

1976

The Other Arms Race: New Technologies and Non-Nuclear Conflict

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Recommended Citation

Luttwak, Edward N.; Kemp, Geoffrey; Pfaltzgraff, Robert L.; and Ra'anan, Uri (1976) "The Other Arms Race: New Technologies and Non-Nuclear Conflict," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 29 : No. 4 , Article 19.
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol29/iss4/19>

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listening to my "fascinating" *recherches de temps perdu*, Lady Bird had heard all the tapes, Harry McPherson, Joe Califano, George Christian, myself, and other White House regulars were off about their own lives. Enter: Doris Kearns, notebook in hand and full of pop Freudianism with overtones of Jung. So Kearns became the Ear and Johnson, shrewd rascal that he was, obviously realized she was "into" dreams. Well, if she wanted dreams, he could provide them—real LBJ-sized, Texas dreams. And they are beauts—I suspect, but cannot prove, he had someone digging up good dream scenarios for appropriate use. A "Task Force on Dreams" would certainly have been in the Johnson tradition.

Well, there you have it. A book which provides nothing new in the way of historical information, but demonstrates that even in his last years Lyndon Johnson had not lost his talent for the "treatment." Perhaps Kearns will be memorialized as his last victim.

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Kemp, Geoffrey, Pfaltzgraff, Robert L., Jr., and Ra'anani, Uri, eds. *The Other Arms Race: New Technologies and Non-Nuclear Conflict*. Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1975. 281pp.

In those difficult years when the intellectual opposition to the Indochina war had driven the study of national security from our premier universities, in those unhappy years when some leading academic strategists repudiated their own vocation, Dean Edmund A. Gullion and Professor Uri Ra'anani of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy did a great service to us all by swimming hard against the tide to

launch a major program of international security studies. In a climate most unfavorable, they nurtured able young teachers, encouraged students to study strategy when the very word was suspect, and did much to keep alive the fragile tradition of academic work in military matters by teaching, by writing, and by organizing conferences—these being virtually the only gatherings of those days at which one could see academics actively concerned with strategic issues. This book is the record of the third Fletcher Conference held in 1974. Written in the aftermath of the October war, most of the papers reflected the early analyses of the conflict's implications for nonstrategic weapon development.

The very first chapter in the book, James Digby's paper on Precision-Guided Munitions, is something of a classic. In it Digby examined the wider implications of the emergence of PGM's, having been the first to register in print the fundamental notion that all these diverse weapons—antiship, antitank, antiaircraft, air-ground, and air-air missiles as well as guided bombs and projectiles had important things in common, and indeed constituted a new form of force rather than a new kind of weapon. Digby has since developed his ideas in papers written later but published earlier, but his core analysis was already in place: the heightened disadvantage of lumpy high-value assets, the much-increased importance of concealment, the generic power-enhancement of small-scale (but *narrowly specialized*) units, the decline of the logistic sanction over warfare, and, in general, the need to rethink war, *ex novo*.

Mike W. Fossier of Raytheon pursued the analysis of Digby's subject on a narrow front in a short incisive paper on battlefield SAM's; this contains perhaps the first public assessment of SAM effectiveness in the October war that was not marked by wild overstatement.

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Uri Ra'anán himself went back to the October war experience to examine its lessons and its nonlessons. At a time when the air was filled with simple-minded generalizations, Ra'anán patiently explained that it was not true that the antitank missile had driven the tank from the field (only tanks stubbornly used as if AT missiles did not exist); that it was not true that SAM's had rendered tactical air obsolete (only tactical air with inadequate ELINT and used without specialized anti-SAM support); and that it was not true that the "defense" had gained the upper hand over the "offense" (precision weapons can be used by the offense also). He further explained why the October war did not mark a turning point in the overall balance of relative capabilities between Arabs and Israelis. Based as they are on the early days of the war, the conventional assessments are comparable to a United States-Japanese assessment made the morning after Pearl Harbor; but the Israelis had their Midway by the 8th day of the war, and their Iwo Jima a few days after that. Professor Ra'anán very carefully points out that he is *not* challenging the generalizations as such, but merely showing that the evidence of the October war does not sustain them.

