Institutions and Contract Enforcement

We provide evidence on how two important types of institutions – dismissal barriers, and bonus pay – affect contract enforcement behavior in a market with incomplete contracts and repeated interactions. Dismissal barriers are shown to have a strong negative impact on worker performance, and market efficiency, by interfering with firms' use of firing threat as an incentive device. Dismissal barriers also distort the dynamics of worker effort levels over time, cause firms to rely more on the spot market for labor, and create a distribution of relationship lengths in the market that is more extreme, with more very short and more very long relationships. The introduction of a bonus pay option dramatically changes the market outcome. Firms are observed to substitute bonus pay for threat of firing as an incentive device, almost entirely offsetting the negative incentive and efficiency effects of dismissal barriers. Nevertheless, contract enforcement behavior remains fundamentally changed, because the option to pay bonuses causes firms to rely less on long-term relationships. Our results show that market outcomes are the result of a complex interplay between contract enforcement policies and the institutions in which they are embedded

Institutions and Contract Enforcement

We provide evidence on how two important types of institutions – dismissal barriers, and bonus pay - affect contract enforcement behavior in a market with incomplete contracts and repeated interactions. Dismissal barriers are shown to have a strong negative impact on worker performance, and market efficiency, by interfering with firms’ use of firing threat as an incentive device. Dismissal barriers also distort the dynamics of worker effort levels over time, cause firms to rely more on the spot market for labor, and create a distribution of relationship lengths in the market that is more extreme, with more very short and more very long relationships. The introduction of a bonus pay option dramatically changes the market outcome. Firms are observed to substitute bonus pay for threat of firing as an incentive device, almost entirely offsetting the negative incentive and efficiency effects of dismissal barriers. Nevertheless, contract enforcement behavior remains fundamentally changed, because the option to pay bonuses causes firms to rely less on long-term relationships. Our results show that market outcomes are the result of a complex interplay between contract enforcement policies and the institutions in which they are embedded.institutions, contracts, contract enforcement, market experiment

ROACH accelerated BLAST

Includes abstract.Includes bibliographical references (p. 115-118).Reconfigurable computing, in recent years, has been taking great strides in becoming part of mainstream computing largely due to the rapid growth in the size of FPGAs and their ability to adapt to certain complex applications efficiently. This dissertation investigates the reuse of application specific hardware developed for radio astronomy in accelerating a popular bioinformatics algorithm

Institutions and Contract Enforcement

We provide evidence on how two important types of institutions – dismissal barriers, and bonus pay – affect contract enforcement behavior in a market with incomplete contracts and repeated interactions. Dismissal barriers are shown to have a strong negative impact on worker performance, and market efficiency, by interfering with firms' use of firing threat as an incentive device. Dismissal barriers also distort the dynamics of worker effort levels over time, cause firms to rely more on the spot market for labor, and create a distribution of relationship lengths in the market that is more extreme, with more very short and more very long relationships. The introduction of a bonus pay option dramatically changes the market outcome. Firms are observed to substitute bonus pay for threat of firing as an incentive device, almost entirely offsetting the negative incentive and efficiency effects of dismissal barriers. Nevertheless, contract enforcement behavior remains fundamentally changed, because the option to pay bonuses causes firms to rely less on long-term relationships. Our results show that market outcomes are the result of a complex interplay between contract enforcement policies and the institutions in which they are embedded.incomplete contracts; bonus pay; efficiency wages; employment protection; firing costs; experiment

Bayesian Asteroseismology of 23 Solar-Like Kepler Targets

We study 23 previously published Kepler targets to perform a consistent grid-based Bayesian asteroseismic analysis and compare our results to those obtained via the Asteroseismic Modelling Portal (AMP). We find differences in the derived stellar parameters of many targets and their uncertainties. While some of these differences can be attributed to systematic effects between stellar evolutionary models, we show that the different methodologies deliver incompatible uncertainties for some parameters. Using non-adiabatic models and our capability to measure surface effects, we also investigate the dependency of these surface effects on the stellar parameters. Our results suggest a dependence of the magnitude of the surface effect on the mixing length parameter which also, but only minimally, affects the determination of stellar parameters. While some stars in our sample show no surface effect at all, the most significant surface effects are found for stars that are close to the Sun's position in the HR diagram.Comment: 14 pages, 9 figures, accepted for publication in MNRA

Institutions and Contract Enforcement

We provide evidence on how two important types of institutions – dismissal barriers, and bonus pay – affect contract enforcement behavior in a market with incomplete contracts and repeated interactions. Dismissal barriers are shown to have a strong negative impact on worker performance, and market efficiency, by interfering with firms' use of firing threat as an incentive device. Dismissal barriers also distort the dynamics of worker effort levels over time, cause firms to rely more on the spot market for labor, and create a distribution of relationship lengths in the market that is more extreme, with more very short and more very long relationships. The introduction of a bonus pay option dramatically changes the market outcome. Firms are observed to substitute bonus pay for threat of firing as an incentive device, almost entirely offsetting the negative incentive and efficiency effects of dismissal barriers. Nevertheless, contract enforcement behavior remains fundamentally changed, because the option to pay bonuses causes firms to rely less on long-term relationships. Our results show that market outcomes are the result of a complex interplay between contract enforcement policies and the institutions in which they are embedded.employment protection, efficiency wages, bonus pay, incomplete contracts, firing costs, experiment

The social sciences and the web : From ‘Lurking’ to interdisciplinary ‘Big Data’ research

Acknowledgements This research is supported by the award made by the RCUK Digital Economy theme to the dot.rural Digital Economy Hub (award reference: EP/G066051/1) and the UK Economic & Social Research Council (ESRC) (award reference: ES/M001628/1).Peer reviewedPublisher PD

Photodissociation of pernitric acid (HO2NO2) at 248 nm

The photodissociation of pernitric acid (PNA) was studied at 248 nm. The quantum yield for production of OH radicals is 34 + or - 16 percent. The yield of OH from PNA was measured relative to that of H2O2. The translational and rotational energy content of the OH photofragment from PNA was characterized. A fluorescent emission was also observed and characterized. It is attributed to electronically excited NO2 produced in the PNA photodissociation. A maximum yield of 30 percent for NO2 production was determined. The intensity of this emission, and a mass spectrometric peak at m/e = 33, were found to be useful means of characterizing the purity of the PNA sample