Sicherungsverwahrte (§66 StGB): Merkmale der Täter und ihre Bedeutung für die Erfolgsaussichten eines therapeutischen Vollzugs

Zusammenfassung: Hintergrund: In einem Urteil vom 04.05.2011 erklärte das Bundesverfassungsgericht die Regelungen zur Sicherungsverwahrung (SV) für verfassungswidrig und forderte den Gesetzgeber zur Erarbeitung eines freiheitsorientierten und "therapiegerichteten" Gesamtkonzeptes auf. Mit der therapeutischen Ausrichtung der SV wird die Psychiatrie und Psychotherapie in die Pflicht genommen. Jedoch besteht aktuell ein Mangel an Informationen über diese zukünftige Zielgruppe und über therapeutische Interventionen. Material und Methoden: Zwischen Februar 2009 und August 2010 wurden 32 Strafgefangene im Regelvollzug und 26 Sicherungsverwahrte sowie eine Kontrollgruppe aus 29 Probanden aus der nicht straffälligen Normalbevölkerung untersucht. Ergebnisse: Fortgeschrittenes Alter, antisoziale Persönlichkeitszüge bzw. -störungen, "Psychopathy"-Merkmale, Substanzmissbrauch, Aggressivität, eine hohe Anzahl von Vorstrafen und Haftjahren, mangelnde Schul- und Berufsausbildung und ein hohes Rückfallrisiko zeichnen die Gruppe der Sicherungsverwahrten aus. Schlussfolgerung: Bei den Sicherungsverwahrten handelt es sich um eine Gruppe therapeutisch schwer erreichbarer Wiederholungstäte

Strategyproof Mechanisms for Additively Separable Hedonic Games and Fractional Hedonic Games

Additively separable hedonic games and fractional hedonic games have received considerable attention. They are coalition forming games of selfish agents based on their mutual preferences. Most of the work in the literature characterizes the existence and structure of stable outcomes (i.e., partitions in coalitions), assuming that preferences are given. However, there is little discussion on this assumption. In fact, agents receive different utilities if they belong to different partitions, and thus it is natural for them to declare their preferences strategically in order to maximize their benefit. In this paper we consider strategyproof mechanisms for additively separable hedonic games and fractional hedonic games, that is, partitioning methods without payments such that utility maximizing agents have no incentive to lie about their true preferences. We focus on social welfare maximization and provide several lower and upper bounds on the performance achievable by strategyproof mechanisms for general and specific additive functions. In most of the cases we provide tight or asymptotically tight results. All our mechanisms are simple and can be computed in polynomial time. Moreover, all the lower bounds are unconditional, that is, they do not rely on any computational or complexity assumptions

Resource Competition on Integral Polymatroids

We study competitive resource allocation problems in which players distribute their demands integrally on a set of resources subject to player-specific submodular capacity constraints. Each player has to pay for each unit of demand a cost that is a nondecreasing and convex function of the total allocation of that resource. This general model of resource allocation generalizes both singleton congestion games with integer-splittable demands and matroid congestion games with player-specific costs. As our main result, we show that in such general resource allocation problems a pure Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist by giving a pseudo-polynomial algorithm computing a pure Nash equilibrium.Comment: 17 page

Efficiency of equilibria in uniform matroid congestion games

Network routing games, and more generally congestion games play a central role in algorithmic game theory, comparable to the role of the traveling salesman problem in combinatorial optimization. It is known that the price of anarchy is independent of the network topology for non-atomic congestion games. In other words, it is independent of the structure of the strategy spaces of the players, and for affine cost functions it equals 4/3. In this paper, we show that the dependence of the price of anarchy on the network topology is considerably more intricate for atomic congestion games. More specifically, we consider congestion games with affine cost functions where the strategy spaces of players are symmetric and equal to the set of bases of a k-uniform matroid. In this setting, we show that the price of anarchy is strictly larger than the price of anarchy for singleton strategy spaces where the latter is 4/3. As our main result we show that the price of anarchy can be bounded from above by 28/13. This constitutes a substantial improvement over the price of anarchy bound 5/2, which is known to be tight for arbitrary network routing games with affine cost functions