What is the Incoherence Objection to Legal Entrapment?

Some legal theorists say that legal entrapment to commit a crime is incoherent. So far, there is no satisfactorily precise statement of this objection in the literature: it is obscure even as to the type of incoherence that is purportedly involved. (Perhaps consequently, substantial assessment of the objection is also absent.) We aim to provide a new statement of the objection that is more precise and more rigorous than its predecessors. We argue that the best form of the objection asserts that, in attempting to entrap, law-enforcement agents lapse into a form of practical incoherence that involves the attempt simultaneously to pursue contrary ends. We then argue that the objection, in this form, encompasses all cases of legal entrapment only if it is supplemented by appeal to the premise that law-enforcement agents have an absolute duty never to create crimes

Farmer evaluation of biocontrol methods against rootknot nematodes in tomatoes

This report was presented at the UK Organic Research 2002 Conference. Root-knot nematodes in tomatoes cause financial loss to Kenyan smallholders. While soil fumigation appears to be losing effectiveness two bio-control agents (bcas), Pasteuria penetrans and Verticillium chlamydosporium, appear promising. Participatory budgeting is being used to compare the bcas with chemical and other biological controls on commercial and organic smallholdings

The Concept of Entrapment

Our question is this: What makes an act one of entrapment? We make a standard distinction between legal entrapment, which is carried out by parties acting in their capacities as (or as deputies of) law- enforcement agents, and civil entrapment, which is not. We aim to provide a definition of entrapment that covers both and which, for reasons we explain, does not settle questions of permissibility and culpability. We explain, compare, and contrast two existing definitions of legal entrapment to commit a crime that possess this neutrality. We point out some problems with the extensional correctness of these definitions and propose a new definition that resolves these problems. We then extend our definition to provide a more general definition of entrapment, encompassing both civil and legal cases. Our definition is, we believe, closer to being extensionally correct and will, we hope, provide a clearer basis for future discussions about the ethics of entrapment than do the definitions upon which it improves

Children with Speech Sound Disorders at School: Challenges for Children, Parents and Teachers

Teachers play a major role in supporting children’s educational, social, and emotional development although may be unprepared for supporting children with speech sound disorders. Interviews with 34 participants including six focus children, their parents, siblings, friends, teachers and other significant adults in their lives highlighted challenges for these children in school, and challenges for their parents and teachers in meeting these children’s developmental and educational needs. These challenges were centred on the need for specific expertise in the school setting, and access to additional classroom and professional services to support these students’ engagement in the learning and social environments of school. This research identifies frustrations that impact these families and teachers as they attempt to navigate the bureaucracies to which they are beholden

'On a Supposed Puzzle Concerning Modality and Existence'

Kit Fine has proposed a new solution to what he calls ‘a familiar puzzle’ concerning modality and existence. The puzzle concerns the argument from the alleged truths ‘It is necessary that Socrates is a man’ and ‘It is possible that Socrates does not exist’ to the apparent falsehood ‘It is possible that Socrates is a man and does not exist’. We discuss in detail Fine’s setting up of the ‘puzzle’ and his rejection, with which we concur, of two mooted solutions to it. (One of these uses standard, Kripkean, notions, and the other rests on work done by Arthur Prior.) We set out, and reject, the philosophy of modality underlying Fine’s new solution, and we defend an alternative response to the alleged puzzle. Our solution follows the work of David Wiggins in distinguishing between the sentential operator ‘It is necessary that’ and the predicate modifier ‘necessarily’. We briefly provide this distinction with a possible- world semantics on which it is neither a necessary truth, in some sense, that Socrates exists nor true, in some sense, that Socrates necessarily exists