UvA-DARE (Digital Academic Repository) Redistribution of Longevity Risk: The effect of heterogeneous mortality beliefs *

Redistribution of longevity risk: The effect of heterogeneous mortality beliefs Boonen, T.J.; De Waegenaere, A.; Norde, H. General rights It is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons). Disclaimer/Complaints regulations If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: https://uba.uva.nl/en/contact, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible. Abstract Existing literature regarding the natural hedge potential that arises from combining different longevity-linked liabilities typically does not address the question how changes in the liability mix can be obtained. We consider firms who aim to exploit the benefits of natural hedge potential by redistributing their risks, and characterize the risk redistributions that will arise when the parties bargain for a redistribution of risk that weakly benefits them all. We analyze the effects of heterogeneity in the beliefs regarding the probability distribution of future mortality rates on the properties of these risk redistributions, and provide a numerical illustration for a case where an insurer with a portfolio of term assurance contracts and a pension fund with a portfolio of life annuities redistribute their risks. JEL-Classification: C71, C78, G22, J1

On the effects of the degree of discretion in reporting managerial performance

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