Foreign Aid – A Fillip for Development or a Fuel for Corruption?

We present an analysis of the effects of foreign aid on economic development when the quality of governance may be compromised by corruption. The analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model in which growth is driven by capital accumulation and public policy is administered by government-appointed bureaucrats. Corruption may arise due to the opportunity for bureaucrats to embezzle public funds which are otherwise used to provide productive public goods and services. Our main results may be summarized as follows: (1) corruption impedes economic development and compromises the effectiveness of aid programmers; (2) the incidence of corruption may, itself, be affected by both the development process and the donation of aid; (3) foreign aid is good for development when governance is good, but may be bad (perhaps very bad) for development when governance is bad; and (4) corruption and poverty may co-exist as permanent, rather than just transitory, fixtures of an economy.Corruption; Development; Foreign aid

Distribution and Development in a Model of Misgovernance

This paper presents an analysis of bureaucratic corruption, income inequality and economic development. The analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model in which bureaucrats are appointed by the government to implement a redistributive programme of taxes and subsidies designed to benefit the poor. Corruption is reflected in bribery and tax evasion as bureaucrats conspire with the rich in providing false information to the government. In accordance with empirical evidence, the model predicts a positive relationship between corruption and inequality, and a negative relationship between corruption and development. --Corruption,inequality,development.

Financial Liberalisation, Bureaucratic Corruption and Economic

We study the effect of international financial integration on economic development when the quality of governance may be compromised by corruption. Our analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model of a small economy in which growth is driven by capital accumulation and public policy is administered by government- appointed bureaucrats. Corruption may arise due to the opportunity for bureaucrats to embezzle public funds, an opportunity that is made more attractive by financial liberalisation which, at the same time, raises efficiency in capital production. Our main results may be summarised as follows: (1) corruption is always bad for economic development, but its effect is worse if the economy is open than if it is closed; (2) the incidence of corruption may, itself, be affected by both the development and openness of the economy; (3) financial liberalisation is good for development when governance is good, but may be bad for development when governance is bad; and (4) corruption and poverty may co-exist as permanent, rather than just transitory, fixtures of an economy.Corruption,development,financial liberalisation

Foreign Aid - a Fillip for Development or a Fuel for Corruption?

We present an analysis of the effects of foreign aid on economic development when the quality of governance may be compromised by corruption. The analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model in which growth is driven by capital accumulation and public policy is administered by government-appointed bureaucrats. Corruption may arise due to the opportunity for bureaucrats to embezzle public funds which are otherwise used to provide productive public goods and services. Our main results may be summarised as follows: (1) corruption impedes economic development and compromises the effectiveness of aid programmes; (2) the incidence of corruption may, itself, be affected by both the development process and the donation of aid; (3) foreign aid is good for development when governance is good, but may be bad (perhaps very bad) for development when governance is bad; and (4) corruption and poverty may co-exist as permanent, rather than just transitory, fixtures of an economy.Corruption, development, foreign aid.

Financial Liberalisation, Bureaucratic Corruption and Economic Development

We study the effect of international financial integration on economic development when the quality of governance may be compromised by corruption. Our analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model of a small economy in which growth is driven by capital accumulation and public policy is administered by government-appointed bureaucrats. Corruption may arise due to the opportunity for bureaucrats to embezzle public funds, an opportunity that is made more attractive by financial liberalisation which, at the same time, raises efficiency in capital production. Our main results may be summarised as follows: (1) corruption is always bad for economic development, but its effect is worse if the economy is open than if it is closed; (2) the incidence of corruption may, itself, be affected by both the development and openness of the economy; (3) financial liberalisation is good for development when governance is good, but may be bad for development when governance is bad; and (4) corruption and poverty may co-exist as permanent, rather than just transitory, fixtures of an economy.Corruption, development, financial liberalisation

Observation of the rare decay B+ -> K+π0π0 and measurement of the quasi-two-body contributions B+ -> K*(892)+π0, B+ -> f0(980)K+, and B+ -> χc0K+

