Models, Brains, and Scientific Realism

Prediction Error Minimization theory (PEM) is one of the most promising attempts to model perception in current science of mind, and it has recently been advocated by some prominent philosophers as Andy Clark and Jakob Hohwy. Briefly, PEM maintains that “the brain is an organ that on aver-age and over time continually minimizes the error between the sensory input it predicts on the basis of its model of the world and the actual sensory input” (Hohwy 2014, p. 2). An interesting debate has arisen with regard to which is the more adequate epistemological interpretation of PEM. Indeed, Hohwy maintains that given that PEM supports an inferential view of perception and cognition, PEM has to be considered as conveying an internalist epistemological perspective. Contrary to this view, Clark maintains that it would be incorrect to interpret in such a way the indirectness of the link between the world and our inner model of it, and that PEM may well be combined with an externalist epistemological perspective. The aim of this paper is to assess those two opposite interpretations of PEM. Moreover, it will be suggested that Hohwy’s position may be considerably strengthened by adopting Carlo Cellucci’s view on knowledge (2013)

Mathematical Knowledge, the Analytic Method, and Naturalism

This chapter tries to answer the following question: How should we conceive of the method of mathematics, if we take a naturalist stance? The problem arises since mathematical knowledge is regarded as the paradigm of certain knowledge, because mathematics is based on the axiomatic method. Moreover, natural science is deeply mathematized, and science is crucial for any naturalist perspective. But mathematics seems to provide a counterexample both to methodological and ontological naturalism. To face this problem, some authors tried to naturalize mathematics by relying on evolutionism. But several difficulties arise when we try to do this. This chapter suggests that, in order to naturalize mathematics, it is better to take the method of mathematics to be the analytic method, rather than the axiomatic method, and thus conceive of mathematical knowledge as plausible knowledge

Scientific Realism, Adaptationism and the Problem of the Criterion

Scientific Realism (SR) has three crucial aspects: 1) the centrality of the concept of truth, 2) the idea that success is a reliable indicator of truth, and 3) the idea that the Inference to the Best Explanation is a reliable inference rule. It will be outlined how some realists try to overcome the difficulties which arise in justifying such crucial aspects relying on an adaptationist view of evolutionism, and why such attempts are inadequate. Finally, we will briefly sketch some of the main difficulties the realist has to face in defending those crucial aspects, and how such difficulties are deeply related: they derive from the inability of SR to satisfyingly avoid the sceptical challenge of the criterion of truth. Indeed, SR seems not to be able to fill the so-called ‘epistemic gap’ (Sankey 2008). In fact, the epistemic gap cannot be filled in no way other than obtaining a criterion of truth, but such a criterion cannot be obtained if the epistemic gap obtains

The Noetic Account of Scientific Progress and the Factivity of Understanding

There are three main accounts of scientific progress: 1) the epistemic account, according to which an episode in science constitutes progress when there is an increase in knowledge; 2) the semantic account, according to which progress is made when the number of truths increases; 3) the problem-solving account, according to which progress is made when the number of problems that we are able to solve increases. Each of these accounts has received several criticisms in the last decades. Nevertheless, some authors think that the epistemic account is to be preferred if one takes a realist stance. Recently, Dellsén proposed the noetic account, according to which an episode in science constitutes progress when scientists achieve increased understanding of a phenomenon. Dellsén claims that the noetic account is a more adequate realist account of scientific progress than the epistemic account. This paper aims precisely at assessing whether the noetic account is a more adequate realist account of progress than the epistemic account

Darwinism in metaethics: What if the universal acid cannot be contained?

The aim of this article is to explore the impact of Darwinism in metaethics and dispel some of the confusion surrounding it. While the prospects for a Darwinian metaethics appear to be improving, some underlying epistemological issues remain unclear. We will focus on the so-called Evolutionary Debunking Arguments (EDAs) which, when applied in metaethics, are defined as arguments that appeal to the evolutionary origins of moral beliefs so as to undermine their epistemic justification. The point is that an epistemic disanalogy can be identified in the debate on EDAs between moral beliefs and other kinds of beliefs, insofar as only the former are regarded as vulnerable to EDAs. First, we will analyze some significant debunking positions in metaethics in order to show that they do not provide adequate justification for such an epistemic disanalogy. Then, we will assess whether they can avoid the accusation of being epistemically incoherent by adopting the same evolutionary account for all kinds of beliefs. In other words, once it is argued that Darwinism has a corrosive impact on metaethics, what if its universal acid cannot be contained

