Reassessing Gender Differences in COVID-19 Risk Perception and Behavior

[Abstract] Objective: This article reassesses the gender differences in COVID-19 attitudes and behavior found in previous studies by examining to what extent the gender gap in the adoption of COVID-19 preventive behaviors is dependent on women's and men's perceptions of risk. Methods: The data utilized in this study were obtained from the “Understanding America Study Coronavirus in America (‘COVID’) Survey,” conducted by the Center for Economic and Social Research (CESR), at the University of Southern California. Result: This study shows that women are more risk averse than men, but that the gender gap in risk behavior depends on the level of risk that is associated with COVID-19. Conclusion: Risk perception is a stronger driver of risk behavior for men than for women, who generally tend to adopt safe measures to protect themselves and others. Different messages should be delivered to women and men to increase compliance with norms

Preferences for Consensus and Majoritarian Democracy: Long- and Short-Term Influences

Financiado para publicación en acceso aberto: Universidade da Coruña/CISUG[Abstract] This article analyzes individuals’ preferences for a consensus or a majoritarian type of democracy. We theorize that variation in these preferences is a function of both institutional learning (long term) and individuals’ position as a political minority or majority (short term). First, as a result of institutional learning, we expect that individuals living in democracies characterized by coalition governments will favor consensus democracy. Conversely, those living in countries characterized by single-party executives will favor majoritarian democracy. Second, we expect that individuals’ position as an electoral minority or majority will affect these beliefs. Those who vote for small parties will favor a consensus democracy, while those who vote for large parties will support a majoritarian system. However, whether institutional learning or individuals’ position as a political minority or majority prevail in influencing these preferences about the ideal model of democracy will be a function of the democratic trajectory of each country. We test these arguments drawing on data from the European Social Survey.This research has received financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation, and Universities through research grant CSO2017-83086-

The Effects of Ideological and Ethnoracial Identity on Political (Mis)Information

[Abstract] There is much concern today about the spread of fake news and the misinformation it can produce among the public. In this article, we investigate how the American public interprets accurate and inaccurate statements from the news. Moving beyond partisanship, we theorize that ideological and ethnoracial identities also shape individuals’ interpretations of the news. We argue that people have incentives to interpret information they encounter in ways that favor their ideological and ethnoracial ingroups and that these incentives are particularly strong when ideological and ethnoracial identities align. Using a survey that asks respondents to classify statements from news stories as facts or opinions, we find support for these hypotheses. Liberals and conservatives, and white, Black, and Hispanic respondents, more often classify as factual statements that favor their ingroup’s interests while classifying information opposing their ingroup’s interests as opinions. Holding cross-cutting ethnoracial and ideological identities diminishes these effects, while identities that align produce stronger ingroup biases in information processing, particularly among whites. Our study reveals that it is not only partisanship but also ideological and ethnoracial identities that shape how Americans interpret the news, and therefore how informed, or misinformed, they are

How long does it take to admit that you do not know? Gender differences in response time to political knowledge questions

[Abstract]: The implications of the persistent gender gap in political knowledge are a puzzle that the literature is still disentangling; and research has evidenced important differences in the way women and men respond to survey questions. We argue in this article that political knowledge survey items not only inform about differences in cognition but also about other latent traits related to gender stereotyping. Gender stereo-types around political knowledge push men to be knowledgeable but not so much women, which we expect to affect men and women's survey responses differently. To test this expectation, we explore response times of do not know answers to political knowledge items. Our results show that men, particu-larly those who declare being interested in politics, take longer than women to admit that they do not know the answer to political knowledge items.Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation(Spanish Government); CSO2012-32009Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (Spanish Government); PID2020115568RB-I0

Adult roles and the gender gap in political knowledge: a comparative study

The unusual size and persistence of the gender gap in political knowledge is perplexing in comparison to other dimensions of politics. Building on situational explanations of political engagement, this article claims that women's and men's specific adult roles lead to an enlargement of the gender gap in knowledge. The present study analyses men and women's levels of political knowledge at different life stages by means of two unique datasets specifically collected to measure what people know about politics. Findings show that adult roles provide more opportunities for men to gain political knowledge than for women. Furthermore, the comparison of levels of political knowledge in two such dissimilar countries as Finland and Spain suggests that while gender equality policies are successful in tearing down some of the obstacles that hinder women's contact with the political world, they are still insufficient to completely bridge the gender gap in political knowledge during adulthood

Is it Simply Gender? Content, Format, and Time in Political Knowledge Measures

We acknowledge the financial support of the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation(grant numbers CSO2012-32009 and CSO2016-75090-R] and of the Centro de InvestigacionesSociologicas (CIS

What is Democracy to Citizens? Understanding perceptions and evaluations of democratic systems in contemporary Europe

Defence date: 26 November 2012Examining Board: Professor Alexander Trechsel, European University Institute (supervisor); Professor Hanspeter Kriesi, European University Institute; Professor José Ramón Montero, Universidad Autonóma de Madrid; Professor Bernhard Wessels, Social Science Research Centre Berlin.The object of this thesis is Europeans’ orientations to democracy. It is argued in this dissertation that an important variable has been missed in the literature, namely, citizens’ cognitive support for democracy. By including this concept in the analysis of Europeans’ support for democracy, a number of aspects which had been much uncertain until now are inspected. First, conceptual clarification of support for democracy is possible, by distinguishing different types of orientations to democracy. Second, and from an empirical perspective, classical indicators of support for democracy are examined, in order to assess for validity. Interesting results have emerged from the analysis: 1. Determining the structure and the levels of affective support for democracy in Europe. The classic churchillian indicator (‘democracy best’) overstates levels of affective support for democracy in Europe. The structure of affective support for democracy is in fact not homogeneous across Europe, but differs substantially from one group of countries to the others. 2. Mapping types of democrats across Europe. There are different types of democrats across Europe, depending on their cognitive orientations to democracy. These are not evenly spread within each country, but there is correspondence between the structure and levels of affective support and the predominant type of democrats in a country. 3. Studying why people are dis-satisfied with democracy in Europe. The congruence hypothesis (are citizens’ orientations to democracy meaningfully related among them?) is tested. Most citizens are indeed fairly congruent: cognitive and affective supports have an impact on the evaluations of their democratic systems. As such, not only is it possible to determine some of the causes of dis-satisfaction with democracy, but also to claim that the indicator of satisfaction with democracy does reasonably well as a measure of general support for the performance of the regime