Entry or exit? The effect of voluntary participation on cooperation

We study the effects of voluntary participation on public good provision. Voluntary participation may foster cooperation through two mechanisms: an entry mechanism, which leads to assortative selection of interaction partners, or an exit mechanism, whereby the opportunity to leave the partnership can be used as a means to resist exploitation by free-riders. We examine the relative effectiveness of these two mechanisms in a one-shot, two-person public goods game experiment. We find that voluntary participation has a positive effect on public good provision through the exit mechanism, but we do not find evidence of a positive effect of entry. Assortative selection of interaction partners seems to play a minor role in our setting, whereas the threat of costly exit is a powerful force to discipline free-riding

Entry or exit? The effect of voluntary participation on cooperation

We study the effects of voluntary participation on cooperation in collective action problems. Voluntary participation may foster cooperation through an entry mechanism, which leads to assortative selection of interaction partners, or an exit mechanism, whereby the opportunity to leave the partnership can be used as a threat against free-riders. We examine the effectiveness of these mechanisms in a one-shot public goods experiment. Voluntary participation has a positive effect on provision only through the exit mechanism. Assortative selection of interaction partners seems to play a minor role in our setting, whereas the threat of costly exit is a powerful force to discipline free-riding

The value of vulnerability: the transformative capacity of risky trust

In an experimental gift-exchange game, we explore the# transformative capacity of vulnerable trust, which we define as trusting untrustworthy players when their untrustworthiness is common knowledge between co-players. In our experiment, there are two treatments: the “Information” treatment and the “No-Information” treatment in which we respectively disclose or not information about trustees’ trustworthiness. Our laboratory evidence consistently supports the transformative capacity of trustors’ vulnerable trust, which generates higher transfers, more trustworthiness and increased reciprocity by untrustworthy trustees

The value of vulnerability: The transformative capacity of risky trust

The "grammar of trust" is one the most explored loci in game theory and behavioural economics. However, still much needs to be understood about the nature of trust in non-enforceable, personalised interactions, in markets and within organizations. This experimental study aims at contributing to the understanding of new dimensions of trust by exploring how risky and vulnerable trust may foster a trustee´s behavioural change. It investigates trustee´s positive reciprocity when the intentional vulnerability of the trustor is both manifestly salient and dependent upon the trustee´s revealed type. The results support the transformative nature of risky trust by showing the capacity of vulnerable trust to generate more fairness and reciprocity in untrustworthy people

"El pez de oro", de Gamaliel Churata, en la tradición de la literatura peruana

Este trabajo pretende ser una reflexión sobre la obra poco conocida de Gamaliel Churata (Arequipa, 1897-Lima, 1969), especialmente sobre El Pez de Oro (1957), que para algunos es «la Biblia del indigenismo» y para otros «uno de los grandes retos no asumidos de la crítica peruana», si bien el reto se está asumiendo en los últimos años en una serie de trabajos críticos que mencionamos a lo largo de estas páginas. Para evaluar esta obra, hay que observar la evolución de Churata desde la época del Boletín Titikaka (1926-30), órgano difusor del movimiento Orkopata que él mismo dirige desde 1925, hasta la publicación de El Pez de Oro en 1957. Este movimiento ha sido objeto de varios estudios, el más completo de los cuales es el de Vich; pero es necesario distinguir a partir de él la evolución de un proyecto literario que se plasma en El Pez de Oro y que gira sobre uno de los ejes más importantes de la literatura peruana, la heterogeneidad de sus materiales literario

development of a virtual calibration methodology for a downsized si engine by using advanced valve strategies

Abstract The calibration phase of a new engine at test bench is an expensive and time-consuming process. To support the engine development process, in this paper a numerical methodology aiming to define the optimal control parameters is proposed for a downsized VVA SI engine. First, a 1D engine model is build-up in GT-Power and is enhanced with phenomenological sub-models. 1D model is then validated against the experimental findings, at high- and part-load operations. In a second stage, a numerical calibration strategy is defined, to automatically identify, for various engine loads/speeds, the control parameters, ensuring optimal performance and complying with proper system limitations. Complete engine maps are computed for different control strategies ( EIVC and Throttled ). An application example is also presented, where computed maps are embedded in a vehicle model to predict the CO 2 emission produced along a NEDC cycle

One swallow doesn’t make a summer: reply to Kataria

In this paper we reply to Mitesh Kataria’s comment, which criticized the simulations of Maniadis, Tufano, and List (2014, Am. Econ. Rev.104(1), 277-290). We view these simulations as a means to illustrating the fact that we economists are unaware of the value of key variables that determine the credibility of our own empirical findings. Such variables include priors (i.e., the pre-study probability that a tested phenomenon is true) and the statistical power of the empirical design. Economists should not hesitate to use Bayesian tools and meta-analysis in order to quantify what we know about these variables

One swallow doesn’t make a summer: reply to Kataria

In this paper we reply to Mitesh Kataria’s comment, which criticized the simulations of Maniadis, Tufano, and List (2014, Am. Econ. Rev.104(1), 277-290). We view these simulations as a means to illustrating the fact that we economists are unaware of the value of key variables that determine the credibility of our own empirical findings. Such variables include priors (i.e., the pre-study probability that a tested phenomenon is true) and the statistical power of the empirical design. Economists should not hesitate to use Bayesian tools and meta-analysis in order to quantify what we know about these variables