Le implicazioni metafilosofiche del darwinismo

Per cercare di cogliere appieno la portata delle conseguenze che la rivoluzione darwiniana ha avuto, e sta avendo, per la riflessione filosofica sulla natura, sul metodo e sul fine della filosofia, ovvero per la metafilosofia, sarà utile dapprima ricostruire brevemente quale sia stata l’immagine prevalente della filosofia che si è venuta formando a partire dall'inizio dell’epoca moderna, ovvero dal fuoriuscire delle scienze dal corpo della filosofia, fino alle risposte che alla domanda “Che cos'è la filosofia?” le maggiori tradizioni filosofiche del Novecento hanno fornito. Saremo così in grado di evidenziare come e perché l’evoluzionismo darwiniano sia stato spesso trascurato, e le sue conseguenze metafilosofiche sostanzialmente non colte, da buona parte del pensiero novecentesco. Cercheremo altresì di mettere in luce come la difficoltà di assorbire realmente tali conseguenze nella immagine della filosofia condivisa da molti pensatori contemporanei persista ancora oggi che il richiamo al naturalismo e l’accettazione del darwinismo come tesi scientifica sembrano diffusi e ampiamente condivisi. Infatti, le conseguenze metafilosofiche del darwinismo insidiano alla radice la giustificazione teorica del fare filosofia che molti autori sostengono e che hanno ereditato proprio da quelle formulazioni novecentesche che avevano trascurato il darwinismo nel loro cercare di giustificare l’autonomia della filosofia al cospetto delle scienze. Infine, vedremo un esempio di come la ridefinizione della natura della filosofia che si impone a partire dal darwinismo sia intimamente legata alla ridefinizione filosofica della natura della conoscenza a cui sempre il darwinismo ci induce. Una tale ridefinizione epistemologica, infatti, mette in discussione molte delle giustificazioni tradizionali riguardanti la natura della conoscenza filosofica. Seguendo la combinazione di queste due linee di smottamento, si cercherà di fornire un saggio della carica metafilosofica del darwinismo

Formalizing Darwinism, Naturalizing Mathematics

In the last decades two different and apparently unrelated lines of research have increasingly connected mathematics and evolutionism. Indeed, on the one hand different attempts to formalize darwinism have been made, while, on the other hand, different attempts to naturalize logic and mathematics have been put forward. Those researches may appear either to be completely distinct or at least in some way convergent. They may in fact both be seen as supporting a naturalistic stance. Evolutionism is indeed crucial for a naturalistic perspective, and formalizing it seems to be a way to strengthen its scientificity. The paper shows that, on the contrary, those directions of research may be seen as conflicting, since the conception of knowledge on which they rest may be undermined by the consequences of accepting an evolutionary perspective

Sulla concezione noetica del progresso scientifico

Le principali concezioni del progresso scientifico sono tre: la concezione epistemica, secondo cui il progresso si verifica quando si verifica un incremento della conoscenza; la concezione semantica, secondo cui il progresso si verifica quando vi è un incremento delle verità; la concezione problem-solving, secondo cui il progresso si verifica quando si verifica un incremento del numero dei problemi che si è in grado di risolvere. La concezione epistemica è ritenuta la più compatibile con una prospettiva realista. Di recente, Dellsén ha proposto la concezione “noetica”, secondo cui il progresso si verifica quando vi è un incremento dell’understanding di un fenomeno da parte degli scienziati. Dellsén sostiene che la concezione noetica sia una concezione realista del progresso più adeguata di quella epistemica. Scopo di questo articolo è valutare se la concezione noetica sia più adeguata della concezione epistemica

Il pluralismo evolutivo in relazione al problema mente-corpo

Il presente lavoro parte dalla descrizione del dibattito tra realisti e antirealisti in filosofia della scienza per cercare di definire e sostenere una posizione antirealista ma non relativista. Della sostenibilità di tale posizione si cercherà di fornire un saggio affrontando alcune tematiche epistemologiche che emergono all'intersezione della riflessione filosofica sulla biologia evoluzionistica e sulle neuroscienze. All'interno di tale cornice, la focalizzazione dell‘analisi verterà sul problema della naturalizzazione della matematica. Si cercherà così di mostrare la percorribilità di una tale posizione antirealista, non relativista, monista e antiadattazionista trasversalmente ai settori della filosofia della scienza in generale e della filosofia della biologia, della filosofia della mente e della filosofia della matematica in particolare

On Mizrahi’s Argument Against Stanford’s Instrumentalism

Mizrahi’s argument against Stanford’s challenge to scientific realism is analyzed. Mizrahi’s argument is worth of attention for at least two reasons: (1) unlike other criticisms that have been made to Stanford’s view so far, Mizrahi’s argument does not question any specific claim of Stanford’s argument, rather it puts into question the very coherence of Stanford’s position, because it argues that since Stanford’s argument rests on the problem of the unconceived alternatives, Stanford’s argument is self-defeating. Thus, if Mizrahi’s argument is effective in countering Stanford’s view, it may be able to question the validity of other philosophical positions which similarly rest on the problem of the unconceived alternatives; (2) Mizrahi’s argument against Stanford’s view is in part based on the development of a Stanford-like argument for the field of philosophy. This makes Mizrahi’s argument potentially relevant to the metaphilosophical debate. After careful examination, Mizrahi’s argument against Stanford’s instrumentalism is found wanting. Moreover, a Stanford-like argument is developed, which aims at challenging the metaphilosophical stance implied by Mizrahi’s argument against Stanford’s instrumentalism