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The Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union

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entirely fit the rather exclusive parameters he has set up. Some will undoubtedly argue with his limitations and his choices; it might well be that religious toleration is a fortunate accident rather than an essential precondition, and a case might be made that sixteenth-century Portugal came as close to filling these criteria as did the seventeenth-century Netherlands.

The stage set, Reynolds begins with primitive man and works his way through to 1815 in the first volume, then goes on to present times in the second. In this new edition, after the lapse of ten years, he has expanded the final section on the Russian-American naval rivalry, and retained an epilogue on "World War III," which ends, as good history in the classical tradition, back where it all started, with primitive, post-nuclear man venturing forth once more upon the waters, trying to put his world together again. He does not see the Russians as a truly maritime power, but rather as a continental land empire playing with seapower and not entirely understanding its possibilities, or its limitations, much in the fashion of the Germans at the turn of this century casually taking on the British. Unfortunately, Reynolds does not see the United States as quite like the British Empire of 1900, who had some conception, no matter how dimly enunciated, of the role of seapower and its primacy in their scheme of things. Vietnam, Reynolds says, "exposed American ignorance of maritime strategy." In this he echoes Professor Ropp, who

used to walk into his military history classes, rub his hand over the map, and say lovingly, "Everything blue belongs to us." What Americans learned in Vietnam was that everything that was not blue did not belong to us.

In spite of that, a navy remains the most visible, and quite possibly the most potent means of projecting *usable* power, as the earlier maritime states all recognized. Anything that reminds Americans of that fundamental point is welcome; this new issue of a work whose original went out of print all too quickly is highly recommended.

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Luttwak, Edward N. *The Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983. 242pp. \$14.95

The premise that the Soviet Union is a classic continental empire—one which has been shaped by a succession of ideological, political and economic failures is fundamental to Edward Luttwak's thoughtful analysis of the grand strategy of the Soviet Union. Failure in peaceful competition with the United States has compelled the Soviet Union to channel its energies into developing military forces to support further expansion. But how does the Kremlin plan to employ these forces? The reality of Soviet strategic intent lies between two extremes, that of a rational nation with essentially defensive aims and that of a contemporary Nazi Germany bent on war awaiting only adequate military preparations.

This book is a coherent, synthetic essay on a complex topic. As a foundation for his analysis, Luttwak cites the factors which have traditionally influenced Soviet strategy: (1) Ideology and politics cannot be separated. (2) Ethnically the Soviet Union remains a multinational empire. (3) The hierarchical nature of the society continues to foster technical and managerial backwardness; innovations and decisions are deferred to higher authority whenever possible. (4) Geographic vastness poses tremendous logistic difficulties.

According to Luttwak, the Soviet Union chose to capitalize on America's decline as a world power in the 1970s only to be confronted in the 1980s by a revitalized adversary determined to regain global primacy. Added to the problem of ascending American influence is the geopolitical reality that the USSR is encircled by enemies and the ideological reality that the appeal of Marxism-Leninism has waned dramatically. To counter these threats, the Soviets have turned to what Luttwak calls the "tools of empire"; they have built a massive military establishment and have courted terrorists as useful allies.

In the next component of this analysis, Luttwak uses a comparative analogy with the Roman Empire to examine the nature and scope of Soviet Imperialism. Accepting the hypothesis that the long-range prospects of the Soviet Union are not good, he argues that the Kremlin must feel some urgency to translate its transitory military advantage into real

power before it is eroded by a stagnating economy. In assessing the prospects for further Soviet expansion, he focuses on the options this particular continental power might employ to enhance its security: political advantages can be gained by weakening the cohesion of the Nato alliance, strategic advantages can be achieved through a limited but map-changing war with China, regional advantages can be assured by maintaining a stable ring of border client states. The essay concludes with speculations on the alignment of economic and military factors expected to influence Soviet grand strategy in the future.

The remainder of the book consists of two extensive appendixes—"The Economic Basis of Soviet Power" by Herbert Block and "The Evolution of Soviet Military Power Since 1965" by W. Seth Carus. Both provide considerable statistical data which indirectly complement Luttwak's essay. The list of references is sparse for a book of this scope and consists primarily of works addressing specific aspects of Soviet military or economic capabilities.

Although this is not a readily digestible book, it clearly warrants the attention of the professional military officer. A cursory reading will enhance any student's perception of the complexity of Soviet strategic issues even if Luttwak's premises and hypotheses are rejected. Yet this essay deserves more careful study. The breadth of scope and depth of analysis Luttwak offers in *The Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union* make it worthy of serious reflection by all

who strive to understand Soviet strategic intentions.

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Kimball, Warren F. *Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence*, 3 vols. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. 2,189pp. \$150

Warren F. Kimball's *Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence* is an interesting attempt to integrate a coherent narrative text into a comprehensive volume of significant correspondence. It is an excellent concept, but in practice it does not seem to work all that well; for in a sense the book-length narrative comes almost to overshadow the Roosevelt-Churchill correspondence. One sometimes feels that there is too much Kimball and not enough Roosevelt and Churchill.

It seems to me that the ideal multivolume work of this kind is Elting E. Morison's great compilation of the letters of Theodore Roosevelt. The format there allows the writings of a powerful personality full scope to carry the story; the editors provide explanatory notes to the correspondence and interpretive introductory chapters, which are some of the finest pieces in TR historiography. These essays focus on specific aspects of TR's career and personality and so add insight and dimension to, without detracting from, the letters themselves. TR explains himself, with the editors providing suggestive high points of

interpretation. Here Kimball seeks to explain FDR and Churchill to us, rather than allow them to explain themselves, and the process seems sometimes strained and a little presumptuous, and a lot less fun.

I also found Kimball's book structurally disconcerting. The author's essays are placed before, rather than after, the relevant letter(s), which sounds logical; but in reality it is quite disconcerting to read an essay on a topic in a letter that one has not yet read! Thus, at times, one feels slightly disoriented.

Then, too, since Kimball's narrative is in a real sense a book, I often found myself with the thought that his bibliographical information and source documentation are not nearly extensive enough to support the weight of his narrative interpretations. This is especially so in relation to military and naval matters, where the author's judgments are sometimes highly debatable: for example, his assertion that had Stalin sided with Churchill as to the need for a Balkan campaign in 1944 Roosevelt would have readily scuttled OVERLORD; or his interesting but quite exaggerated idea of the political sophistication and key impact on political decisions of senior US Army officers in World War II. Kimball has fewer comments on naval matters, but some, such as ". . . the submarine was the U.S. Navy's most effective weapon against Japan . . ."—Gad, man, what about the Carrier!—sometimes merit qualification or even contradiction.

Finally, in his handling of the onset