Applying Quadratic Scoring Rule transparently in multiple choice settings: A note

The quadratic scoring rule (QSR) is often used to guarantee an incentive compatible elicitation of subjective probabilities over events. Experimentalists have regularly not been able to ensure that subjects fully comprehend the consequences of their actions on payoffs given the rules of the games. In this note, we present a procedure that allows the transparent use of the QSR even in multiple-choice scenarios. For that purpose, two methodological means are applied: an alternative representation of the score and a short learning period to familiarize subjects with the payoff mechanism. The results suggest that both means were necessary and successful in facilitating subjects’ understanding of the rule.quadratic scoring rule, belief elicitation, saliency, experiment

Applying Quadratic Scoring Rule transparently in multiple choice settings: A note

The quadratic scoring rule (QSR) is often used to guarantee an incentive compatible elicitation of subjective probabilities over events. Experimentalists have regularly not been able to ensure that subjects fully comprehend the consequences of their actions on payoffs given the rules of the games. In this note, we present a procedure that allows the transparent use of the QSR even in multiple-choice scenarios. For that purpose, two methodological means are applied: an alternative representation of the score and a short learning period to familiarize subjects with the payoff mechanism. The results suggest that both means were necessary and successful in facilitating subjects' understanding of the rule.Quadratic scoring rule, experimental methodology, experimental design

Accepting zero in the ultimatum game does not reflect selfish preferences

First Version (“Accepting Zero in the Ulti matum Game: Selfish Nash Response?”): January 2013.The study shows that subjects who set their minimum acceptable offer equal to zero in an ultimatum game (UG) are the most generous dictators in a dictator game. The finding implies that interpreting indiscriminately the acceptance of low UG offers as payoff maximization can be misleading and suggests that altruism and/or the desire to maximize welfare are to a large extent behind

Applying quadratic scoring rule transparently in multiple choice setting: a note

The quadratic scoring rule (QSR) is often used to guarantee an incentive compatible elicitation of subjective probabilities over events. Experimentalists have regularly not been able to ensure that subjects fully comprehend the consequences of their actions on payoffs given the rules of the games. In this note, we present a procedure that allows the transparent use of the QSR even in multiple-choice scenarios. For that purpose, two methodological means are applied: an alternative representation of the score and a short learning period to familiarize subjects with the payoff mechanism. The results suggest that both means were necessary and successful in facilitating subjects’ understanding of the rule

Fair and unfair punishers coexist in the Ultimatum Game

In the Ultimatum Game, a proposer suggests how to split a sum of money with a responder. If the responder rejects the proposal, both players get nothing. Rejection of unfair offers is regarded as a form of punishment implemented by fair-minded individuals, who are willing to impose the cooperation norm at a personal cost. However, recent research using other experimental frameworks has observed non-negligible levels of antisocial punishment by competitive, spiteful individuals, which can eventually undermine cooperation. Using two large-scale experiments, this note explores the nature of Ultimatum Game punishers by analyzing their behavior in a Dictator Game. In both studies, the coexistence of two entirely different sub-populations is confirmed: prosocial punishers on the one hand, who behave fairly as dictators, and spiteful (antisocial) punishers on the other, who are totally unfair. The finding has important implications regarding the evolution of cooperation and the behavioral underpinnings of stable social systems

The separate effects of self-estimated and actual alcohol intoxication on risk-taking: a field experiment

First
 Version
(“Alcohol
 Consumption 
and 
Risk 
Attitude”):
 October 
2008.Many risky actions are carried out under the influence of alcohol. However, the effect of alcoholic intoxication over the willingness to take risks is complex and still remains unclear. We conduct an economic field experiment in a natural, drinking and risk-taking environment to analyze how both actual and self-estimated blood alcohol concentration (BAC) levels influence subjects’ choices over monetary lotteries. Our results reveal a negative impact of both actual and self-estimated BAC levels on risk-taking. However, for male and young subjects, we find a positive relationship between BAC underestimation (a pattern of estimation error which mainly occurs at high BAC levels) and the willingness to choose riskier lotteries. Our findings suggest that a risk compensation mechanism is activated only when individuals’ own intoxication level is consciously self-perceived to be high. We conclude therefore that human propensity to engage in risky activities under the influence of alcohol is not due to an enhanced preference for risky choices. In addition to the suggestion in the existing literature that such propensity is due to a weakened ability to perceive risks, our results indicate that an impaired self-perception of own intoxication level may also be an important factor.Financial
 support 
from 
the 
Spanish 
Ministry
 of 
Science
 and Innovation (SEJ2010‐17049/ECON),
 the
 Regional
 Programs SEJ‐02547,
 SEJ‐340
 and
 SEJ‐023
 of
 the
 Regional
 Government 
of 
Andalusia


A review of agent-based modelling of climate-energy policy

Unidad de excelencia María de Maeztu CEX2019-000940-MAltres ajuts: Russian Science Foundation. Grant Number: 19-18-00262Agent-based models (ABMs) have recently seen much application to the field of climate mitigation policies. They offer a more realistic description of micro behaviour than traditional climate policy models by allowing for agent heterogeneity, bounded rationality and non-market interactions over social networks. This enables the analysis of a broader spectrum of policies. Here, we review 61 ABM studies addressing climate-energy policy aimed at emissions reduction, product and technology diffusion, and energy conservation. This covers a broad set of instruments of climate policy, ranging from carbon taxation and emissions trading through adoption subsidies to information provision tools such as smart meters and eco-labels. Our treatment pays specific attention to behavioural assumptions and the structure of social networks. We offer suggestions for future research with ABMs to answer neglected policy question

Economic experiments outside the lab

Tesis Univ. Granada. Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económic

Author Correction: Energy-related behaviour and rebound when rationality, self-interest and willpower are limited

In the version of this article initially published, the Acknowledgements section, now reading “This study has received funding through an ERC Advanced Grant from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement no. 741087),” was omitted and has now been inserted in the HTML and PDF versions of the article

Energy-related behaviour and rebound when rationality, self-interest and willpower are limited

The extent to which adopting energy-efficient technologies results in energy savings depends on how such technologies are used, and how monetary savings from energy efficiency are spent. Energy rebound occurs when potential energy savings are diminished due to post-adoption behaviour. Here we review empirical studies on how six behavioural regularities affect three energy-relevant decisions and ultimately rebound: adoption of energy-saving products or practices, their intensity of use and spending of associated monetary savings. The findings suggest that behaviours that reflect limited rationality and willpower may increase rebound, while the effects of behaviours driven by bounded self-interest are less clear. We then describe how interventions associated with each of the behavioural regularities can influence rebound and thus serve to achieve higher energy savings. Future research ought to study energy-relevant decisions in a more integrated manner, with a particular focus on re-spending as this presents the greatest challenge for research and policy