Making Mountains of Debt Out of Molehills: The Pro-Cyclical Implications of Tax and Expenditure Limitations

This paper presents evidence that property tax limits have detrimental effects on state and local revenues during recessions. Property tax limits cause states to rely on income–elastic revenue sources, such as the income tax or charges and fees. Greater reliance on these revenue sources results in greater revenue declines during economic downturns. We present analysis of time–series, cross–sectional data for the U.S. states for each of these conclusions. Our results suggest that states would have fewer and more modest financial problems during economic downturns if they did not enact property tax limitations

The rise of European Commercial Association during the Middle Ages

The unity of Western Europe has not yet approached the political, economic and religious entity realized under the Roman Empire. Nor is it likely to duplicate such a centralized and authoritative basis of organization. It is the purpose of this paper to explore European economic association on the basis of co-operation rather than dominance. For this purpose historical cornerstones of economic co-operation and commercial endeavor will be discussed. ... Among them the individuals and groups who pursued trade not only revived the collapsed commerce known to the Roman world, but provided the framework for modern commercial and financial activity and cooperation. Their motives were, no doubt, selfish, since basic human self-interest is a commanding force. The results, however, were liberating, both socially and politically, as well as economically. Thus the Medieval commercial heritage is enjoyed not only in the lands of North and West Europe, but in the Western Hemisphere as well today. It seems singularly important in explaining political as well as economic developments of the twentieth century

For Whom the TEL Tolls: Can State Tax and Expenditure Limits Effectively Reduce Spending?

Can voters stop state governments from spending at high rates through the enactment of tax and expenditure limits (TELs), or do these laws become dead letters? We draw upon the principal-agent literature to theorize that TELs – one of the most frequent uses of the initiative process across the country – may be circumvented by the sorts of elected officials who would inspire their passage. In order to investigate our claim, we conduct an event study. First, we test for the effectiveness of TELs across states using a differences-in-differences model. Second, we dissect our treatment variable using different legal provisions of the limits to test whether there is a uniform effect across different types of TELs. Finally, we compare state fiscal patterns before and after adoption on a state-by-state basis. Using this simple approach and other methods, we show that TELs are largely ineffective, and that state officials can circumvent them by raising money through fees or borrowing. Our finding is consistent with recent studies showing that policies passed through direct democracy can often be thwarted by the politicians charged with implementing them

For Whom the TEL Tolls: Can State Tax and Expenditure Limits Effectively Reduce Spending?

Can voters stop state governments from spending at high rates through the enactment of tax and expenditure limits (TELs), or do these laws become dead letters? We draw upon the principal-agent literature to theorize that TELs – one of the most frequent uses of the initiative process across the country – may be circumvented by the sorts of elected officials who would inspire their passage. In order to investigate our claim, we conduct an event study. First, we test for the effectiveness of TELs across states using a differences-in-differences model. Second, we dissect our treatment variable using different legal provisions of the limits to test whether there is a uniform effect across different types of TELs. Finally, we compare state fiscal patterns before and after adoption on a state-by-state basis. Using this simple approach and other methods, we show that TELs are largely ineffective, and that state officials can circumvent them by raising money through fees or borrowing. Our finding is consistent with recent studies showing that policies passed through direct democracy can often be thwarted by the politicians charged with implementing them

The rise of European Commercial Association during the Middle Ages

The unity of Western Europe has not yet approached the political, economic and religious entity realized under the Roman Empire. Nor is it likely to duplicate such a centralized and authoritative basis of organization. It is the purpose of this paper to explore European economic association on the basis of co-operation rather than dominance. For this purpose historical cornerstones of economic co-operation and commercial endeavor will be discussed. ... Among them the individuals and groups who pursued trade not only revived the collapsed commerce known to the Roman world, but provided the framework for modern commercial and financial activity and cooperation. Their motives were, no doubt, selfish, since basic human self-interest is a commanding force. The results, however, were liberating, both socially and politically, as well as economically. Thus the Medieval commercial heritage is enjoyed not only in the lands of North and West Europe, but in the Western Hemisphere as well today. It seems singularly important in explaining political as well as economic developments of the twentieth century

The general equilibrium of tax and expenditure limits

This dissertation analyzes the effectiveness of tax and expenditure limits. I contend that these limits are frequently implemented unfaithfully. Further, the politics of circumvention used to evade these limits causes unintended secondary and tertiary effects. To understand the policy implementation process, I apply principal-agent theory. The first chapter of my dissertation analyzes the effectiveness of tax and expenditure limits empirically. I pay close attention to pitfalls of time-series, cross- sectional data. Specifically, I account for violations of Guass-Markov caused by serial correlation or heteroskedasticity. I employ flexible TEL indicators to test for temporary and heterogeneous effects of the limits. In the second chapter I leverage two conditions previously shown to produce successful delegation to agents from the principal-agent literature. I apply each condition to the case of tax and expenditure limits and test whether or not limits are more effective when these conditions are met. My results show that tax and expenditure limits are more successfully when implemented by agents that share ideological convictions for cutting the size of government. I also present suggestive evidence that making limits easier to monitor makes them more effective. My third chapter focuses on the secondary and tertiary consequences of tax and expenditure limits. Specifically, I present evidence that property tax limits have detrimental effects on state and local revenues during recessions. Property tax limits cause states to rely on income-elastic revenue sources which cause greater revenue declines during economic downturns. Finally, my fourth chapter is a case study of Massachusetts' 1980 Property Tax Limit, Proposition 2 1/2. This initiative limits municipal property taxes to growth by 2.5% per year. In this chapter I look at the formula used to calculate the limit, highlighting how changes to this formula over time have made the limit less effective. I also analyze the extent to which revenue substitution, such as increases in state aid and charges and the extent to which revenue substitution, such as increases in state aid and charges and fees, can be attributed to the property tax limi

Common inheritance of chromosome Ia associated with clonal expansion of Toxoplasma gondii

Toxoplasma gondii is a globally distributed protozoan parasite that can infect virtually all warm-blooded animals and humans. Despite the existence of a sexual phase in the life cycle, T. gondii has an unusual population structure dominated by three clonal lineages that predominate in North America and Europe, (Types I, II, and III). These lineages were founded by common ancestors ~10,000 yr ago. The recent origin and widespread distribution of the clonal lineages is attributed to the circumvention of the sexual cycle by a new mode of transmission—asexual transmission between intermediate hosts. Asexual transmission appears to be multigenic and although the specific genes mediating this trait are unknown, it is predicted that all members of the clonal lineages should share the same alleles. Genetic mapping studies suggested that chromosome Ia was unusually monomorphic compared with the rest of the genome. To investigate this further, we sequenced chromosome Ia and chromosome Ib in the Type I strain, RH, and the Type II strain, ME49. Comparative genome analyses of the two chromosomal sequences revealed that the same copy of chromosome Ia was inherited in each lineage, whereas chromosome Ib maintained the same high frequency of between-strain polymorphism as the rest of the genome. Sampling of chromosome Ia sequence in seven additional representative strains from the three clonal lineages supports a monomorphic inheritance, which is unique within the genome. Taken together, our observations implicate a specific combination of alleles on chromosome Ia in the recent origin and widespread success of the clonal lineages of T. gondii