Vade mecum on the Stability and Growth Pact

This document is the third issue of the Vade mecum published for the first time in May 2013 with the aim of improving transparency of the way the Commission applies the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). It presents the relevant procedures and methodologies designed for implementing the SGPEste documento es el tercer número del Vademécum publicado por primera vez en mayo de 2013 con el objetivo de mejorar la transparencia de la forma en que la Comisión aplica las normas del Pacto de Estabilidad y Crecimiento (PEC). Presenta los procedimientos y metodologías pertinentes para la aplicación del PEC

What makes a good ‘bad bank’? The Irish, Spanish and German experience

This paper examines the experience of three asset management companies (AMCs) or ʽbad banksʼ established in the euro area following the 2008 global financial crisis. Specifically, it studies NAMA, Sareb and FMS Wertmanagement (FMS). These AMCs were set up to purchase growing nonperforming loans on banks’ balance sheets with the aim of their eventual disposal. The study seeks to identify factors that support an AMC’s success. It also analyses the impact of the European regulatory framework, including the Eurostat rules, State-aid regulations and bank resolution rules, on the AMCs’ design. It also reflects on the way recent changes to EU bank resolution rules now limit the involvement of State aid in AMCs. The study finds that the type of assets transferred and the macroeconomic environment are crucially important for successful asset disposals. The paper also focuses on additional success factors, such as clean asset documentation, a solid valuation process, efficient asset servicing, a strong legal framework and skilled staff. Though challenges remain, the three AMCs have contributed to banking sector stabilisation as they have been undertaken alongside bank restructuring measures. The financial backing of the authorities, decisive in the cases analysed, has however come at a fiscal cost

Information and Financial Crisis Policymaking

The degree to which governments intervene to contain financial crises varies considerably. We aim to understand why policymakers choose the level of intervention they do to contain financial shocks. In particular, we want to understand why policymakers may choose policies that create outcomes they do not want. We focus on a defining feature of financial crisis policymaking that has been largely unaddressed in the literature on policy responses to crises: policymakers lack good information about the health of their banking systems. So, they rely on their bureaucrats and other actors for necessary information. However, information providers may have different policy preferences. To understand the interactions between these actors and the implications for policy choice, we advance a signalling game of financial crisis containment. We use comparative statics and a case study of the recent Irish crisis to demonstrate how information asymmetries can have a significant impact on bailout choices