132 research outputs found

    The power of the Monstrous: An introduction to the special issue

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    Alterity and Otherness have often been the privileged field of contemplation within Western philosophy. Since the Presocratic philosophers, Being has been defined in relation to – and more often opposed to – non-Being, just as Goodness has been considered in relation to Evil, Beauty in relation to the Ugly, Society in relation to Nature, and the examples could be multiplied ad libitum. Every identity is shaped in opposition to an excluded other, an outside, or some thing. Identity and alterity are thus constructed as two inseparable sides of a single, coherent philosophical discourse, or rather a field of various discourses that comprise a philosophy, associated with - although not limited to - the early centuries of what we call modernity

    Freedom, equality and conflict: Rousseau on Machiavelli

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    Rousseau’s praise for Machiavelli in the Social Contract goes along with his condemnation of partial association and political conflicts. Yet Machiavelli builds his theory precisely around the idea of the constructive role of conflicts, seeing the irreducible multiplicity of the many as the source of a positive conflictuality. Is the ontological primacy of Rousseau’s singularity in the general will compatible with the political primacy of Machiavelli’s conflictual multiplicity? By exploring Rousseau’s strategy in his use of Machiavelli, I will argue that the key to interpreting the ambiguities of Rousseau’s reading lies in the evaluation of the differences in the relationship between multiplicity and singularity in both authors. While the people produces an immanent and conflictualistic ground for power in Machiavelli, in Rousseau it is subjected to a transcendent process of ontological submission to the general will

    Monstrous Individuations: Deleuze, Simondon, and Relational Ontology

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    Starting with Gilbert Simondon's theory of the individual (singular and collective) and its genesis, developed in his book L'individuation psychique et collective, this article discusses the principle of individuation and the critique of finalism. Simondon distinguishes and yet strictly binds together the two individuations that he calls psychique and collective, which is necessary, he argues, to avoid the double failure of psychologism and sociologism, by which he means the doctrines that assign a fixed (ontological) identity to man and his mind, on the one hand, and to society, on the other. Both psychologism and sociologism, according to Simondon, fail to understand their only reality, which is first and foremost relational. Influenced by Simondon's ontology, Gilles Deleuze's concept of nomadism is taken up in order to develop the idea of a principle of individuation intended as a critique of teleology. The question of individuation is thus referred to its ontological roots in the conflict between Aristotelian metaphysics (priority of act over power [potentia] and of final cause over efficient and material causes) and Spinozist metaphysics (power [potentia] existing only in act, absolute immanence, radical criticism of every teleology). This essay shows what is at stake between the two authors and what Deleuze could not have derived from Simondon, which Del Lucchese calls a Spinozistic problematic

    Tres medici, duo athei? The Physician as Atheist and the Medicalization of the Soul

