La Pologne vue de France : un aperçu historiographique

L’historiographie française de la Pologne connaît un certain développement depuis le début des années 1980, en privilégiant l’étude du XXe siècle, en particulier les périodes de l’entre-deux-guerres et surtout de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale. La recherche récente a cependant permis d’approfondir nos connaissances sur l’histoire de la Pologne depuis le XVIe siècle. Moins prolifique que la production bibliographique britannique ou américaine, la recherche  française est sur la voie d’un élargissement des champs de recherche à des problématiques qui intègrent non seulement la dimension politique de l’histoire, mais également l’économie, la culture, l’histoire des mentalités. Elle s’appuie en grande partie sur l’historiographie polonaise dont les débats rejaillissent jusqu’en France et sur un travail en relation avec les chercheurs polonais que rendent possible les rencontres scientifiques et les échanges universitaires de plus en plus nombreux.Poland viewed from France: an historiographic perspective. French historiography of Poland has seen some development since the early 1980s, focusing on the study of the twentieth century, particularly the periods between the two world wars and above all the Second World War. Recent research, however, has deepened our knowledge of the history of Poland since the sixteenth century. Less prolific than British or American bibliographic work, French research is on a path of broadening the field of research with issues that include not only the political dimension of history, but also economic, cultural, history of attitudes. It relies heavily on Polish historiography, the debates of which spill over to France, and on related work with Polish researchers that makes possible increasingly numerous scientific meetings and academic exchanges

Histoire des conflits et déterminisme géographique en Europe orientale dans les rapports des officiers français au début du XXe siècle

Au tournant des XIXe et XXe siècles, les travaux des géographes militaires et des attachés militaires français sur l’Europe centrale et orientale se font de plus en plus nombreux. Dans le contexte de l’alliance militaire franco-russe, l’étude des confins des Empires russe, allemand, austro-hongrois et ottoman reflète les préoccupations françaises. Les études et les rapports proposent des réflexions stratégiques inspirées de l’observation géographique et de l’expérience militaire historique de régions considérées comme des terres d’invasion, théâtre de l’inévitable choc entre « Slaves et Germains ». Pour les officiers français, les données géographiques conditionnent souvent les caractéristiques politiques et culturelles des États. L’observation doit donc permettre de prévoir le déroulement des futures opérations de guerre. Elle a surtout pour objets la recherche d’informations sur les voies de communication, la valeur des armées, celle des soldats de l’armée russe alliée et l’esprit des populations.At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, the works of the French military attachés and geographers regarding Central and Eastern Europe are becoming more numerous. In the context of the French-Russian military alliance, the study of the outposts of the Russian, German, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires reflects the French concerns. Studies and reports offer strategic reflections based on the geographical observation and the historical and military experience of areas which are reputed to be lands of invasion and a theater of the unavoidable war between “the Slavs and the Germans”. According to the French officers, geographical data often determine the political and cultural characteristics of the states. Thus, the observation should allow to anticipate the conduct of the future war operations. Their main purposes were the search for information about the lines of communication, the value of the armies and of the soldiers of the Russian allied army, and the minds of the populations as well

Enjeux et rivalités politiques franco-britanniques : le plébiscite de haute Silésie (1921)

En vertu de l’article 88 du traité de Versailles, un plébiscite doit avoir lieu en haute Silésie, pour décider de l’appartenance de cette riche région minière à l’Allemagne ou à la Pologne. Aux rivalités entre Polonais et Allemands s’ajoutent celles entre Français et Britanniques qu’opposent des visions géopolitiques divergentes. L’urgence du plébiscite se fait d’autant plus sentir que sur place, la force d’interposition internationale, composée de contingents français et italiens, auxquels se joignent des troupes britanniques, a le plus grand mal à venir à bout des insurrections allemandes et polonaises. Ces troubles attisent la mésentente franco-britannique, Londres accusant le général français Le Rond, président de la Commission interalliée, de favoriser la partie polonaise. Les négociations franco-britanniques sont laborieuses, avant comme après le plébiscite de mars 1921, qui est remporté par la population allemande. Face à l’échec des pourparlers, la décision est prise de confier la question à la Société des Nations. Il ne s’agit en fait que d’une manière de continuer les négociations franco-britanniques sous le couvert de l’organisation internationale. Un compromis est finalement trouvé, avec le partage de la haute-Silésie dont la Pologne reçoit la partie la plus riche mais les rancœurs restent profondes.Franco-British issues and political rivalries: the plebiscite in Upper Silesia (1921).Under Article 88 of the Treaty of Versailles, a plebiscite should have been held in Upper Silesia to decide whether this rich mining region belonged to Germany or Poland. To the rivalries between Poles and Germans were added those between the French and British who had divergent geopolitical visions. The urgency of the plebiscite was felt especially in this place; the international intervention force, composed of French and Italian contingents, to which were joined British troops, had great difficulty putting down German and Polish insurrections.  These disorders fanned the Franco-British disagreement, London accusing the French general Le Rond, President of the Inter-Allied Commission, of favoring the Poles. Franco-British negotiations were difficult, before and after the March 1921 plebiscite, which was won in a sweeping victory by the German population. Given the failure of talks, the decision was made to entrust the matter to the League of Nations.  This was in fact only a way to continue the Franco-British negotiations under the cover of the international organization. A compromise was finally reached, with the sharing of Upper Silesia of which Poland received the richest part but resentment remained deep

