Party platforms in electoral competition with heterogeneous constituencies

This paper shows how political parties differentiate to reduce electoral competition. Two parties choose platforms in a unidimensional policy space, and then candidates from these parties compete for votes in a continuum of constituencies with different median voters. Departing from their parties' platforms is costly enough that candidates do not take the median voter's preferred position in every constituency. Because the candidate whose party is located closer to the median voter gets a higher expected payoff, parties acting in their candidates' best interests differentiate---when one party locates right of center, the other prefers to locate strictly left of center to carve out a "home turf,'' constituencies that can be won with little to no deviation from the platform of the candidate's party. Hence, competition that pulls candidates together pushes parties apart. Decreasing "campaign costs'' increases party differentiation as the leftist party must move further from the rightist party to carve out its home turf, as does increasing heterogeneity across constituencies.Political parties, median voter, Hotelling competition

Cursed Equilibrium

There is evidence that people do not fully take into account how other people’s actions are contingent on these others’ information. This paper defines and applies a new equilibrium concept in games with private information, "cursed equilibrium", which assumes that each player correctly predicts the distribution of other players’ actions, but underestimates the degree to which these actions are correlated with these other players’ information. We apply the concept to common-values auctions, where cursed equilibrium captures the widely observed phenomenon of the winner’s curse. We also show how cursed equilibrium predicts other empirically observed phenomena, such as trade in adverse- selection settings where conventional analysis predicts no trade, and "naïve" voting in elections and juries where rational-choice models predict that voters fully take into account the informational content in being pivotal.

Party Platforms in Electoral Competition with many constituencies

This paper uses the Hotelling-Downs spatial model of electoral competition between candidates to explore competition between political parties. Two parties choose platforms in a unidimensional policy space, and then in a continuum of constituencies with different median voters candidates from the two parties compete in first-past-the-post elections. Departing from party platform is costly enough that candidates do not take the median voters preferred position in each constituency. In equilibrium, parties acting in their candidates best interests differentiate when one party locates right of center, the other prefers to locate strictly left of center to carve out a home turf,  consituencies that can be won with little to no deviation from party platform. Hence, Downsian competition that pulls candidates together pushes parties apart. Decreasing campaign costs  increases party differentiation as the leftist party must move further from the rightist party to carve out its home turf. For a range of costs, parties take more extreme positions than their most extreme candidates. For small costs, parties are too extreme to maximize voter welfare, whereas for large costs they are not extreme enough.electoral competition, spatial competition, Hotelling-Downs model

Low-Skill Workers' Access to Quality Green Jobs

Explores the potential for the green jobs market to help low-skill workers gain needed skills and higher wages. Offers recommendations for improving training efforts, including curricular reforms and financial support, and examples of innovative programs

The Optimum Ph for Diastase of Malt Activity

Author Institution: The Charles F. Kettering Foundation, Yellow Springs, Ohi

Effects of Certain Inorganic Ions on Corn Leaf Catalase

Author Institution: The Charles F. Kettering Foundation, Yellow Springs, Ohi

Interim Evaluation of the West Virginia State Module: A Long Range Follow-up of Adult Basic Education Participants

An interim evaluation report of the West Virginia State Module on the Long Range Follow-up of Adult Basic Education Participants submitted by George W. Eyster in March of 1969

Interim Evaluation of the Georgia State Module: Adult Basic Education Recruitment Program

An interim evaluation of the Georgia State Module on the Adult Basic Education Recruitment Program submitted by George W. Eyster in March of 1969

1969 Interim Evaluation of the Ohio State Module: Adult Basic Education Life-Centered Curricula Development and Teaching Techniques

The 1969 Interim Evaluation of the Ohio State Module: Adult Basic Education Life-Centered Curricula Development and Teaching Techniques submitted by George W. Eyster