A METHOD FOR IMPROVED CAPITAL MEASUREMENT BY COMBINING ACCOUNTS AND FIRM INVESTMENT DATA

We propose a new method for estimating capital stocks at the firm level by combining business accounts information and investment data. The method also produces capital estimates at the sector or industry level by summing individual firms' capital stocks and appropriately inflating this sum to account for firms not included in the data set. Our approach has two major advantages compared with the much used Perpetual Inventory Method (PIM). First, long investment series are not necessary. Second, sector capital estimates are automatically adjusted for changes in the capital stock because of entry and exit of firms. While capital growth rates in Norwegian manufacturing were only 1 percent on average during 1993-2004 according to national accounts figures, our method yields much higher growth rates of 5.5 percent on average. Copyright � 2007 The Authors; Journal compilation � International Association for Research in Income and Wealth 2007.

Dynamic costs of the draft

We propose a dynamic general-equilibrium model with human capital accumulation to evaluate the economic consequences of compulsory services (such as military draft or social work). Our analysis identifies a so far ignored dynamic cost arising from distortions in time allocation over the life cycle. We provide conservative estimates for the excess burden that arises when the government relies on forced labor rather than on income taxation to finance public expenditures. Our results suggest that eliminating the draft could produce considerable dynamic gains, both in terms of GDP and lifetime utility

More on marriage, fertility and the distribution of income

According to Pareto (1896), the distribution of income depends on �the nature of the people comprising a society, on the organization of the latter, and, also, in part, on chance.� In the model developed here the �nature of the people� is captured by attitudes toward marriage, divorce, fertility, and children. Singles search for mates in a marriage market. Married agents bargain about work, and the quantity and quality of children. They can divorce. Social policies, such as child support requirements, reflect the �organization of the (society).� Finally, �chance� is modeled by randomness in income, marriage opportunities, and marital bliss