113 research outputs found
On-Net/Off-Net Price Discrimination and 'Bill-and-Keep' vs. 'Cost-Based' Regulation of Mobile Termination Rates
This paper surveys the recent literature on competition between mobile network operators in the presence of call externalities and network effects. It shows that the regulation of mobile termination rates based on “long-run incremental costs” increases networks’ strategic incentives to inefficiently set high on-net/off-net price differentials, thus harming smaller networks and new entrants. The paper argues in favor of a “bill-and-keep” system for mobile-to-mobile termination, and presents international evidence in support of this conclusion.mobile termination, network effects, call externalities, bill-and-keep
Welfare Analysis of Regulating Mobile Termination Rates in the UK (with an Application to the Orange/T-Mobile Merger)
This paper presents results from a calibrated welfare model of the UK mobile telephony market which includes many mobile networks; calls to and from the fixed network; networkbased price discrimination; and call externalities. The analysis focuses on the short-run effects of adopting lower mobile termination rates (MTRs) on total welfare, consumer surplus and profits. Our simulations show that reducing MTRs broadly in line with the recent European Commission Recommendation to either “long-run incremental cost”; reciprocal termination charges with fixed networks; or “bill-and-keep” (i.e. zero termination rates), increases social welfare, consumer surplus and networks’ profits. Depending on the strength of call externalities, social welfare may increase by as much as £360 million to £2.5 billion per year. The analysis thus lends support to a move away from fully-allocated cost pricing and towards much lower MTRs, with bill-and-keep frequently leading to the highest increase in welfare when call externalities matter. We also apply the model to estimate the welfare effects of the recently-approved merger between Orange and T-Mobile under two different scenarios concerning MTRs.telecommunications; regulation; mobile termination rates; network effects; welfare; simulations welfare, simulations
Competition in Electricity Spot Markets: Economic Theory and International Experience
auctions, electricity markets
Modeling Electricity Auctions
The recent debates over discriminatory versus
uniform-price auctions in the UK and elsewhere have revealed an incomplete understanding of the limitations of some popular auction models when applied to real-world electricity markets. This has
led certain regulatory authorities to prefer
discriminatory auctions on the basis of reasoning from models which are not directly applicable to any existing electricity market. Vickrey auctions, although often recommended by economists, have
also been ignored in these debates. This article describes the approach which we believe should be taken to analyzing these issues
Anticompetitive Contracts in the U.K. Pay-TV Market
contracts, raising rivals costs, pay TV
Toeholds, takeovers and football
auctions, toeholds, vertical integration, sports rights
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Designing Electricity Auctions
Motivated by the new auction format introduced in the England andWales electric-
ity market, as well as the recent debate in California, we characterize bidding behavior
and market outcomes in uniform and discriminatory electricity auctions. We ¯nd that
uniform auctions result in higher average prices than discriminatory auctions, but the
ranking in terms of productive e±ciency is ambiguous. The comparative e®ects of
other market design features, such as the number of steps in suppliers' bid functions,
the duration of bids and the elasticity of demand are also analysed. We also consider
the relationship between market structure and market performance in the two auction
formats. Finally, we clarify some methodological issues in the analysis of electricity auctions. In particular, we show that analogies with continuous share auctions are misplaced so long as ¯rms are restricted to a ¯nite number of bids
Contracts and Competition in the Pay-TV Market
Contracts, licensing, pay-TV
Welfare analysis of regulating mobile termination rates in the UK with an application to the Orange/T-Mobile merger
We present a calibrated model of the UK mobile telephony market with four
mobile networks; calls to and from the fixed network; network-based price discrimination; and call externalities. Our results show that reducing mobile termination
rates broadly in line with the recent European Commission Recommendation to
either pure long-run incremental cost ; reciprocal termination charges with fixed
networks; or Bill & Keep (i.e. zero termination rates), increases social welfare,
consumer surplus and networks profits. Depending on the strength of call externalities, social welfare may increase by as much as £ 990 million to £ 4.5 billion per
year, with Bill & Keep leading to the highest increase in welfare. We also apply
the model to estimate the welfare effects of the 2010 merger between Orange and
T-Mobile under different scenarios concerning MTRs, and predict that consumer
surplus decreases strongly
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