The Political Application of Naval Force

Like other forms of military power, naval forces have a political function, only more so. And while the combat use of fleets is as intermittent as war itself, the political effects generated by naval forces are continuous. In deciding what kind of fleet to deploy and how large a fleet is needed, we can therefore choose one of two very different goals: wartime \u27 \u27insurance or peacetime political power. Historically, the United States has designed and justified its forces in terms of the contingency of war, a difficult thing to do when war seems remote as in the current phase of detente

2020 年“オリンピック開催”を目処に、日本はアジアで立ち位置をどう再構築すべきか（国際学研究フォーラム講演録2: 2014年10月9日 ）

於：関西学院大学丸の内キャンパ

Pitfalls of Professionalism? Military Academies and Coup Risk

Military academies tend to be strongly linked to the professionalization of the armed forces. This explains why many countries in the world have created such institutions. The following article studies a potential negative externality stemming from military schools: increased coup risk. We argue that military academies may create, inculcate, and strengthen cohesive views that could conflict with incumbent policies, and that these schools establish networks among military officers that may facilitate coordination necessary for plotting a putsch. We also contend and empirically demonstrate that these negative side effects of military academies are in particular pronounced in nondemocracies, that is, military academies have diverse effects across regime types. This work has significant implications for our understanding civil–military relations. Furthermore, we contribute to the literature on military education and professionalization, as we suggest that military academies are important vehicles through which coups can emerge predominantly in authoritarian states