26 research outputs found

    Street-level bureaucrats: En studie om möjligheten att skapa policy

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    In the book ”street-level bureaucracy dilemmas of the individual in public services” (2010) the author Michael Lipsky writes about the individual in public services. Lipsky presents a theory about street-level bureaucrats as policy makers. He argues that policy is created by the people at the bottom of the organizational hierarchy, the street-level bureaucrats. This is made possible by two interlinked factors, a relatively large distance from organizational authority witch leads to freedom in the daily routine. The purpose of this paper is to highlight the problem of seeing street-level bureaucrats as a homogeneous group. This essay questions Lipskys tendency to generalize various types of street-level bureaucrats’ possibility to make policy. Therefore the research question is: To what extent does organizational depth affect opportunity for street-level bureaucrats to make policy? By comparing two organizations with different organizational depth, the police and the healthcare, with the degree of freedom at these workplaces this study examine if these two factors correlate. Based on interviews this study finds that even though the organizational depth differs the opportunity to make policy does not vary

    On LFSR based Stream Ciphers - analysis and design

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    Stream ciphers are cryptographic primitives used to ensure privacy in digital communication. In this thesis we focus on stream ciphers built using Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSRs). Several different stream ciphers are analysed and new attacks are presented. In addition, two new stream ciphers are presented, both based on the same design. The first attack is performed on SOBER-t16 and SOBER-t32. A new distinguishing attack is presented for simplified versions of the two ciphers, as well as for the complete version of SOBER-t16. Next, the cipher A5/1, used in the GSM standard for mobile telephones, is analysed. The resulting attack is an initial state recovery attack which recovers the secret key using approximately 5 minutes of known keystream. The attack takes roughly 5 minutes to perform on today's standard PC. Bluetooth is a well-known standard for wireless communication and the cipher responsible for the secrecy within that standard is called E0. An initial state recovery algorithm on E0 is presented, based on recently discovered correlations within the cipher. These new correlations are stronger than previously known. This attack, however, is only applicable to E0 in a theoretical perspective, since the required length of the observed keystream is longer than allowed in the Bluetooth standard. Following this, two distinguishing attacks are presented targeting clock controlled generators; the shrinking generator and the self-shrinking generator. The attack on the shrinking generator is based on a new observation that the majority bits of a block surrounding the tap positions in the LFSR output also fulfils the linear recurrence equation. The attack on the self-shrinking generator identifies two new classes of weak feedback polynomials. For the first class, both a distinguishing attack and an initial state recovery attack are presented. This distinguishing attack is remarkable in the sense that the required length of the observed keystream only grows linearly in the length of the shift register. For the second class of weak feedback polynomials a distinguishing attack is given. The final part of this thesis concerns the design of stream ciphers. Two new designs are presented, SNOW 1.0 and SNOW 2.0, the latter being an improvement on the former. These ciphers are designed to be very fast, especially in a software implementation

    Piratverksamheten i Sverige och EU - SÀrskilt om varumÀrkesintrÄng

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    Denna uppsats behandlar ett antal ÄtgÀrder som har vidtagits inom gemenskapen för att försöka stÀvja den allt mer vÀxande varumÀrkesförfalskningen och pirattillverkningen inom Sverige och EU. Denna olagliga verksamhet har funnits under en lÄng tid, och inledningsvis sÄgs det inte som ett större problem dÄ det mest handlade om harmlösa t-tröjor och solglasögon utan nÄgon skyddande verkan. Men denna syn har dock successivt Àndrats med tiden. Numera kan det vara förfalskningar och kopior som Àr sÄ pass vÀlgjorda att det inte lÀngre gÄr att se nÄgon direkt skillnad. Utbudet av de olagliga varorna Àr dessutom avsevÀrt mycket större i dagslÀget Àn förr, som exempel kan nÀmnas drycker, möbler, lÀkemedel och frimÀrken. Inte ens de skyddsanordningar som skapats för att skilja original frÄn kopia har fungerat, dÄ Àven skyddet kopierats. Undersökningar har visat att problemet Àr otroligt stort och det nÀmns siffror uppemot 600 miljarder dollar som gÄr förlorat varje Är. Dessutom har denna handel ofta anknytning till den organiserade brottsligheten och terroristorganisationer. För att försöka bekÀmpa piratverksamhet inom den Europeiska gemenskapen lade kommissionen Är 1998 fram en Grönbok med ett antal viktiga frÄgor rörande varumÀrkesintrÄng och pirattillverkning. Dessa frÄgor besvarades aktivt och presenterades av kommissionen ca 2 Är senare i en ambitiös handlingsplan, som framförallt var inriktad pÄ att fÄ fram ett nytt direktiv dÀr skyddet av de immateriella rÀttigheterna skulle sÀkerstÀllas. Förslaget till direktivet kom den 30 januari 2003, men brister fanns och först den 29 april 2004 kom sjÀlva direktivet, som dock av vissa karaktÀriserats som urvattnat dÄ en rad kompromisser ligger bakom. DÄ det gÀller den svenska tullmyndigheten sÄ finns det ett antal lagar och förordningar att anvÀnda sig av dÄ ingripande mot olagliga varor blir aktuellt. En av de senaste bestÀmmelserna pÄ detta omrÄde Àr RÄdets förordning (EG) nr 1383/2003 om tullmyndigheters ingripande mot varor som misstÀnks göra intrÄng i vissa immateriella rÀttigheter och om vilka ÄtgÀrder som skall vidtas mot varor som gör intrÄng i vissa immateriella rÀttigheter. Problem kan dock uppkomma dÄ det gÀller parallellhandel av varor, det finns nÀmligen inga nationella eller gemenskapsrÀttsliga instrument som tullen kan anvÀnda sig av för att ingripa mot just dessa varor, utan gÀllande bestÀmmelser Àr bara inriktade pÄ varumÀrkesförfalskningar och pirattillverkningar. Detta kan te sig lite bekymmersamt dÄ parallellhandel ofta Àr förknippat med förfalskade och piratkopierade produkter

