Infants recruit logic to learn about the social world

When perceptually available information is scant, we can leverage logical connections among hypotheses to draw reliable conclusions that guide our reasoning and learning. We investigate whether this function of logical reasoning is present in infancy and aid understanding and learning about the social environment. In our task, infants watch reaching actions directed toward a hidden object whose identity is ambiguous between two alternatives and has to be inferred by elimination. Here we show that infants apply a disjunctive inference to identify the hidden object and use this logical conclusion to assess the consistency of the actions with a preference previously demonstrated by the agent and, importantly, also to acquire new knowledge regarding the preferences of the observed actor. These findings suggest that, early in life, preverbal logical reasoning functions as a reliable source of evidence that can support learning by offering a logical route for knowledge acquisition.https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-020-19734-

Can infants adopt underspecified contents into attributed beliefs? Representational prerequisites of theory of mind

Recent evidence suggests that young infants, as well as nonhuman apes, can anticipate others’ behavior based on their false beliefs. While such behaviors have been proposed to be accounted by simple associations between agents, objects, and locations, human adults are undoubtedly endowed with sophisticated theory of mind abilities. For example, they can attribute mental contents about abstract or non-existing entities, or beliefs whose content is poorly specified. While such endeavors may be human specific, it is unclear whether the representational apparatus that allows for encoding such beliefs is present early in development. In four experiments we asked whether 15-month-old infants are able to attribute beliefs with underspecified content, update their content later, and maintain attributed beliefs that are unknown to be true or false. In Experiment 1, infants observed as an agent hid an object to an unspecified location. This location was later revealed in the absence or presence of the agent, and the object was then hidden again to an unspecified location. Then the infants could search for the object while the agent was away. Their search was biased to the revealed location (that could be represented as the potential content of the agent’s belief when she had not witnessed the re-hiding), suggesting that they (1) first attributed an underspecified belief to the agent, (2) later updated the content of this belief, and (3) were primed by this content in their own action even though its validity was unknown. This priming effect was absent when the agent witnessed the re-hiding of the object, and thus her belief about the earlier location of the object did not have to be sustained. The same effect was observed when infants searched for a different toy (Experiment 2) or when an additional spatial transformation was introduced (Experiment 4), but not when the spatial transformation disrupted belief updating (Experiment 3). These data suggest that infants’ representational apparatus is prepared to efficiently track other agents’ beliefs online, encode underspecified beliefs and define their content later, possibly reflecting a crucial characteristic of mature theory of mind: using a meta representational format for ascribed beliefs.Published versio

The pupillometry of the possible: an investigation of infants' representation of alternative possibilities

Contrasting possibilities has a fundamental adaptive value for prediction and learning. Developmental research, however, yielded controversial findings. Some data suggest that preschoolers might have trouble in planning actions that take into account mutually exclusive possibilities, while other studies revealed an early understanding of alternative future outcomes based on infants' looking behaviour. To better understand the origin of such abilities, here we use pupil dilation as a potential indicator of infants' representation of possibilities. Ten- and fourteen-month-olds were engaged in an object-identification task by watching video animations where three different objects with identical top parts moved behind two screens. Importantly, a target object emerged from one of the screens but remained in partial occlusion, revealing only its top part, which was compatible with a varying number of possible identities. Just as adults' pupil diameter grows monotonically with the amount of information held in memory, we expected that infants' pupil size would increase with the number of alternatives sustained in memory as candidate identities for the partially occluded object. We found that pupil diameter increased with the object's potential identities in fourteen- but not in ten-month-olds. We discuss the implications of these results for the foundation of humans’ capacities to represent alternatives

Intuitions of probabilities shape expectations about the future at 12 months and beyond

Rational agents should integrate probabilities in their predictions about uncertain future events. However, whether humans can do this, and if so, how this ability originates, are controversial issues. Here, we show that 12-month-olds have rational expectations about the future based on estimations of event possibilities, without the need of sampling past experiences. We also show that such natural expectations influence preschoolers’ reaction times, while frequencies modify motor responses, but not overt judgments, only after 4 years of age. Our results suggest that at the onset of human decision processes the mind contains an intuition of elementary probability that cannot be reduced to the encountered frequency of events orelementary heuristics

Combinatorial thought in infancy: Language processing reveals conceptual combination

The unparalleled productivity of the human mind rests on our ability to combine a finite set of simple representations into an infinity of complex thoughts, a process often implemented in language. To investigate the developmental origins of combinatorial thought, we tested whether infants combine concepts linked to words they have just acquired. Across three eye-tracking experiments, 12-month-olds (N = 60) learned two novel quantity labels (e.g., “mize” for 1; “padu” for 2 items), and combined them with familiar nouns (e.g., “duck”) to identify referents of quantified noun phrases (e.g., “padu duck”) in an adult-like manner. Thus, combinatorial processes for setting up complex representations are available already in infancy and may support building complex models of experience for learning and language development

EYE TRACKING [composition]

This is a project repository for Pomiechowska, B, Brody, G., Teglas, E., & Kovacs, A. Combinatorial thought in infancy: Language processing reveals conceptual combination

Dogs' Gaze Following Is Tuned to Human Communicative Signals

Summary Recent evidence suggests that preverbal infants' gaze following can be triggered only if an actor's head turn is preceded by the expression of communicative intent [1]. Such connectedness between ostensive and referential signals may be uniquely human, enabling infants to effectively respond to referential communication directed to them. In the light of increasing evidence of dogs' social communicative skills [2], an intriguing question is whether dogs' responsiveness to human directional gestures [3] is associated with the situational context in an infant-like manner. Borrowing a method used in infant studies [1], dogs watched video presentations of a human actor turning toward one of two objects, and their eye-gaze patterns were recorded with an eye tracker. Results show a higher tendency of gaze following in dogs when the human's head turning was preceded by the expression of communicative intent (direct gaze, addressing). This is the first evidence to show that (1) eye-tracking techniques can be used for studying dogs' social skills and (2) the exploitation of human gaze cues depends on the communicatively relevant pattern of ostensive and referential signals in dogs. Our findings give further support to the existence of a functionally infant-analog social competence in this species