interview released in the late Nineties, «the Albanian communists, [who were] as children fully depending by Yugoslav assistance since the days when Popović, Mugoša and Tempo had created their communist party»3 enjoyed the status of a semi-colony. The country had no full control over its borders. Yugo-Albanian joint companies were also started following the example of the Soviet Union in its satellites. In this context, on August the 1st 1947 it was signed the Bled agreement, also known as the Tito – Dimitrov agreement. It was a pact of friendship and co-operation between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia meant to evolve towards the inclusion of the first in the Yugoslav federation. The plan was that Bulgaria was to cede its part of the geographic region of Macedonia to the Yugoslav republic of the same name. Also Albania had to join such enlarged Yugoslavia. It was to get Kosovo in return for the favor4 . The Yugoslav projects of hegemony in the Balkans, together with the aggressive policy towards the West5 , are the real reason behind the expulsion of the country from the Comintern, which has been formalized on June the 28th 1948. The Tito-Stalin split had obviously important consequences for the internal and foreign politics of Yugoslavia. It was also an event of first importance in the history of the Cold War. Sticking to the Trieste issue, it had important effects both in loco and at the international level. In the Free territory of Trieste the more obvious consequence was the split of the local communist party, which resulted in two communist parties. The first and most influential, pro Italian, was guided by the charismatic figure Vittorio Vidali. The other, pro Yugoslav, was guided by Branko Babič. At the international political level, the exclusion of Yugoslavia from the list of satellites of the Soviet Union had the effect to “freeze” the Tripartite Declaration which had been issued only three months before. The Western Powers needed some time to develop a new and more balanced approach over the issue of Trieste. The move towards the West of Yugoslavia – a move with no viable alternative – begun to show its effects since late 1949, once it was clear not only that the split between Tito a Stalin was not a joke, but also that the first was able to withstand the pressure from the latter’s hostility. Between the end of 1949 and the first months of 1950 Yugoslavia received the first loans granted by world leading banks thank to the intervention of the USA. Economic assistance intensified towards the end of the year, when the Mutual defence aid program was signed. With such a move Yugoslavia became the first socialist country to receive American funding in the frame of the NATO, or, to borrow the title of one of Tvrtko Jakovina’s books, the American socialist ally. The better relations between Yugoslavia and the West, which, besides loans and weapons, also exposed the people of Yugoslavia to western cultural influences, did not concern Italy. Because of the issue of Trieste relations between the two countries mirrored - to a lesser extent - those between Yugoslavia and the East. The atmosphere in the border area stood tense, frequent press campaigns were organized to attack the other country and diplomats worked in total isolation both in Belgrade and Rome. The case of Vladimir Velebit, Ambassador of Yugoslavia in Rome in 1952, stands symbolic. Anyhow, as a consequence of the help received, Yugoslavia made with time some political concessions to the West. Political propaganda was moderated in its anti western tones and also the policy towards the Catholic Church got tempered, so that the Archbishop of Zagreb Stepinac, who was in jail since 1946, was granted house arrest towards the end of 1951. Also in the matter of the Trieste issue it was decided to move some steps in order to meet the desire of the Western powers, which was to see the relations between Italy and Yugoslavia improve. As the two countries were part of the same “side”, it was rational for them to cooperate at least in the military field, in case of a Soviet attack on the West. The first of such “steps” was made in 1949 already, when a Yugoslavia still in state of emergency introduced the idea that the Free Territory of Trieste could be partitioned between the two bordering countries. Things developed in 1950 with a programme of negotiations between the Italian Minister of the Foreign Affairs Sforza and the Ambassador of Italy to Yugoslavia Martino and their Yugoslav counterparts Kardelj and Iveković. The fact that the Western Powers were reluctant to put a strong pressure on the two contenders determined the failure of the talks, which stopped at a very early stage. It is true that while Italy still stuck to the Tripartite Declaration, Yugoslavia at least continued to offer some form of partition of the disputed land. At the same time there are elements which suggest that Yugoslavia just wanted to show that it was “playing its role” and blame only Italy for the breakdown of the talks. In such a game Yugoslavia was helped by Italy’s unwillingness to compromise beyond a shadow of a doubt. The next – and more official - round of talks on Trieste happened in Paris in the months between 1951 and 1952. The negotiators appointed were Bebler and Guidotti, delegate of Italy to the United Nations. Many important international events had strengthened Yugoslavia’s negotiation position in the last year and half. The most important was certainly the outbreak of the Korea war. Because of the dynamics of that conflict, many believed that Yugoslavia would be the next victim of the Soviet Union. For this reason Yugoslavia was admitted to membership in the Mutual defence aid program. As a consequence of the new importance of Yugoslavia, on March 1951 the Western powers issued a statement hoping that the Trieste issue may be solved through direct negotiations between Italy and Yugoslavia, de facto infringing the Tripartite Declaration on the anniversary of its announcement. In the following months both the American and English diplomacies undertook surveys to determine if, instead of dividing the FTT in its zones of occupation, it was possible to address the issue through land exchanges. The move was appreciated by the Yugoslav leadership as an additional tool to jeopardize the diplomatic process around Trieste without carrying any responsibility for its failure. The Yugoslav approach to the negotiations held between 1951 and 1952 was then to show itself open to all of the different approaches the Western Powers had tried so far, proposing now one, now the other. The Paris negotiation stands important because there two new “solutions” made their appearance. The first was the request of an access to the sea for Yugoslavia in the suburbs of Trieste, an idea that would be submitted again in subsequent negotiations. The second solution was the activation of