    VETE: Virtualizing the Trusted Execution Environment

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    This document is the final report for the SICS project Virtualizing the Trusted Execution Environment (VETE). This project was carried out in close collaboration with Ericsson Research and with support from ST-Ericsson. In this project, we desig an dimplement a hypervisor for the U8500 NovaThor platform that operates inside the Secure world of the main CPUs. The hypervisor will virtualize the underlying hardware in such way that the Trusted Execution Environment either directly or with the help of the hypervisor can provide secure isolation between the Trusted Applications, and between Trusted Applications and normal applications.VET

    Distinguishing attacks on SOBER-t16 and t32

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    Two ways of mounting distinguishing attacks on two similar stream ciphers, SOBER-t16 and SOBER-t32, are proposed.. It results in distinguishing attacks faster than exhaustive key search on full SOBER-t16 and on SOBER-t32 without stuttering

    SNOW - a new stream cipher

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    In this paper a new word-oriented stream cipher, called SNOW, is proposed. The design of the cipher is quite simple, consisting of a linear feedback shift register, feeding a finite state machine. The design goals of producing a stream cipher significantly faster than AES, with significantly lower implementation costs in hardware, and a security level similar to AES is currently met. Our fastest C implementation requires under 1 clock cycle per running key bit. The best attacks are generic attacks like an exhaustive key search attack

    New Circuit Minimization Techniques for Smaller and Faster AES SBoxes

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    In this paper we consider various methods and techniques to find the smallest circuit realizing a given linear transformation on n input signals and m output signals, with a constraint of a maximum depth, maxD, of the circuit. Additional requirements may include that input signals can arrive to the circuit with different delays, and output signals may be requested to be ready at a different depth. We apply these methods and also improve previous results in order to find hardware circuits for forward, inverse, and combined AES SBoxes, and for each of them we provide the fastest and smallest combinatorial circuits. Additionally, we propose a novel technique with “floating multiplexers” to minimize the circuit for the combined SBox, where we have two different linear matrices (forward and inverse) combined with multiplexers. The resulting AES SBox solutions are the fastest and smallest to our knowledge

    Another attack on A5/1

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    A5/1 is a stream cipher used in the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) standard. Several time-memory tradeoff attacks against A5/1 have been proposed, most notably the recent attack by Biryukov, Shamir, and Wagner, which can break A5/1 in seconds using huge precomputation time and memory. This correspondence presents a completely different attack on A5/1, based on ideas from correlation attacks. Whereas time-memory tradeoff attacks have a complexity which is exponential with the shift-register length, the complexity of the proposed attack is almost independent of the shift-register length. Our implementation of the suggested attack breaks A5/1 in a few minutes using 2-5 min of conversation plaintext

    Another attack on A5/1

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    A5/1 is a stream cipher used in the GSM system. Several time-memory trade-off attacks against A5/1 have been proposed previously. This paper presents a completely different attack, based on ideas from correlation attacks

    A new version of the stream cipher SNOW

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    In 2000, the stream cipher SNOW was proposed. A few attacks followed, indicating certain weaknesses in the design. In this paper we propose a new version of SNOW, called SNOW 2.0. The new version of the cipher does not only appear to be more secure, but its implementation is also a bit faster in software
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