La Pologne vue de France : un aperçu historiographique

L’historiographie française de la Pologne connaît un certain développement depuis le début des années 1980, en privilégiant l’étude du XXe siècle, en particulier les périodes de l’entre-deux-guerres et surtout de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale. La recherche récente a cependant permis d’approfondir nos connaissances sur l’histoire de la Pologne depuis le XVIe siècle. Moins prolifique que la production bibliographique britannique ou américaine, la recherche  française est sur la voie d’un élargissement des champs de recherche à des problématiques qui intègrent non seulement la dimension politique de l’histoire, mais également l’économie, la culture, l’histoire des mentalités. Elle s’appuie en grande partie sur l’historiographie polonaise dont les débats rejaillissent jusqu’en France et sur un travail en relation avec les chercheurs polonais que rendent possible les rencontres scientifiques et les échanges universitaires de plus en plus nombreux.Poland viewed from France: an historiographic perspective. French historiography of Poland has seen some development since the early 1980s, focusing on the study of the twentieth century, particularly the periods between the two world wars and above all the Second World War. Recent research, however, has deepened our knowledge of the history of Poland since the sixteenth century. Less prolific than British or American bibliographic work, French research is on a path of broadening the field of research with issues that include not only the political dimension of history, but also economic, cultural, history of attitudes. It relies heavily on Polish historiography, the debates of which spill over to France, and on related work with Polish researchers that makes possible increasingly numerous scientific meetings and academic exchanges

La Roumanie et la Pologne dans la politique soviétique de la France : la difficulté d’établir un « front uni »

De 1924 à 1935, les relations entre la France, la Roumanie et la Pologne vis-à-vis de l’Union soviétique sont marquées par la volonté française d’asseoir son influence en Europe centre-orientale. Paris entend maintenir une unité de front entre ses deux alliés dans le but de forger une force dissuasive face à l’Est et d’éviter toute implication directe dans la région. L’unité polono-roumaine doit également permettre de tenir Berlin et Moscou éloignées l’une de l’autre. De 1924 au protocole Litvinov de 1929, Paris mène un jeu complexe consistant à soutenir ses alliés en évitant toute tension avec leur voisine soviétique. Avec l’implication progressive de l’Union soviétique dans les questions de sécurité en Europe, la cohésion franco-polono-roumaine perd de sa vigueur. Concentrée sur le problème de la Bessarabie, Bucarest est un obstacle au rapprochement franco-soviétique et polono-soviétique. A partir de 1933, au moment où la Roumanie s’inscrit dans l’axe reliant Paris à Moscou, la Pologne refuse la politique de sécurité française et entend mener une politique d’équilibre bilatéral entre l’Allemagne et l’URSS. À la fin de 1935, le manque de cohérence entre les trois alliés ne peut que profiter à une Allemagne nazie désormais prête aux coups de force.Romania and Poland in the French soviet politic: the difficulty establishing a close front. From 1924 to 1935 relations between France, Romania and Poland “vis-à-vis” the Soviet Union were marked by a French desire to embed its influence in east-central Europe. Paris sought to maintain a united front between its two allies with a view to forging a deterrent force facing eastwards, and at the same time avoid all direct involvement in the region herself. Polish-Romanian unity was also designed to keep a distance between Germany and the USSR. Between 1924 and the Litvinov Protocol of 1929, the French pursued a complex game that entailed supporting their allies whilst avoiding any tension with their Soviet neighbour. With the steadily growing involvement of the USSR in questions of European security, however, Franco-Polish-Romanian cohesion gradually weakened. Focused as it was on the problem of Bessarabia, Romania proved to be an obstacle to both Franco-Soviet and Polish-Soviet rapprochements. From 1933, when Romania joined the axis that re-linked Paris to Moscow, Poland rejected France’s security policy and embarked on its own policy of pursuing a bilateral equilibrium between Germany on the one hand and the USSR on the other. At the end of 1935 the lack of coherence between the three allies could only benefit Nazi Germany which was henceforth ready to stage coups de force

La Roumanie et la Pologne dans la politique soviétique de la France : la difficulté d’établir un « front uni »