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    Until recently, examinations of the ‘mind-body problem’ in historical context paid only cursory attention to its specifically medical dimension, if at all. At best, some ‘folk physiology’ was entertained, usually to laugh at it (the pineal gland, animal spirits). Conversely, historians of neuroscience or of artificial intelligence (Jeannerod 1985, Dupuy 2000) often present figures like La Mettrie as heroic early cases of ‘naturalization’, giving an experimental basis to materialism: their symmetrically inverse mistake is to take professions of medical authority too literally (although there are genuine cases where all of the above does coalesce – where ‘actors’ categories mysteriously transcend historiographic projections –, such as Hieronymus Gaub’s reflections on the ‘regimen of the mind’ in the mid-eighteenth century, or, more theoretically, Guillaume Lamy’s Epicurean-inflected Anatomical Discourses on the Soul, eighty years earlier). Contrary to the denial of the relevance of medicine in early modern philosophy, as regards issues such as the body-soul (then body-mind) relation among others, it seems patently difficult to separate medical theory, medically nourished philosophical speculation, and metaphysics. This is the case, whether in Descartes, Gaub, the ‘animist’ Georg-Ernest Stahl, or materialists such as Guillaume Lamy and La Mettrie: medicine, or rather ‘a certain idea of medicine’, is everywhere. Here I focus on the motif of a radical medicine – a medical precursor of the Radical Enlightenment (Israel 2001, 2006, 2007), symbolized negatively by the slogan, tres medici, duo athei, or ‘where there are three doctors, there are two atheists’, i.e. medicine as a basis for atheism. This theme runs through various works of medical or medico-theological propaganda: Thomas Browne’s 1643 De religio medici begins with Browne regretting rumors of doctors being atheists as the “general scandal of my Profession”; Germain de Bezançon’s 1677 Les mĂ©decins Ă  la censure works hard at rebutting the saying, “Bon Physicien, mauvais chrĂ©tien.” But these are examples of the fear of a radical medicine – a medicine that denies the existence of an immortal soul, or even defends materialism and atheism. Are there positive statements of this doctrine? Indeed, attacks on it are much more common than statements identifying with it, like medical versions of natural theology in general. In fact, just as there were theologically motivated medical works, there were also medically motivated works of radical or heretical theology, like William Coward’s Second Thoughts on the Human Soul (Coward 1702, building on Overton 1644), which engaged in polemics concerning the nature of the soul – mortal or immortal? (Thomson 2008). Parallel to the mortalist trend, but flowing into a common genre of radical, medico-materialist texts (sometimes anonymous, such as L’Âme MatĂ©rielle, from the 1720s) are at least two other strands of radical medicine: a post-Cartesian focus on medicina mentis and the nature of the mind (Henricus Regius, Hieronymus Gaub, Antoine Le Camus), and an Epicurean medicine, in which mind and body are organismically united, with an additional hedonistic component, notably in Lamy, Mandeville and La Mettrie (Wright 1991, Wolfe and van Esveld 2014). The focus on a medicine of the mind (Corneanu, ms. 2013) is obviously connected to a ‘medicalization of the soul’: there was a body-soul problem in and for medicine, a sort of medicalized ‘pneumatology’. Radical medicine is located somewhere in between the early forms of ‘naturalization’ or ‘medicalization’ of the soul and the pose of scientific neutrality that is characteristic of early nineteenth-century medicine (as in Cabanis, Bichat or Bernard): it is a short-lived episode. I seek to reconstruct this intellectual figure, in which mortalist, post-Cartesian and Epicurean strands intersect and sometimes come together. I suggest that medically influenced materialism in the Radical Enlightenment (e.g. in the later French cases, La Mettrie, MĂ©nuret and Diderot), is different from later, more experimentally focused and more quantitatively oriented forms of medical materialism, precisely because of its radical dimension. This radical medicine often insists on vitality, as opposed to “anatomie cadavĂ©rique”: it is vital and hedonistic, a medicine concerned with maintaining bodily pleasure.Until recently, examinations of the 'mind-body problem' in historical context paid only cursory attention to its specifically medical dimension, if at all. At best, some 'folk physiology' was entertained, usually to laugh at it (the pineal gland, animal spirits). Conversely, historians of neuroscience or of artificial intelligence (Jeannerod M, The brain machine. The development of neurophysiological thought, trans. D. Urion, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1985; Dupuy J-P, The mechanization of the mind: on the origins of cognitive science, trans. M.B. DeBevoise, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2000) often present figures like La Mettrie as heroic early cases of 'naturalization', giving an experimental basis to materialism: their symmetrically inverse mistake is to take professions of medical authority too literally (although there are genuine cases where all of the above does coalesce where 'actors' categories mysteriously transcend historiographic projections -, such as Hieronymus Gaub's reflections on the 'regimen of the mind' in the mid-eighteenth century, or, more theoretically, Guillaume Lamy's Epicurean-inflected Anatomical Discourses on the Soul, eighty years earlier). Contrary to the denial of the relevance of medicine in early modern philosophy, as regards issues such as the body-soul (then body-mind) relation among others, it seems patently difficult to separate medical theory, medically nourished philosophical speculation, and metaphysics. This is the case, whether in Descartes, Gaub, the 'animist' Georg-Ernest Stahl, or materialists such as Guillaume Lamy and La Mettrie: medicine, or rather 'a certain idea of medicine', is everywhere.Here I focus on the motif of a radical medicine - a medical precursor of the Radical Enlightenment (Israel J, Radical enlightenment. Philosophy and the making of modernity, 1650-1750, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001; Israel J, Enlightenment contested. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006, Israel J, Enlightenment, radical enlightenment and the "medical revolution" of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In: Grell OP, Cunningham A (ed) Medicine and religion in enlightenment Europe. Ashgate, Aldershot, pp 5-28, 2007), symbolized negatively by the slogan, tres medici, duo athei, or 'where there are three doctors, there are two atheists', i.e. medicine as a basis for atheism. This theme runs through various works of medical or medico-theological propaganda: Thomas Browne's 1643 De religio medici begins with Browne regretting rumors of doctors being atheists as the "general scandal of my Profession"; Germain de Bezancon's 1677 Les medecins a la censure works hard at rebutting the saying, "Bon Physicien, mauvais chretien." But these are examples of the fear of a radical medicine - a medicine that denies the existence of an immortal soul, or even defends materialism and atheism. Are there positive statements of this doctrine? Indeed, attacks on it are much more common than statements identifying with it, like medical versions of natural theology in general.In fact, just as there were theologically motivated medical works, there were also medically motivated works of radical or heretical theology, like William Coward's Second Thoughts on the Human Soul (Coward W, Second thoughts on the human soul. R. Basset, London, 1702, building on Overton 1644), which engaged in polemics concerning the nature of the soul - mortal or immortal? (Thomson A, Bodies of thought: science, religion, and the soul in the early enlightenment. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008). Parallel to the mortalist trend, but flowing into a common genre of radical, medico-materialist texts (sometimes anonymous, such as L'Ame Materielle, from the 1720s) are at least two other strands of radical medicine: a post-Cartesian focus on medicina mentis and the nature of the mind (Henricus Regius, Hieronymus Gaub, Antoine Le Camus), and an Epicurean medicine, in which mind and body are organismically united, with an additional hedonistic component, notably in Lamy, Mandeville and La Mettrie (Wright JP, Locke, Willis, and the seventeenth-century epicurean soul. In: Osler MJ (ed) Atoms, Pneuma, and Tranquillity: Epicurean and stoic themes in European thought. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 239-258, 1991; Wolfe CT, van Esveld M, The material soul: strategies for naturalising the soul in an early modern epicurean context. In: Kambaskovic D (ed) Conjunctions: body, soul and mind from Plato to the enlightenment. Springer, Dordrecht, pp 371-421, 2014). The focus on a medicine of the mind (Corneanu, (ms. 2013), The care of the whole man: medicine and theology in the late renaissance, 2013) is obviously connected to a 'medicalization of the soul': there was a body-soul problem in and for medicine, a sort of medicalized 'pneumatology'. Radical medicine is located somewhere in between the early forms of 'naturalization' or 'medicalization' of the soul and the pose of scientific neutrality that is characteristic of early nineteenth-century medicine (as in Cabanis, Bichat or Bernard): it is a short-lived episode. I seek to reconstruct this intellectual figure, in which mortalist, post-Cartesian and Epicurean strands intersect and sometimes come together. I suggest that medically influenced materialism in the Radical Enlightenment (e.g. in the later French cases, La Mettrie, Menuret and Diderot), is different from later, more experimentally focused and more quantitatively oriented forms of medical materialism, precisely because of its radical dimension. This radical medicine often insists on vitality, as opposed to "anatomie cadaverique": it is vital and hedonistic, a medicine concerned with maintaining bodily pleasure

