35 research outputs found
Statutory Underpinning: A Threat to Press Freedom?
Newspaper bosses are considering their next move following the Royal Charter deal and many maintain their strong objections to the statutory underpinning proposed by Leveson. In an exclusive preview of his remarks at the upcoming Media Law after Leveson workshop in Oxford, Eric Barendt, Emeritus Professor of Media Law at University College London, looks back at the case made for statute and finds it lacking
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Privacy, Free Speech and Ruthlessness: The Australian Law Reform Commission's Report, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era
Judicial Review, Irrationality, and the Limits of Intervention by the Courts
When exercising judicial review, the courts, on occasions, have intervened in circumstances where administrative decisions were not irrational. However, these low standards of judicial intervention are arguably constitutional, especially since the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA). To this end, this article seeks to establish a zone of executive decision-making, for reasons of democracy, where the courts are clearly excluded. But it is unable to do so. Does this mean, therefore, that judicial intervention on the grounds of irrationality exists without limit? Assuming this to be the case, it is suggested that the courts should show greater respect to the administrative branch of the state where it has genuinely sought to engage with the legal process in arriving at its decisions
Freedom of Expression in the United Kingdom Under the Human Rights Act 1998
Symposium: An Ocean Apart? Freedom of Expression in Europe and the United States. This Article was originally written in French and delivered as a conference paper at a symposium held by the Center for American Law of the University of Paris II (Panthèon-Assas) on January 18-19, 2008
Freedom and privacy of speech: balancing two rights
Privacy and freedom of speech are important human rights, but until recently they have not been strongly protected in English law.
In English law freedom of speech has traditionally been a residual liberty, in that it existed only when its exercise was not restricted by statute or by the common law.
Libel law, largely still governed by the common law, is concerned with the protection of an individual’s right to reputation; it has been an important restriction on the exercise of free speech and freedom of the press.
But there has been no explicit right to privacy, and I will spend a little time explaining why privacy has been left unprotected by the law.
Both rights are guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which has been incorporated into the law of the United Kingdom by the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA