Price collusion of manufacturers and social welfare losses in Belarus

The price collision (explicit and tacit) of manufacturers in goods markets is considered to be illegal because it results in competition restriction or infringement of economic interests of other business entities or consumers. In exceptional cases agreements of that kind can be recognized admissible on condition that they result in production development, the growth of goods sales volumes, stimulation of technological progress or world wide recovery of domestic goods competitiveness. In view of this the assessment of short- and long-term social conse­quences of the price collusion in the goods markets is an actual problem from the point of view of antitrust regulation. The object of our study is to assess inefficiency of the price collusion of manufacturers in the markets of wood particle boards, plywood and fiberboards of Belarus. We developed a methodological approach to the quantitative assessment of inefficiency of the price collusion of manufacturers in oligopoly goods markets. Financial reporting of wood­working companies and the data of the Pricing Policy Department for 2006–2010 were used as the initial data for the quantitative analysis. It is established that the goods markets under study during the period analyzed were statically and dynamically ineffective and their antimonopoly regulation is economically inadvisable.Ценовой сговор производителей на товарных рынках (и явный, и молчаливый) считается незаконным, поскольку приводит к ограничению конкуренции или ущемлени

Price collusion of manufacturers and social welfare losses in Belarus

The price collision (explicit and tacit) of manufacturers in goods markets is considered to be illegal because it results in competition restriction or infringement of economic interests of other business entities or consumers. In exceptional cases agreements of that kind can be recognized admissible on condition that they result in production development, the growth of goods sales volumes, stimulation of technological progress or world wide recovery of domestic goods competitiveness. In view of this the assessment of short- and long-term social conse­quences of the price collusion in the goods markets is an actual problem from the point of view of antitrust regulation. The object of our study is to assess inefficiency of the price collusion of manufacturers in the markets of wood particle boards, plywood and fiberboards of Belarus. We developed a methodological approach to the quantitative assessment of inefficiency of the price collusion of manufacturers in oligopoly goods markets. Financial reporting of wood­working companies and the data of the Pricing Policy Department for 2006–2010 were used as the initial data for the quantitative analysis. It is established that the goods markets under study during the period analyzed were statically and dynamically ineffective and their antimonopoly regulation is economically inadvisable.Ценовой сговор производителей на товарных рынках (и явный, и молчаливый) считается незаконным, поскольку приводит к ограничению конкуренции или ущемлени

Импортозамещение в Республике Беларусь

В данной работе были рассмотрены мероприятия по проведению импортозамещения в Республике Беларусь, проанализированы результаты по выполнению Плана мероприятий за 2022 и 2023 года. Авторами установлено, что Беларусь успешно развивается в сфере импортозамещения

Continuous Avalanche Segregation of Granular Mixtures in Thin Rotating Drums

We study segregation of granular mixtures in the continuous avalanche regime (for frequencies above ~ 1 rpm) in thin rotating drums using a continuum theory for surface flows of grains. The theory predicts profiles in agreement with experiments only when we consider a flux dependent velocity of flowing grains. We find the segregation of species of different size and surface properties, with the smallest and roughest grains being found preferentially at the center of the drum. For a wide difference between the species we find a complete segregation in agreement with experiments. In addition, we predict a transition to a smooth segregation regime - with an power-law decay of the concentrations as a function of radial coordinate - as the size ratio between the grains is decreased towards one.Comment: 4 pages, 4 figures, http://polymer.bu.edu/~hmaks

Spontaneous Stratification in Granular Mixtures

Granular materials size segregate when exposed to external periodic perturbations such as vibrations. Moreover, mixtures of grains of different sizes spontaneously segregate in the absence of external perturbations: when a mixture is simply poured onto a pile, the large grains are more likely to be found near the base, while the small grains are more likely to be near the top. Here, we report a spontaneous phenomenon arising when we pour a mixture between two vertical plates: the mixture spontaneously stratifies into alternating layers of small and large grains whenever the large grains are rougher than the small grains. In contrast, we find only spontaneous segregation when the large grains are more rounded than the small grains. The stratification is related to the occurrence of avalanches; during each avalanche the grains comprising the avalanche spontaneously stratify into a pair of layers through a "kink" mechanism, with the small grains forming a sublayer underneath the layer of large grains.Comment: 4 pages, 6 figures, http://polymer.bu.edu/~hmakse/Home.htm

Stratification Instability in Granular Flows

When a mixture of two kinds of grains differing in size and shape is poured in a vertical two-dimensional cell, the mixture spontaneously stratifies in alternating layers of small and large grains, whenever the large grains are more faceted than the small grains. Otherwise, the mixture spontaneously segregates in different regions of the cell when the large grains are more rounded than the small grains. We address the question of the origin of the instability mechanism leading to stratification using a recently proposed set of equations for surface flow of granular mixtures. We show that the stable solution of the system is a segregation solution due to size (large grains tend to segregate downhill near the substrate and small grains tend to segregate uphill) and shape (rounded grains tend to segregate downhill and more faceted grains tend to segregate uphill). As a result, the segregation solution of the system is realized for mixtures of large-rounded grains and small-cubic grains with the large-rounded grains segregating near the bottom of the pile. Stability analysis reveals the instability mechanism driving the system to stratification as a competition between size-segregation and shape-segregation taking place for mixtures of large-cubic grains and small-rounded grains. The large-cubic grains tend to size-segregate at the bottom of the pile, while at the same time, they tend to shape-segregate near the pouring point. Thus, the segregation solution becomes unstable, and the system evolves spontaneously to stratification.Comment: 10 pages, 10 figures, http://polymer.bu.edu/~hmakse/Home.htm