Catalyst of hate? Ethnic insulting on YouTube in the aftermath of terror attacks in France, Germany and the United Kingdom 2014–2017

In the last 20 years, several major terror attacks conducted in the name of political Islam hit Western Europe. We examine the impact of such terror attacks on hostile behaviour on social media from a cross-national perspective. To this end, we draw upon time-stamped, behavioural data from YouTube and focus on the frequency and popularity (‘likes’) of ethnically insulting comments among a corpus of approximately one hundred thousand comments. We study aggregate change and use individual-level panel data to investigate within-user change in ethnic insulting in periods leading up to and following major terror events in Germany, France and the UK. Results indicate that terror attacks boost interest in immigration-related topics in general, and lead to a disproportional increase in hate speech in particular. Moreover, we find that attack effects spill over to other countries in several, but not all, instances. Deeper analyses suggest, however, that this pattern is mainly driven by changes in the composition of users and not by changing behaviour of individual users. That is, a surge in ethnic insulting comes from hateful users newly entering online discussions, rather than previous users becoming more hateful following an attack

A Many-analysts Approach to the Relation Between Religiosity and Well-being

The relation between religiosity and well-being is one of the most researched topics in the psychology of religion, yet the directionality and robustness of the effect remains debated. Here, we adopted a many-analysts approach to assess the robustness of this relation based on a new cross-cultural dataset (N = 10, 535 participants from 24 countries). We recruited 120 analysis teams to investigate (1) whether religious people self-report higher well-being, and (2) whether the relation between religiosity and self-reported well-being depends on perceived cultural norms of religion (i.e., whether it is considered normal and desirable to be religious in a given country). In a two-stage procedure, the teams first created an analysis plan and then executed their planned analysis on the data. For the first research question, all but 3 teams reported positive effect sizes with credible/confidence intervals excluding zero (median reported β = 0.120). For the second research question, this was the case for 65% of the teams (median reported β = 0.039). While most teams applied (multilevel) linear regression models, there was considerable variability in the choice of items used to construct the independent variables, the dependent variable, and the included covariates

A many-analysts approach to the relation between religiosity and well-being

The relation between religiosity and well-being is one of the most researched topics in the psychology of religion, yet the directionality and robustness of the effect remains debated. Here, we adopted a many-analysts approach to assess the robustness of this relation based on a new cross-cultural dataset (N=10,535 participants from 24 countries). We recruited 120 analysis teams to investigate (1) whether religious people self-report higher well-being, and (2) whether the relation between religiosity and self-reported well-being depends on perceived cultural norms of religion (i.e., whether it is considered normal and desirable to be religious in a given country). In a two-stage procedure, the teams first created an analysis plan and then executed their planned analysis on the data. For the first research question, all but 3 teams reported positive effect sizes with credible/confidence intervals excluding zero (median reported β=0.120). For the second research question, this was the case for 65% of the teams (median reported β=0.039). While most teams applied (multilevel) linear regression models, there was considerable variability in the choice of items used to construct the independent variables, the dependent variable, and the included covariates

Essays on Immigration, Religion & Assimilation in Western Europe

The dissertation investigates the role of religion and religious difference in the process of assimilation between immigrants and native populations in Western Europe. To do so, it asks a set of interrelated research questions: how does cultural difference affect assimilation? How do Muslims immigrant population culturally adapt to the secular context of Western European nation-states? How does upward mobility impact the acculturation patterns and experiences of religious stigma among the rising immigrant elite? Three separate studies provide answers to these questions. The first study is a large, theoretically-driven review of the last decade of immigrant incorporation scholarship in America and Western Europe. Through a comparative lens, it identifies large empirical trends toward assimilation, but also the unique role played by religious and cultural difference in the European context - a role not foreseen in assimilation theory. The second study uses large-scale survey data from France to investigate assimilation between Muslim immigrants and natives in terms of religiosity. Using a unique research design, it uncovers the role of parental socialization and perceived discrimination in shaping a religiosity surplus among Muslims compared to the reference population. The third article, a qualitative analyses of the subjective experience of upwardly mobile immigrants in France, uses thirty-eight in-depth interviews to provide a first empirical look at the rising immigrant elite. It shows that non-Muslim immigrants typically feel they have achieved status and respect in the French community, while Muslim immigrants generally still feel like cultural outsiders despite high levels of socioeconomic attainment

Cracks in the melting pot? Religiosity and assimilation among the diverse Muslim population in France

The maintenance of high religiosity levels among Muslim youths in Western Europe constitutes a puzzle in need of an explanation. Focusing on France and using a new empirical strategy for the quantitative study of cultural differences between heterogeneous populations, this study first demonstrates that French Muslims form a diverse group yet one with a consistent and sizable “religiosity differential” resisting intergenerational assimilation to native levels. It then formulates and tests five hypotheses to explain the second generation’s delayed religious assimilation. Material insecurity, the perception and self-report of discrimination, parental religious socialization, transnational ties with the origin country, and neighborhood ethnic segregation are all influential but with an uneven impact across subgroups within native and Muslim populations. Together, results suggest that the religiosity differential stems fromamixture of cultural transmission fromthe context of origin and blocked acculturation due to stratification and social closure in the context of destination

What's behind a racial category? Uncovering heterogeneity among asian americans through a data-driven typology