    Appendectomy during the COVID-19 pandemic in Italy: a multicenter ambispective cohort study by the Italian Society of Endoscopic Surgery and new technologies (the CRAC study)

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    Major surgical societies advised using non-operative management of appendicitis and suggested against laparoscopy during the COVID-19 pandemic. The hypothesis is that a significant reduction in the number of emergent appendectomies was observed during the pandemic, restricted to complex cases. The study aimed to analyse emergent surgical appendectomies during pandemic on a national basis and compare it to the same period of the previous year. This is a multicentre, retrospective, observational study investigating the outcomes of patients undergoing emergent appendectomy in March-April 2019 vs March-April 2020. The primary outcome was the number of appendectomies performed, classified according to the American Association for the Surgery of Trauma (AAST) score. Secondary outcomes were the type of surgical technique employed (laparoscopic vs open) and the complication rates. One thousand five hundred forty one patients with acute appendicitis underwent surgery during the two study periods. 1337 (86.8%) patients met the inclusion criteria: 546 (40.8%) patients underwent surgery for acute appendicitis in 2020 and 791 (59.2%) in 2019. According to AAST, patients with complicated appendicitis operated in 2019 were 30.3% vs 39.9% in 2020 (p = 0.001). We observed an increase in the number of post-operative complications in 2020 (15.9%) compared to 2019 (9.6%) (p < 0.001). The following determinants increased the likelihood of complication occurrence: undergoing surgery during 2020 (+ 67%), the increase of a unit in the AAST score (+ 26%), surgery performed > 24 h after admission (+ 58%), open surgery (+ 112%) and conversion to open surgery (+ 166%). In Italian hospitals, in March and April 2020, the number of appendectomies has drastically dropped. During the first pandemic wave, patients undergoing surgery were more frequently affected by more severe appendicitis than the previous year's timeframe and experienced a higher number of complications. Trial registration number and date: Research Registry ID 5789, May 7th, 202

    Philosophy as political technē: The tradition of invention in Simondon’s political thought

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    Gilbert Simondon has recently attracted the interest of political philosophers and theorists, despite he is rather renowned as a philosopher of technics – as the author of Of the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects – who also elaborated a general theory of complex systems in Individuation in the Light of the Notions of Form and Information. A group of scholars has developed Gilles Deleuze’s early suggestion that Simondon’s social ontology might offer the basis for a re-theorisation of radical democracy. Others, following Herbert Marcuse, have instead focused on Simondon’s analysis of the relationship between technology and society. However, only a joint study of Simondon’s two major works can reveal their implicit political stakes. As I will argue, Simondon’s anti-Aristotelianism and his anti-Heideggerian understanding of the Greek origins of philosophy, allow us to conceive philosophical thought as a ‘tradition of invention’, that is, a pedagogical technē endowed with the political task of maintaining the openness of the social system and allowing normative invention to emerge from within
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