Patterns of third-party and disputant-initiated mediation inmilitarized interstate disputes, 1946-1992

In this dissertation, I seek to explain mediation initiation in militarized interstate disputes. In large part this purpose serves to bridge an important gap in the mediation literature between the onset of mediation and its outcome. Specifically, I examine how various dispute, disputant and third party traits interact to foster a mediation attempt. In doing so, I focus on answering three related questions. First, what are the differences between third party and disputant initiated mediation? Second, why are the two types different? Third, what are the implications of these differences? A new dataset on third party intermediary interventions is utilized for this study, covering the post World War II period from 1946 to 1992. During this period, there are 1137 militarized interstate disputes, with 379 mediation attempts by third party actors. After a thorough description of the data and the manner in which the dataset was compiled, I empirically test various hypotheses concerning both third party and disputant initiated mediation as they relate to the conflict and mediation literatures. In doing so, I distinguish between three dimensions of a militarized dispute: power, severity and regime type. Additionally, I incorporate a triadic model of conflict management behavior that takes into account third party characteristics and linkages to disputants to explain mediation initiation. Finally, I disaggregate disputant initiated mediation to determine if different conditions lead to one or both disputants initiating mediation efforts. My results suggest that the conditions leading to third party initiation are rather different than those leading to disputant initiation. Most notable are how dispute factors such as territory, multilateral disputes and power asymmetry affect the likelihood of either type of initiation. Additionally, the role of third party characteristics like major power status and linkages such as trade and alliance ties are also found to be important in determining when third parties will initiate mediation. Such results on the whole suggest a further need to re-evaluate our observations about mediation outcome and mediation theory in general

Replication data for: The Conflict Management Efforts of Allies in Interstate Disputes

Motivations for conflict management are rarely discussed in terms of commitments that potential third-parties have toward one or both disputants. The current study addresses this lacuna by examining how alliance designs affect conflict management behavior. Specifically, we argue that third-party states'™ willingness to manage interstate conflicts depends on both the existence and depth of an alliance relationship. We test this argument using data on conflict management within militarized interstate disputes during the period 1946-2000. We find that allies are more likely than non-allies to manage their partner'™s disputes. Underneath this aggregate relationship, however, we also find that the depth of alliance commitments strongly influences this behavior. Deeper commitments -- both across and within alliance types --“ increase the likelihood of conflict management significantly

Podobnosti preferenc in skupinska hegemonija

The Group of Seven (G-7) nations hold economic and military/political capabilities in hegemonic proportion in international politics. Organisationally, the G-7 has worked during both the Cold War and thereafter to address a broad series of global governance issues and to develop global architecture. Yet, there has been little by way of systematic analysis to determine the extent of the groupćs cohesiveness, and the likelihood that suchcohesiveness will endure in the post-Cold War environment. Here, we develop a method for assessing G-7 cohesion and apply it to systematically describe trends in G-7 cohesion since 1975 in the United Nations General Assembly. We conclude with some suggestions for future research.V mednarodni politiki države iz skupine sedmih najbolj razvitih (G 7) obvladujejo ekonomske in vojaško-politične zmogljivosti hegemonskih razmerij. Države skupine G 7 so med hladno vojno in po njej delovale organizirano, da bi razvile globalno arhitekturo. Kot skupina so se soočale s številnimi vprašanji globalnega vodenja/upravljanja (governance). O tej temi pa je bilo malo sistematično analiz, še zlasti takšnih, ki bi ugotavljale, koliko je skupina kohezivna in kakšna je verjetnost, da bo ta kohezivnost preživela v mednarodnem okolju tudi po koncu hladne vojne. Avtorji razvijajo metodo za ugotavljanje kohezivnosti skupine G 7 in jo uporabijo, da bi sistematično opisali težnje po njej znotraj generalne skupščine Združenih narodov od leta 1975 naprej. Članek sklenejo s priporočili za prihodnje raziskovanje