De 1924 à 1935, les relations entre la France, la Roumanie et la Pologne vis-à-vis de l’Union soviétique sont marquées par la volonté française d’asseoir son influence en Europe centre-orientale. Paris entend maintenir une unité de front entre ses deux alliés dans le but de forger une force dissuasive face à l’Est et d’éviter toute implication directe dans la région. L’unité polono-roumaine doit également permettre de tenir Berlin et Moscou éloignées l’une de l’autre. De 1924 au protocole Litvinov de 1929, Paris mène un jeu complexe consistant à soutenir ses alliés en évitant toute tension avec leur voisine soviétique. Avec l’implication progressive de l’Union soviétique dans les questions de sécurité en Europe, la cohésion franco-polono-roumaine perd de sa vigueur. Concentrée sur le problème de la Bessarabie, Bucarest est un obstacle au rapprochement franco-soviétique et polono-soviétique. A partir de 1933, au moment où la Roumanie s’inscrit dans l’axe reliant Paris à Moscou, la Pologne refuse la politique de sécurité française et entend mener une politique d’équilibre bilatéral entre l’Allemagne et l’URSS. À la fin de 1935, le manque de cohérence entre les trois alliés ne peut que profiter à une Allemagne nazie désormais prête aux coups de force.Romania and Poland in the French soviet politic: the difficulty establishing a close front. From 1924 to 1935 relations between France, Romania and Poland “vis-à-vis” the Soviet Union were marked by a French desire to embed its influence in east-central Europe. Paris sought to maintain a united front between its two allies with a view to forging a deterrent force facing eastwards, and at the same time avoid all direct involvement in the region herself. Polish-Romanian unity was also designed to keep a distance between Germany and the USSR. Between 1924 and the Litvinov Protocol of 1929, the French pursued a complex game that entailed supporting their allies whilst avoiding any tension with their Soviet neighbour. With the steadily growing involvement of the USSR in questions of European security, however, Franco-Polish-Romanian cohesion gradually weakened. Focused as it was on the problem of Bessarabia, Romania proved to be an obstacle to both Franco-Soviet and Polish-Soviet rapprochements. From 1933, when Romania joined the axis that re-linked Paris to Moscow, Poland rejected France’s security policy and embarked on its own policy of pursuing a bilateral equilibrium between Germany on the one hand and the USSR on the other. At the end of 1935 the lack of coherence between the three allies could only benefit Nazi Germany which was henceforth ready to stage coups de force

Education, démocratie, révision et pragmatisme

This book proposes a development of the method of inquiry in relation to the theory of revision. The examination focuses on the conditions for reconstructing possible epistemic networks in democratic regimes, primarily through school. The theme of education is treated through Dewey’s philosophy, then with the Rorty’s pragmatism where conceptions of education are removed from the idea of method. Rorty's positions are appreciated in the perspective of his rallying to Rawlsian liberalism, which allows balanced equilibrium to prevail as a means of evaluating the principles of justice as equity. To this method is added the counterfactual reasoning in the original position hypothesis and the questions addressed to Trotsky by the Dewey Commission. This last point resumes the method of inquiry and offers the possibility of using counterfactual reasoning in the educational field

Deliberative democracy and the improvement of children’s rational thinking

By considering the demands for deliberative democracy some liberals are oriented to affording citizen more direct opportunities. It is this situation that Rawls takes into account with his method of reflexive equilibrium. For him, inquiry appears as means of evaluating principles of justice and moral judgments. When people receive information opposed to their own beliefs about particular issues revisions are to be made. In this investigation, particular issues give the opportunity to test higher and lower beliefs. They become ultimately acceptable by looking for their general coherence. People have to accept the deliberative process in which they may change their considered judgments of justice or some principles. Nevertheless, Rawls still considers the ways « free and rational persons » may develop rational thinking without any reference to children‟s development of creativity. We would like, therefore, to insist on the possibilities given by Dewey‟s pragmatic method of inquiry. In fact, Dewey was also interested by the conditions of reconstruction of the cognitive sets possible in democratic regimes, but primarily in schools. He contends that education should promote the development of intelligence applied to democratic experience. In his definition of valuation as inquiry, Dewey has in mind the use of History in curriculum. Teachers may present an « indirect sociology » that describes people habits as contextual practices. They could belong to foreign countries despite the fact they are part of our History. It helps to improve the efficiency of the reflexive equilibration by enlarging the national perspectives. In this case, the coherence of children's judgments depends on their ability to imagine how they would react if they were in some other place. It goes beyond tastes for investigation that schools can provide to students who are engaged to acquire the values of reasoning

La notion de croissance chez Dewey et Rorty

The notion of growth has two aspects: quantitative and qualitative. The first suggests addition, increase or physiological change. The second concerns enrichment and personal fulfilment; it is linked to the task of education. The American philosophers John Dewey and Richard Rorty agree in emphasising the necessary indeterminacy of the notion of 'growth' in order to leave evolutionary perspectives open. Their points of view diverge, however, when it comes to valorising the period of childhood. One emphasises the creativity and individuality of adolescence, while the other refuses to allow such a distinction. An analysis of the two conceptions of the 'ages of life allows the author to identify two philosophies of education. Richard Rorty wishes to foreground literary education and the relations between teachers and students. For him the notion of growth finds its real home in the university, whereas John Dewey highlights the importance of a general method applicable in all educational institutions. How accordingly do the two authors help us to appreciate the ideas of maturity and of personal and collective fulfilment? How do they offer an educational alternative and social choice based on their particular epistemological models