the FTT on condition that instead of by the Governor the Territory would be governed by Italy and Yugoslavia alternating. After the failure of the Paris negotiation Yugoslavia achieved another success. It was managed to resize the placing of Italian employees into the management bodies of the AngloAmerican occupational zone of the FTT as a move meant to solve the Trieste issue with the de facto partition of the FTT. During the summer of 1952 Tito in person circumvented the attempt made by the Western Powers to put pressure on Yugoslavia in order to bring the problem of the border with Italy to an end. After that, the issue was raised once again by the Foreign Secretary of the Unied Kingdom Anthony Eden, during the visit he paid to Yugoslavia in September. The Italian historiography tends to put the focus on the fact that during Eden’s visit Tito and Kardelj accepted the partitioning of the FTT provided the measure would be presented as an imposition of the Western Powers. The extensive research made on Yugoslav documents proves that the Yugoslav leadership agreed to Eden’s proposal only after much insistence. The meeting specifically devoted to the issue was summoned upon his request. It is also to be noted that not later that the very next day Brilej already resurrected the approach based on the access to the sea for Yugoslavia in the suburbs of Trieste when talking with the Ambassador of the United Kingdom to Yugoslavia Dixon. Despite Yugoslavia’s reluctance, it is probably true that if the Western Powers were to impose the solution soon after Eden’s visit, Tito would have accepted it. It was not the case. The United State’s diplomacy was not able to play such a move in the run-up to the 1952 presidential election, which was won by General Dwight D. Eisenhower on November the 4th. The question arises of whether Tito and his comrades ran a bluff to Eden assuming the proposal wouldn't have a future. It was probably the case. At the turn of 1952 and 1953 two major events further strengthened Yugoslavia’s international position. The first was the military talks with the Western Powers which took place in the month of November 1952. Their aim was to harmonize Yugoslavia’s strategic plans with the ones of the NATO. Although unsuccessful, the talks well symbolize the levels achieved in cooperation between Yugoslavia and the West. The second and most important event was the signing, on February the 28th 1953, of the Balkan Pact. This was basically a pact of friendship and cooperation between Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey. Despite the absence of military clauses – Greece and Turkey were NATO members and their defensive plans were a military secret the Pact was significant in its positive impact on the economy of Yugoslavia. Furthermore, the Western Powers gave green light to its ratification despite Italy’s firm opposition. The country’s Prime Minister, Alcide De Gasperi, had also tried – to no effect - to put pressure on Greece to convince it not to sign the Pact. Even assuming that Yugoslavia would have agreed to be bended to the NATO in early 1952 if the West didn’t oppose it, things were to change in a matter of days. Just one week after the signing of the Balkan Pact the death of Stalin came to create fresh opportunities for Yugoslavia’s foreign policy. Despite the Yugoslav elite did its best to reassure its Western partners that no reproaching with the Soviet Union was looming on the horizon, the first steps in the direction of a different and more balanced relationship with Moscow were taken pretty soon. Diplomatic and economic relations were also quickly, although with a certain diffidence and not to full extent, restored. During Tito’s visit to London, two weeks after Stalin’s death, Tito refused to solve the issue of Trieste according to Eden’s proposal of September 1952. He proposed in return the usual mix of inconsistent approaches to the problem, including direct talks with Italy. Another step moved by the American diplomacy during the spring was similarly bypassed. After the Italian general election in June 1953, at a time when Yugoslavia possibly believed it had reached the peak of its international standing, the Yugoslav leadership briefly considered it might be able to get Trieste somehow, perhaps in the form of a joint administration with Italy which had been mentioned for the first time in early 1951. In retrospect, looking at the adverse reactions such proposal prompted by the Western Powers ever since, this hope looks unrealistic. In any case the documents on the issue produced by the Yugoslav state apparatus in the summer of 1953 leave little space for doubt. In one of them it is clearly stated for instance that «in the new phase of the Cold War it is possible for Yugoslavia to address the issue of Trieste successfully, what is like to say so that the A Zone will not be given to Italy but will instead remain, or, more correctly, become neutral and linked to Yugoslavia».It can be assumed that, at least as regards the issue of Trieste, the successes achieved by Yugoslavia on the international stage made the Yugoslav elite suffer from excessive optimism. The consequences in the field of diplomacy of the election of Eisenhower as President of the United States was perhaps not properly assessed. The new Secretary of State John Foster Dulles adopted an approach less sympathetic to Yugoslavia than his predecessor. As Bekić puts it down, for Dulles «it was preferable that Yugoslavia remained what it has been so far. Not the vanguard of Europen communism neither a Trojan horse in the Western block (..) but insted in a position of amoral neutrality»6 . This was the framework when the Bipartite Delcaration of October the 8th 1953 went out to the light. The Declaration was the announcment of the upcoming withdrawal of Western troops from the Anglo-American zone of the Free Territory of Trieste. To make the thing even worse, the Declaration contained no guarantee over the B Zone for Yugoslavia, and was for this reason inter

L’Italia vista dalla Jugoslavia (1945-1954)

The aim of this article is to investigate how Italy and Italians were depicted in post WWII Yugoslavia. It’s shown how the corpus of national stereotypes developed in the Nineteenth century was used later on. The research points out that the Yugoslav elite confronted the border crisis it had with Italy through a dual strategy. On one hand the official statements and the press mirrored the official ideology and described facts in political terms, as if it was a skirmish between communism and an imperialistic regime. By the other side the research shows that in 1951-1953, as a toll to support the Yugoslav diplomatic action for the “internationalization” of Trieste, a specific bland of propaganda was developed, which borrowed from old anti venetian stereotypes and updated them according to the new political and international situation