Three articles on the politics of the Medal of Honor

Despite its prominence and overlap with so many fields of political science, the Medal of Honor has received little scholarly attention. This dissertation contributes to our understanding with three articles that view the Medal of Honor as a political tool. The first explains that, because the president uses the Medal of Honor as a tool and the tool's effectiveness varies with its value, he has worked to reduce the number of unworthy recipients by creating several layers of independent review. Multiple layers help prevent one person's preferences from dominating, and each additional layer makes it more difficult for unworthy nominees to get through. The rules of the game allow for appeals to reverse incorrect decisions. These rules influenced two recent cases. In the first, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates avoided an Inspector General investigation into Sergeant Rafael Peralta's nomination, which would have lowered the value of the award, by retracting his endorsement. In the second, General Davis Petraeus recommended downgrading Captain William Swenson's nomination to a Distinguished Service Cross; but his administrative clerks lost the paperwork, which allowed the process to restart, and the nomination received an endorsement from Petraeus's replacement. The second article considers the Medal of Honor as a motivational tool. Although most theoretical economics studies suggest that awards increase employee productivity, the little research that exists on the topic has shown that awards actually decrease overall effort (Gubler, Larkin and Pierce, 2013). In addition, those theoretical studies assume that individuals succeed or fail on their own and that employees do not affect cost functions for one another. Chapter 3 explores a game that accounts for these deficiencies in a military context, where success is determined at the group level and soldiers can make action more or less costly for other soldiers (for example, by digging trenches). The model suggests that wages and awards decrease a soldier's effort but increase other soldiers' effort. These results are more consistent with the empirical findings than most theoretical economic studies. The final article considers the Medal of Honor as a public-opinion tool. Several studies have suggested that the president has little to no influence over public opinion (e.g. Edwards, 2003), but human-interest stories presented through soft-news sources offer the possibility reaching low-awareness individuals, who can be influenced with new information, with positive information about the war through entertainment-focused media, such as late-night talk shows (Baum, 2002, 2003). This in turn may help the president protect his ability to pursue his domestic agenda (Thrall, 2000). I find that the president awards more Medals of Honor when his job approval is low, with a lag of about two months. I also find that the president is 23% more likely to hold a Medal of Honor ceremony between Monday and Thursday, when it will get more attention, than on a Friday, Saturday, or Sunday. (Published By University of Alabama Libraries

Efficacy and safety of two neutralising monoclonal antibody therapies, sotrovimab and BRII-196 plus BRII-198, for adults hospitalised with COVID-19 (TICO): a randomised controlled trial

We aimed to assess the efficacy and safety of two neutralising monoclonal antibody therapies (sotrovimab [Vir Biotechnology and GlaxoSmithKline] and BRII-196 plus BRII-198 [Brii Biosciences]) for adults admitted to hospital for COVID-19 (hereafter referred to as hospitalised) with COVID-19. In this multinational, double-blind, randomised, placebo-controlled, clinical trial (Therapeutics for Inpatients with COVID-19 [TICO]), adults (aged ≥18 years) hospitalised with COVID-19 at 43 hospitals in the USA, Denmark, Switzerland, and Poland were recruited. Patients were eligible if they had laboratory-confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infection and COVID-19 symptoms for up to 12 days. Using a web-based application, participants were randomly assigned (2:1:2:1), stratified by trial site pharmacy, to sotrovimab 500 mg, matching placebo for sotrovimab, BRII-196 1000 mg plus BRII-198 1000 mg, or matching placebo for BRII-196 plus BRII-198, in addition to standard of care. Each study product was administered as a single dose given intravenously over 60 min. The concurrent placebo groups were pooled for analyses. The primary outcome was time to sustained clinical recovery, defined as discharge from the hospital to home and remaining at home for 14 consecutive days, up to day 90 after randomisation. Interim futility analyses were based on two seven-category ordinal outcome scales on day 5 that measured pulmonary status and extrapulmonary complications of COVID-19. The safety outcome was a composite of death, serious adverse events, incident organ failure, and serious coinfection up to day 90 after randomisation. Efficacy and safety outcomes were assessed in the modified intention-to-treat population, defined as all patients randomly assigned to treatment who started the study infusion. This study is registered with ClinicalTrials.gov, NCT04501978. Between Dec 16, 2020, and March 1, 2021, 546 patients were enrolled and randomly assigned to sotrovimab (n=184), BRII-196 plus BRII-198 (n=183), or placebo (n=179), of whom 536 received part or all of their assigned study drug (sotrovimab n=182, BRII-196 plus BRII-198 n=176, or placebo n=178; median age of 60 years [IQR 50–72], 228 [43%] patients were female and 308 [57%] were male). At this point, enrolment was halted on the basis of the interim futility analysis. At day 5, neither the sotrovimab group nor the BRII-196 plus BRII-198 group had significantly higher odds of more favourable outcomes than the placebo group on either the pulmonary scale (adjusted odds ratio sotrovimab 1·07 [95% CI 0·74–1·56]; BRII-196 plus BRII-198 0·98 [95% CI 0·67–1·43]) or the pulmonary-plus complications scale (sotrovimab 1·08 [0·74–1·58]; BRII-196 plus BRII-198 1·00 [0·68–1·46]). By day 90, sustained clinical recovery was seen in 151 (85%) patients in the placebo group compared with 160 (88%) in the sotrovimab group (adjusted rate ratio 1·12 [95% CI 0·91–1·37]) and 155 (88%) in the BRII-196 plus BRII-198 group (1·08 [0·88–1·32]). The composite safety outcome up to day 90 was met by 48 (27%) patients in the placebo group, 42 (23%) in the sotrovimab group, and 45 (26%) in the BRII-196 plus BRII-198 group. 13 (7%) patients in the placebo group, 14 (8%) in the sotrovimab group, and 15 (9%) in the BRII-196 plus BRII-198 group died up to day 90. Neither sotrovimab nor BRII-196 plus BRII-198 showed efficacy for improving clinical outcomes among adults hospitalised with COVID-19. US National Institutes of Health and Operation Warp Spee