Where Ra'anán feared to tread, Richard Ogorkiewicz, the well-known tank expert, was content to stride: his sanguine paper on the future of the battle tank stressed the potential of new tank technologies and argued that good designs and good tactics would cope not only with present AT missiles, but also with the ones still on the drawing boards. Brigadier General Ralph of the USAF did much the same service for tactical air, in the context of a paper primarily dedicated to USAF-weapon development efforts. Brig. Ken Hunt, deputy director of the IISS and an analyst always noted for his robust commonsense, reviewed the full range of problems tackled by Digby

Ogorkiewicz, and Ralph in the specific context of NATO, coming to similar conclusions. The detailed October war analyses carried out in the last 2 years or so certainly support Ra'anán's and Hunt's skepticism on the *short-term* strategic implications of *current* precision weapons.

Two very able and versatile younger members of the Fletcher stable, Geoffrey Kemp and Robert Pfaltzgraff, contribute a chapter in which the analysis of the new weapon technologies is projected in a longer term perspective and broadened to take into account weapon transfers to the wealthier backward countries. Once the limitations of the current generation of PGM's are overcome, the two authors anticipate that their impact on nonnuclear warfare may indeed be revolutionary.

Naval matters have scarcely been considered in studies of the October war, but this book contains an excellent and most valuable paper on U.S. ship design by Reuven Leopold, Technical Director at NAVSEC (the nearest thing to a chief ship designer within the present Navy structure). Having played a leading role in the design of both the DD 963 and the LHA, first in industry and then in the Navy, Leopold is not only very well-qualified but also a gifted lecturer. Impossible to summarize, his paper should be read by all who (i) want to know how ships are "designed" in these days when the lone naval architect has been replaced by thousands of planners, engineers, cost analysts, plain bureaucrats . . . and naval officers; and, (ii) who has a less than perfect knowledge of the labyrinths of decision. This reviewer still retains a vivid impression of Leopold's dazzling presentation at the conference, which he heard at a time when his total knowledge of the subject could easily have been transcribed on the back of a 13 cent stamp.

In a book of sober reassessment, Brian K. Jenkins' chapter on the impact of new technologies and terrorism,

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adopts a strikingly different tone. Perhaps the greatest weakness of our strategic thinking is the lack of a sound historical perspective, and Mr. Jenkins is typical in being much impressed by the role of new technologies in magnifying the destructive potential of terrorism. He gives a long catalogue of innovations which terrorists could readily put to use, from portable SAM's to mini-machine guns. He fails, however, to recognize that new technologies give still greater advantages to the counter-terrorist: since his paper was presented, aircraft hijacking has virtually ceased thanks to some low-cost detectors (and much passenger inconvenience). His lack of perspective is manifest in the treatment of terrorism as a *new* phenomenon, but terrorism is as old as the organized state (before that we were all terrorists), and technological innovation has *systematically restricted its potential*: the Romans had to fight terrorism without even having a material with which to build fences, let alone instant ID cards and X-ray detectors.

This book can be read with profit by all interested in the current shape of nonnuclear war, and its reference value is enhanced by a solid 50 pages of weapon definitions and specifications (to be used with care: there are many errors). Now we have another reason to be grateful to the Fletcher crowd.

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McCubbin, Hamilton I., Dahl, Barbara B., & Hunter, Edna J., eds. *Families in the Military System*. Beverly Hills/London: Sage Publications, 1976. 393pp.

The 10 studies which this volume presents, together with a review of research and a nicely annotated 153-item bibliography, touch on many matters of personal concern to today's

career military, most of whom are married, many with dependent children in the house. Unfortunately, whatever spontaneous interest these topics may arouse is severely taxed by a style of presentation that outsiders like to dub as "academic jargon." Actually, it more closely resembles the language used in technical reports of behavioral studies so widely prevalent in military personnel management and the medical services.

In contrast to the best of academic work, which tends to be reflective, the contributions hew closely to the tangible responses contained in questionnaires, data from personnel records, and similarly quantified information. Of course, they include the "mandatory" reviews of the "literature" and the hypotheses devised from "theory" as well as "discussions" of results, but these tend to be tagged on (before or after) the crosstabulations and correlations. There is not enough in the way of synthesis that interprets the diverse findings against the appropriate social and organizational setting. While the preface and introduction attempt to do this, they are all too brief, and the one chapter that serves as a review essay is primarily an evaluative summary of what research has so far revealed.

However, I do not mean to write off the volume because of these evident flaws. A careful reading will uncover many observations, important for an understanding of the military, even though their full implications are not always adequately articulated by the authors. What clearly emerges is that the military family is no longer encapsulated in the military community, nor its claims totally subordinated to those of the organizational hierarchy, to the degree they once were. To this extent, then, it is in the family, the most basic of human institutions, that civil-military conflict manifests itself in its most personal, if not its most elementary, form. As every officer knows, the claims