Category theory and set theory as theories about complementary types of universals

Instead of the half-century old foundational feud between set theory and category theory, this paper argues that they are theories about two different complementary types of universals. The set-theoretic antinomies forced naïve set theory to be reformulated using some iterative notion of a set so that a set would always have higher type or rank than its members. Then the universal u_{F}={x|F(x)} for a property F() could never be self-predicative in the sense of u_{F}∈u_{F}. But the mathematical theory of categories, dating from the mid-twentieth century, includes a theory of always-self-predicative universals--which can be seen as forming the "other bookend" to the never-self-predicative universals of set theory. The self-predicative universals of category theory show that the problem in the antinomies was not self-predication per se, but negated self-predication. They also provide a model (in the Platonic Heaven of mathematics) for the self-predicative strand of Plato's Theory of Forms as well as for the idea of a "concrete universal" in Hegel and similar ideas of paradigmatic exemplars in ordinary thought

ESOPs & CO-OPs: Worker Capitalism & Worker Democracy

[Excerpt] The broad purpose of the labor movement has always been to further the economic self-determination of workers, to maximize working people\u27s control over their economic destiny. Self-determination is the goal, but what are the means? In the past and present state of capitalist society, the only real opportunity for most people to earn a living is by selling their labor as an employee to some employer. In that historical situation, workers can best promote their self-determination through unionized collective bargaining with their employer. Collective bargaining is the best means at hand, but it is only a means, not an end in itself. As the economic situation changes, new opportunities arise. In some cases, workers can break out of the employees\u27 role and achieve the status of worker-owners of their business. Labor can hire capital (instead of the reverse). In this newfound role, the workers can have much greater powers to control their own economic destiny, to promote their own self-determination. But worker ownership also presents a whole new set of problems and challenges. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the two major forms of worker ownership in view of the overall goal of the labor movement, to promote democratic self-determination in the workplace

Tradable Pollution Permits and the Regulatory Game

This paper analyzes polluters\u27 incentives to move from a traditional command and control (CAC) environmental regulatory regime to a tradable permits (TPP) regime. Existing work in environmental economics does not model how firms contest and bargain over actual regulatory implementation in CAC regimes, and therefore fail to compare TPP regimes with any CAC regime that is actually observed. This paper models CAC environmental regulation as a bargaining game over pollution entitlements. Using a reduced form model of the regulatory contest, it shows that CAC regulatory bargaining likely generates a regulatory status quo under which firms with the highest compliance costs bargain for the smallest pollution reductions, or even no reduction at all. As for a tradable permits regime, it is shown that all firms are better off under such a regime than they would be under an idealized CAC regime that set and enforced a uniform pollution standard, but permit sellers (low compliance cost firms) may actually be better off under a TPP regime with relaxed aggregate pollution levels. Most importantly, because high cost firms (or facilities) are the most weakly regulated in the equilibrium under negotiated or bargained CAC regimes, they may be net losers in a proposed move to a TPP regime. When equilibrium costs under a TPP regime are compared with equilibrium costs under a status quo CAC regime, several otherwise paradoxical aspects of firm attitudes toward TPP type reforms can be explained. In particular, the otherwise paradoxical pattern of allowances awarded under Phase II of the 1990 Clean Air Act\u27s acid rain program, a pattern tending to favor (in Phase II) cleaner, newer generating units, is explained by the fact that under the status quo regime, a kind of bargained CAC, it was the newer cleaner units that were regulated, and which therefore had higher marginal control costs than did the largely unregulated older, plants. As a normative matter, the analysis here implies that the proper baseline for evaluating TPP regimes such as those contained in the Bush Administration\u27s recent Clear Skies initiative is not idealized, but nonexistent CAC regulatory outcomes, but rather the outcomes that have resulted from the bargaining game set up by CAC laws and regulations

Inalienable rights: A litmus test for liberal theories of justice

Liberal-contractarian philosophies of justice see the unjust systems of slavery and autocracy in the past as being based on coercion—whereas the social order in modern democratic market societies is based on consent and contract. However, the ‘best’ case for slavery and autocracy in the past were consent-based contractarian arguments. Hence, our first task is to recover those ‘forgotten’ apologia for slavery and autocracy. To counter those consent-based arguments, the historical anti-slavery and democratic movements developed a theory of inalienable rights. Our second task is to recover that theory and to consider several other applications of the theory. Finally, the liberal theories of justice expounded by John Rawls and by Robert Nozick are briefly examined from this perspective

Community syndicalism for the United States: preliminary observations on law and globalization in democratic production

two structural labor crises for developed economies: 1) The channeling of substantial investment into non-productive, paper commodities, reducing growth of production for use and therefore reducing available aggregate job creation; and 2) The continued exportation of industrial jobs to other lower cost jurisdictions, and outsourcing, automation, just-in-time production, and speed-ups associated with global supply chains. As a result, local communities and regional populations have destabilized and even collapsed with attendant social problems. One possible response is Community Syndicalism – local community finance and operating credit for industrial production combined with democratic worker ownership and control of production. The result would increase investment directly for production, retain jobs in existing population centers, promote job skilling, and retain tax bases for local services and income supporting local businesses, at the same time increasing support for authentic political democracy by rendering the exploitive ideology of the Public/Private distinction superfluous. Slowing job exportation may reduce the global race to the bottom of labor standards and differential wage rates reducing the return to producers of value and increasing the skew of income distribution undermining social wages and welfare worldwide. Community Syndicalism can serve as moral goal in an alternative production model focusing incentives on long term stability of jobs and community economic base

On some alleged "problems" and alleged solutions" in democratic firms

This paper will discuss two problems that have plagued the literature on the Ward-DomarVanek labor-managed firm (LMF) model, the perverse supply response problem and the horizon problem. The paper also discusses the solution to the horizon problem and the alleged "solution" of a membership market. Design/methodology/approach : This is a conceptual paper so it analyzes the two problems and shows how they can be resolved. It also shows how one alleged "solution" (membership market) is based on several conceptual mistakes about the structure of rights in a democratic firm. Findings: The perverse supply response is based on the assumption that the members of a democratic firm can expel for no cause some members when it would benefit the remaining members. It is shown that the same perverse behavior happens conceptually and historically in a conventional firm under the same assumptions. The horizon problem is resolved by the system of internal capital accounts (ICAs) that has been independently invented at least four times. Research limitations/implications: The idea of a democratic firm is quite often dismissed by conventional economists: At first it seems like a good idea but unfortunately it is plagued by structural problems such as the perverse supply response and the horizon problem. Hence it is important to see that the first is not a problem under ordinary assumptions and that the second is a solved problem. Practical implications: The perverse supply response problem can be reproduced in a conventional firm under similar assumptions, and the horizon problem is real problem for social or common ownership firms but is solved in the Mondragon-type worker cooperatives by the system of ICAs. This has been known and published since the early 1980s, but conventional economists ignore the solution and still cite it as an inherent structure problem of a democratic firm. Originality/value: It has not been previously shown in the LMF literature that the perverse supply response can be reproduced in a conventional corporation under similar assumptions since the maximand for the conventional firm is not total market value but that value per current shareholder. The solution to the "horizon problem using ICAs has long been known" but never acknowledged in the conventional literature as if it was a necessary feature of workplace democracy. The idea of a membership market is analyzed and criticized Keywords Labor-manage