Irrational Expectations: Can a Regulator Credibly Commit to Removing an Unbundling Obligation?

There is a large empirical literature that investigates the effects of unbundling requirements on broadband operators' incentives to invest in infrastructure. To date, that literature has generally relied on industry-wide data as an indicator of how the representative operator reacts to the imposition of mandatory unbundling. In this paper, we present original findings on how specific firms reacted to the removal of an unbundling obligation that is, an act of "regulatory forbearance"either for an existing access technology or for a new access technology. We rely on three case studies to evaluate the impact of regulatory forbearance on specific incumbents and entrants that were directly affected by the regulator's decision. Our findings from the first case study appear to undermine the so-called "stepping stone" justification for unbundling an existing access technology (for example, the copper loop). In particular, there is a large discontinuity in the investment by entrants around the date of forbearance, in contrast to the steady movement up the ladder of investment predicted by the stepping stone hypothesis. Such a discontinuity suggests that either (1) the regulator failed to signal its deregulatory intentions to entrants, or (2) that the signal was clear but the entrant did not react according to the theory. We also find that incumbent investment increases significantly in response to forbearance from regulating a new access technology (for example, fiber loops). When forbearing from regulating an existing access technology, regulators can signal their future intentions to entrants by slowly increasing the regulated wholesale rate. In the case of forbearing from regulating a new technology, however, there is no equivalent mechanism by which regulators can signal their deregulatory intentions to incumbents. Because a regulator cannot credibly signal its commitment to industry participants, and because such a commitment is critical to the practical success of the stepping stone theory, the best policy for maximizing investment is to accelerate the date of forbearance for existing and new access technologies.Technology and Industry

Protocol: optimised electrophyiological analysis of intact guard cells from arabidopsis

Genetic resources available for Arabidopsis thaliana make this species particularly attractive as a model for molecular genetic studies of guard cell homeostasis, transport and signalling, but this facility is not matched by accessible tools for quantitative analysis of transport in the intact cell. We have developed a reliable set of procedures for voltage clamp analysis of guard cells from Arabidopsis leaves. These procedures greatly simplify electrophysiological recordings, extending the duration of measurements and scope for analysis of the predominant K+ and anion channels of intact stomatal guard cells to that achieved previously in work with Vicia and tobacco guard cells

Spectrum Reallocation and the National Broadband Plan

Of the several significant changes in United States telecommunications policy proposed by the National Broadband Plan, none are more substantial than its proposals for spectrum policy. In particular, the Plan proposes to reallocate 500 MHz of spectrum from broadcast television, mobile satellite, government and other current uses to mobile broadband through the use of innovative incentive auctions and other voluntary, market-oriented mechanisms. The Plan\u27s spectrum proposals have the potential to be a major step forward in the decades-long, bipartisan effort to replace command-and-control spectrum allocation with a more flexible, dynamic and market-oriented approach. Considerable work remains to be done, however, and only time and future developments will tell whether the Plan signals a significant step towards a more market-oriented policy

The Sound Recording Performance Rights at a Crossroads: Will Market Rates Prevail?

Starting in the 1990s, Federal policy has moved in the direction of a market-oriented approach towards sound recording rights, beginning with Congress’ decision to create a sound recording performance copyright in 1995. In 1998, Congress provided that most statutory royalty rates, including the rates paid by webcasters like Pandora Radio, would be set using a market-based “willing buyer, willing seller” (“WBWS”) standard. Since then, the WBWS standard has been applied in several rate setting proceedings, but complaints from webcasters that the rates were “too high” have led to Congressional intervention and, ultimately, to adoption of rates below market levels. Now, as a new rate setting cycle is about to get underway, webcasters have begun lobbying Congress to replace the WBWS standard with a new version of the so-called 801(b) standard, which promises copyright users a right of “non-disruption.” Adoption of the 801(b) standard – and the other changes favored by the webcasters – would result in rates below economically efficient levels, thereby distorting markets, slowing innovation and harming consumers. This paper examines the market for sound recording performance rights, concluding that Congress should resist webcasters’ pleas for regulatory favoritism and instead continue moving towards a market-oriented approach, starting with extending the sound performance right to terrestrial radio

Initiation of Postpartum Contraception by 90 Days at a Midwest Academic Center

Introduction. Contraception is a critical component of addressing the health needs of women in the postpartum period. We assessed contraception initiation by 90 days postpartum at a large, academic medical center in the Midwest. Methods. In this retrospective cohort study, 299 charts were randomly sampled and 231 were analyzed from deliveries between May 1 to July 5, 2018. Contraceptive method, maternal demographics, and obstetric characteristics at hospital discharge were collected, as well as contraceptive method at the postpartum follow-up appointment. Methods and strata of contraception were categorized as follows: 1) highly effective methods (HEM) defined as sterilization, intrauterine device, or implant, 2) moderately effective methods (MEM) defined as injectable contraception, progestin-only pills, and combined estrogen/progestin pills, patches, and rings, and 3) less effective methods (LEM) defined as condoms, natural family planning, and lactational amenorrhea. Women lost to follow-up who had initiated a HEM or injectable contraception were coded as still using the method at 90 days. We used logistic regression to identity factors associated with HEM use. Results. Of the 231 included patients, 118 (51%) received contraception before hospital discharge and 166 (83%) by 90 days postpartum. Postpartum visits were attended by 74% (171/231) of patients. Before hospital discharge, 28% (65/231) obtained a HEM and 41% (82/200) were using a HEM by 90 days postpartum. Patients obtaining HEM or injectable contraception before hospital discharge attended a follow-up visit less often than those who did not receive HEM before discharge (RR = 0.68, 95% CI: 0.54 - 0.86, p ≤ 0.01). Conclusion. When readily available, many women will initiate contraception in the postpartum period. Health systems should work to ensure comprehensive access to contraception for women in the postpartum period