Despite emphasis on the importance of intragroup heterogeneity in much theoretically inclined migration and race scholarship, quantitative research routinely relies on split sample approaches in which ethnoracial groups are the categories of analysis. This cumulatively contributes to the reification of groups under study when research findings are assessed and groups compared side by side. In this paper, we ask: How are Asian Americans internally differentiated, and how does this heterogeneity matter for broader patterns of immigrant inclusion? Using latent class analysis, we produce a typology at the intersection of class, gender, regional location, and immigrant generation, pointing to vulnerable, ordinary, hyper-selected, rooted, and achieving Asian Americans. These subgroups reveal differentiation in the experience of race and suggest that racialization and inclusion dynamics are jointly occurring social forces among Asian Americans. Our approach offers a blueprint for inductive analyses of immigrant-origin groups emphasizing heterogeneity and reflexivity vis-à-vis racial and national-origin categories

Religious diversity in France: intergenerational transmissions and practices by origins

In 2019‑2020, 51% of the population aged 18 to 59 in metropolitan France said they had no religion. This religious disaffiliation has been increasing over the past ten years and concerns 58% of people with no migration background, 19% of immigrants who arrived after the age of 16 and 26% of the descendants of two immigrant parents. While Catholicism remains the dominant religion (29% of the population declare themselves to be Catholic), Islam confirms its place as the second religion in France (10%). The number of people claiming another Christian religion is also increasing, reaching 9%. The frequency and intensity of religious practice varies by religious affiliation: only 8% of Catholics regularly attend a place of worship, compared to just over 20% of other Christians, Muslims and Buddhists, and 34% of Jews. Processes of religious transmission between generations shape the religious landscape over the long term: 91% of people raised in a Muslim family follow the religion of their parents. This transmission is also very strong among Jews (84%), but less so among Catholics (67%) and other Christians (69%). All else being equal, growing up in a family of mixed religious or Catholic ancestry is a key factor in the secularization process among the descendants of immigrants

La diversité religieuse en France : transmissions intergénérationnelles et pratiques selon les origines

En 2019‑2020, 51 % de la population de 18 à 59 ans en France métropolitaine déclare ne pas avoir de religion. En augmentation depuis dix ans, cette désaffiliation religieuse concerne 58 % des personnes sans ascendance migratoire, 19 % des immigrés arrivés après 16 ans et 26 % des descendants de deux parents immigrés. Si le catholicisme reste la première religion (29 % de la population se déclare catholique), l’islam est déclaré par un nombre croissant de fidèles (10 %) et confirme sa place de deuxième religion de France. Le nombre de personnes déclarant une autre religion chrétienne augmente également, pour atteindre 9 %. La fréquence et l’intensité de la pratique religieuse varient en fonction de la religion déclarée : seuls 8 % des catholiques fréquentent régulièrement un lieu de culte, contre un peu plus de 20 % des autres chrétiens, des musulmans et des bouddhistes, et 34 % des juifs. Les processus de transmission religieuse entre générations façonnent le paysage religieux sur le long terme : 91 % des personnes élevées dans une famille musulmane suivent la religion de leurs parents. Cette transmission est très forte aussi chez les juifs (84 %), elle est moindre chez les catholiques (67 %) et chez les autres chrétiens (69 %). À caractéristiques identiques, le fait d’avoir grandi dans une famille d’ascendance religieuse mixte ou catholique est déterminant dans le processus de sécularisation des descendants d’immigrés

La diversité religieuse en France : transmissions intergénérationnelles et pratiques selon les origines

En 2019‑2020, 51 % de la population de 18 à 59 ans en France métropolitaine déclare ne pas avoir de religion. En augmentation depuis dix ans, cette désaffiliation religieuse concerne 58 % des personnes sans ascendance migratoire, 19 % des immigrés arrivés après 16 ans et 26 % des descendants de deux parents immigrés. Si le catholicisme reste la première religion (29 % de la population se déclare catholique), l’islam est déclaré par un nombre croissant de fidèles (10 %) et confirme sa place de deuxième religion de France. Le nombre de personnes déclarant une autre religion chrétienne augmente également, pour atteindre 9 %. La fréquence et l’intensité de la pratique religieuse varient en fonction de la religion déclarée : seuls 8 % des catholiques fréquentent régulièrement un lieu de culte, contre un peu plus de 20 % des autres chrétiens, des musulmans et des bouddhistes, et 34 % des juifs. Les processus de transmission religieuse entre générations façonnent le paysage religieux sur le long terme : 91 % des personnes élevées dans une famille musulmane suivent la religion de leurs parents. Cette transmission est très forte aussi chez les juifs (84 %), elle est moindre chez les catholiques (67 %) et chez les autres chrétiens (69 %). À caractéristiques identiques, le fait d’avoir grandi dans une famille d’ascendance religieuse mixte ou catholique est déterminant dans le processus de sécularisation des descendants d’immigrés

Religious diversity in France: intergenerational transmissions and practices by origins

In 2019‐2020, 51% of the population aged 18 to 59 in metropolitan France said they had no religion. This religious disaffiliation has been increasing over the past ten years and concerns 58% of people with no migration background, 19% of immigrants who arrived after the age of 16 and 26% of the descendants of two immigrant parents. While Catholicism remains the dominant religion (29% of the population declare themselves to be Catholic), Islam confirms its place as the second religion in France (10%). The number of people claiming another Christian religion is also increasing, reaching 9%. The frequency and intensity of religious practice varies by religious affiliation: only 8% of Catholics regularly attend a place of worship, compared to just over 20% of other Christians, Muslims and Buddhists, and 34% of Jews. Processes of religious transmission between generations shape the religious landscape over the long term: 91% of people raised in a Muslim family follow the religion of their parents. This transmission is also very strong among Jews (84%), but less so among Catholics (67%) and other Christians (69%). All else being equal, growing up in a family of mixed religious or Catholic ancestry is a key factor in the secularization process among the descendants of immigrants