We report an analysis of charmless hadronic decays of charged B mesons to the final state K(+) pi(0)pi(0), using a data sample of (470.9 +/- 2.8) x 10(6) B (B) over bar events collected with the BABAR detector at the Y(4S) resonance. We observe an excess of signal events, with a significance above 10 standard deviations including systematic uncertainties, and measure the branching fraction and CP asymmetry to be B(B(+) -> K(+) pi(0)pi(0)) = (16.2 +/- 1.2 +/- 1.5) x 10(-6) and A(CP)(B(+) -> K(+) pi(0)pi(0)) = -0.06 +/- 0.06 +/- 0.04, where the uncertainties are statistical and systematic, respectively. Additionally, we study the contributions of the B(+) -> K*(892)(+) pi(0), B(+) -> f(0)(980)K(+), and B(+) -> chi(c0)K(+) quasi-two-body decays. We report the world's best measurements of the branching fraction and CP asymmetry of the B(+) -> K(+) pi(0)pi(0) and B(+) -> K(+)(892)(+) pi(0) channels

Gender inequality, corruption, and economic development

We investigate the effect of bureaucratic corruption on economic development when women are discriminated against in the labor market. The analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model in which capital accumulation drives economic development. The government appoints bureaucrats to administer public policy. Corruption arises due to the opportunity for bureaucrats to embezzle public funds. In the event of detection and dismissal, the private sector serves as the bureaucrats' outside option. Our main results can be summarized as follows: first, when the public sector is a more gender‐equal employer than the private sector, female bureaucrats are less corrupt than male; second, corruption and development are jointly determined allowing the possibility of a poverty trap; and third, a policy to increase female participation in the public sector potentially reduces corruption and fosters economic development

Why is Corruption Less Harmful in Some Countries Than in Others?

Empirical evidence shows that not all countries with high levels of corruption have suffered poor growth performance. Bad quality governance has clearly been much less damaging (if at all) in some economies than in others. Why this is so is a question that has largely been ignored, and the intention of this paper is to provide an answer. We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model in which growth occurs endogenously through the invention of new goods based on re- search and development activity. For such activity to be undertaken, firms must acquire complementary licenses from public officials who are able to exploit their monopoly power by demanding bribes in ex- change for these (otherwise free) permits. We show that the effects of corruption depend on the extent to which bureaucrats coordinate their rent-seeking behaviour. Specifically, our analysis predicts that countries with organised corruption networks are likely to display lower levels of bribes, higher levels of research activity and higher rates of growth than countries with disorganised corruption arrangements

A Model of DC-DC Converter with Switched-Capacitor Structure for Electric Vehicle Applications

In this paper, a DC-DC converter with an innovative topology for automotive applications is proposed. The goal of the presented power converter is the electrical storage system management of an electric vehicle (EV). The presented converter is specifically compliant with a 400 V battery, which represents the high-voltage primary source of the system. This topology is also able to act as a bidirectional power converter, so that in this case, the output section is an active stage, which is able to provide power as, for example, in the case of a low-voltage battery or a supercapacitor. The proposed topology can behave either in step-down or in step-up mode, presenting in both cases a high gain between the input and output voltage. Simulation results concerning the proposed converter, demonstrating the early feasibility of the system, were obtained in a PowerSIM environment and are described in this paper

Examination of coalescence as the origin of nuclei in hadronic collisions

The origin of weakly bound nuclear clusters in hadronic collisions is a key question to be addressed by heavy-ion collision (HIC) experiments. The measured yields of clusters are approximately consistent with expectations from phenomenological statistical hadronization models (SHMs), but a theoretical understanding of the dynamics of cluster formation prior to kinetic freeze-out is lacking. The competing model is nuclear coalescence, which attributes cluster formation to the effect of final state interactions (FSI) during the propagation of the nuclei from kinetic freeze-out to the observer. This phenomenon is closely related to the effect of FSI in imprinting femtoscopic correlations between continuum pairs of particles at small relative momentum difference. We give a concise theoretical derivation of the coalescence-correlation relation, predicting nuclear cluster spectra from femtoscopic measurements. We review the fact that coalescence derives from a relativistic Bethe-Salpeter equation, and recall how effective quantum mechanics controls the dynamics of cluster particles that are nonrelativistic in the cluster center-of-mass frame. We demonstrate that the coalescence-correlation relation is roughly consistent with the observed cluster spectra in systems ranging from PbPb to pPb and pp collisions. Paying special attention to nuclear wave functions, we derive the coalescence prediction for the hypertriton and show that it, too, is roughly consistent with the data. Our work motivates a combined experimental programme addressing femtoscopy and cluster production under a unified framework. Upcoming pp, pPb, and peripheral PbPb data analyzed within such a program could stringently test coalescence as the origin of clusters