86 research outputs found

    Sanctioning Corporations

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    In (Faint) Praise of the Large APs: Comments on Marc Galanter, Planet of the APs

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    Law, Community, and Communication

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    Law, Community, and Communication

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    To whom does the law speak? Canvassing a neglected picture of law’s interpretive field

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    Among the most common strategies underlying the so-called indeterminacy thesis is the following two-step argument: (1) that law is an interpretive practice, and that evidently legal actors more generally hold different (and competing) theories of meaning, which lead to disagreements as to what the law says (that is, as to what the law is); (2) and that, as there is no way to establish the prevalence of one particular theory of meaning over the other, indeterminacy is pervasive in law. In this paper I offer some reflections to resist this trend. In particular I claim that a proper understanding of law as an authoritative communicative enterprise sheds new light on the relation between the functioning of the law and our theories of interpretation, leading to what can be considered a neglected conclusion: the centrality of the linguistic criterion of meaning in our juridical interpretive practices. In the first part of the chapter I discuss speech-act theory in the study of law, assessing its relevance between alternative options. Then I tackle the ‘to whom does the law speak?’ question, highlighting the centrality of lay-people for our juridical practices. Lastly, I examine the consequences of this neglected fact for our interpretive theories

    Gender injustice in compensating injury to autonomy in English and Singaporean negligence law

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    The extent to which English law remedies injury to autonomy (ITA) as a stand-alone actionable damage in negligence is disputed. In this article I argue that the remedy available is not only partial and inconsistent (Keren-Paz in Med Law Rev, 2018) but also gendered and discriminatory against women. I first situate the argument within the broader feminist critique of tort law as failing to appropriately remedy gendered harms, and of law more broadly as undervaluing women’s interest in reproductive autonomy. I then show by reference to English remedies law’s first principles how imposed motherhood cases—Rees v Darlington and its predecessor McFarlane v Tayside Health Board—result in gender injustice when compared with other autonomy cases such as Chester v Afshar and Yearworth v North Bristol NHS Trust: A minor gender-neutral ITA is better remedied than the significant gendered harm of imposing motherhood on the claimant; men’s reproductive autonomy is protected to a greater extent than women’s; women’s reproductive autonomy is protected by an exceptional, derisory award. Worst of all, courts refuse to recognise imposed motherhood as detriment; and the deemed, mansplained, nonpecuniary joys of motherhood are used to offset pecuniary upkeep costs, forcing the claimant into a position she sought to avoid and thus further undermining her autonomy. The recent Singaporean case ACB v Thomson Medical Pte Ltd, awarding compensation for undermining the claimant’s genetic affinity in an IVF wrong-sperm-mix-up demonstrates some improvement in comparison to English law, and some shared gender injustices in the context of reproductive autonomy. ACB’s analysis is oblivious to the nature of reproductive autonomy harm as gendered; and prioritises the father’s interest in having genetic affinity with the baby over a woman’s interest in not having motherhood imposed upon her

    Revising the Past: On the Metaphysics of Repentance, Forgiveness, and Pardon

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    How do the practices listed in the subtitle manage to forestall negative reactive attitudes, such as resentment and guilt, and render them no longer appropriate? I argue that these “revisionary practices” redraw the self’s temporal boundary to exclude the wrongful act, thus releasing the wrongdoer from continuing to bear responsibility for that act

    Harmful Thoughts

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    Sanctioning Corporations

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    The question of corporate criminal liability should be split into (at least) two questions: (1) Should corporations be subject to criminal sanctions? (2) Should these sanctions be subject to the same substantive, procedural, and evidentiary constraints as those that apply in the case of individual defendants? I argue for a positive answer to the first question, and a negative answer to the second
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