413 research outputs found
A transform of complementary aspects with applications to entropic uncertainty relations
Even though mutually unbiased bases and entropic uncertainty relations play
an important role in quantum cryptographic protocols they remain ill
understood. Here, we construct special sets of up to 2n+1 mutually unbiased
bases (MUBs) in dimension d=2^n which have particularly beautiful symmetry
properties derived from the Clifford algebra. More precisely, we show that
there exists a unitary transformation that cyclically permutes such bases. This
unitary can be understood as a generalization of the Fourier transform, which
exchanges two MUBs, to multiple complementary aspects. We proceed to prove a
lower bound for min-entropic entropic uncertainty relations for any set of
MUBs, and show that symmetry plays a central role in obtaining tight bounds.
For example, we obtain for the first time a tight bound for four MUBs in
dimension d=4, which is attained by an eigenstate of our complementarity
transform. Finally, we discuss the relation to other symmetries obtained by
transformations in discrete phase space, and note that the extrema of discrete
Wigner functions are directly related to min-entropic uncertainty relations for
MUBs.Comment: 16 pages, 2 figures, v2: published version, clarified ref [30
An All-But-One Entropic Uncertainty Relation, and Application to Password-based Identification
Entropic uncertainty relations are quantitative characterizations of
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, which make use of an entropy measure to
quantify uncertainty. In quantum cryptography, they are often used as
convenient tools in security proofs. We propose a new entropic uncertainty
relation. It is the first such uncertainty relation that lower bounds the
uncertainty in the measurement outcome for all but one choice for the
measurement from an arbitrarily large (but specifically chosen) set of possible
measurements, and, at the same time, uses the min-entropy as entropy measure,
rather than the Shannon entropy. This makes it especially suited for quantum
cryptography. As application, we propose a new quantum identification scheme in
the bounded quantum storage model. It makes use of our new uncertainty relation
at the core of its security proof. In contrast to the original quantum
identification scheme proposed by Damg{\aa}rd et al., our new scheme also
offers some security in case the bounded quantum storage assumption fails hold.
Specifically, our scheme remains secure against an adversary that has unbounded
storage capabilities but is restricted to non-adaptive single-qubit operations.
The scheme by Damg{\aa}rd et al., on the other hand, completely breaks down
under such an attack.Comment: 33 pages, v
Secure multiparty PageRank algorithm for collaborative fraud detection
Collaboration between financial institutions helps to improve detection of fraud. However, exchange of relevant data between these institutions is often not possible due to privacy constraints and data confidentiality. An important example of relevant data for fraud detection is given by a transaction graph, where the nodes represent bank accounts and the links consist of the transactions between these accounts. Previous works show that features derived from such graphs, like PageRank, can be used to improve fraud detection. However, each institution can only see a part of the whole transaction graph, corresponding to the accounts of its own customers. In this research a new method is described, making use of secure multiparty computation (MPC) techniques, allowing multiple parties to jointly compute the PageRank values of their combined transaction graphs securely, while guaranteeing that each party only learns the PageRank values of its own accounts and nothing about the other transaction graphs. In our experiments this method is applied to graphs containing up to tens of thousands of nodes. The execution time scales linearly with the number of nodes, and the method is highly parallelizable. Secure multiparty PageRank is feasible in a realistic setting with millions of nodes per party by extrapolating the results from our experiments
Implementing Information-Theoretically Secure Oblivious Transfer from Packet Reordering
If we assume that adversaries have unlimited computational capabilities, secure computation between mutually distrusting players can not be achieved using an error-free communication medium. However, secure multi-party computation becomes possible when a noisy channel is available to the parties. For instance, the Binary Symmetric Channel (BSC) has been used to implement Oblivious Transfer (OT), a fundamental primitive in secure multi-party computation. Current research is aimed at designing protocols based on real-world noise sources, in order to make the actual use of information-theoretically secure computation a more realistic prospect for the future. In this paper, we introduce a modified version of the recently proposed Binary Discrete-time Delaying Channel (BDDC), a noisy channel based on communication delays. We call our variant Reordering Channel (RC), and we show that it successfully models packet reordering, the common behavior of packet switching networks that results in the reordering of the packets in a stream during their transit over the network. We also show that the protocol implementing oblivious transfer on the BDDC can be adapted to the new channel by using a different sending strategy, and we provide a functioning implementation of this modified protocol. Finally, we present strong experimental evidence that reordering occurrences between two remote Internet hosts are enough for our construction to achieve statistical security against honest-but-curious adversaries
Unconditionally Secure Oblivious Transfer from Real Network Behavior
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) deals with the problem of shared computation between parties that do not trust each other: they are interested in performing a joint task, but they also want to keep their respective inputs private. In a world where an ever-increasing amount of computation is outsourced, for example to the cloud, MPC is a subject of crucial importance. However, unconditionally secure MPC protocols have never found practical application: the lack of realistic noisy channel models, that are required to achieve security against computationally unbounded adversaries, prevents implementation over real-world, standard communication protocols. In this paper we show for the first time that the inherent noise of wireless communication can be used to build multi-party protocols that are secure in the information-theoretic setting. In order to do so, we propose a new noisy channel, the Delaying-Erasing Channel (DEC), that models network communication in both wired and wireless contexts. This channel integrates erasures and delays as sources of noise, and models reordered, lost and corrupt packets. We provide a protocol that uses the properties of the DEC to achieve Oblivious Transfer (OT), a fundamental primitive in cryptography that implies any secure computation. In order to show that the DEC reflects the behavior of wireless communication, we run an experiment over a 802.11n wireless link, and gather extensive experimental evidence supporting our claim. We also analyze the collected data in order to estimate the level of security that such a network can provide in our model. We show the flexibility of our construction by choosing for our implementation of OT a standard communication protocol, the Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP). Since the RTP is used in a number of multimedia streaming and teleconference applications, we can imagine a wide variety of practical uses and application settings for our construction
Statistically-secure ORAM with Overhead
We demonstrate a simple, statistically secure, ORAM with computational
overhead ; previous ORAM protocols achieve only
computational security (under computational assumptions) or require
overheard. An additional benefit of our ORAM is its
conceptual simplicity, which makes it easy to implement in both software and
(commercially available) hardware.
Our construction is based on recent ORAM constructions due to Shi, Chan,
Stefanov, and Li (Asiacrypt 2011) and Stefanov and Shi (ArXiv 2012), but with
some crucial modifications in the algorithm that simplifies the ORAM and enable
our analysis. A central component in our analysis is reducing the analysis of
our algorithm to a "supermarket" problem; of independent interest (and of
importance to our analysis,) we provide an upper bound on the rate of "upset"
customers in the "supermarket" problem
Security and Efficiency Analysis of the Hamming Distance Computation Protocol Based on Oblivious Transfer
open access articleBringer et al. proposed two cryptographic protocols for the computation of Hamming distance. Their first scheme uses Oblivious Transfer and provides security in the semi-honest model. The other scheme uses Committed Oblivious Transfer and is claimed to provide full security in the malicious case. The proposed protocols have direct implications to biometric authentication schemes between a prover and a verifier where the verifier has biometric data of the users in plain form.
In this paper, we show that their protocol is not actually fully secure against malicious adversaries. More precisely, our attack breaks the soundness property of their protocol where a malicious user can compute a Hamming distance which is different from the actual value. For biometric authentication systems, this attack allows a malicious adversary to pass the authentication without knowledge of the honest user's input with at most complexity instead of , where is the input length. We propose an enhanced version of their protocol where this attack is eliminated. The security of our modified protocol is proven using the simulation-based paradigm. Furthermore, as for efficiency concerns, the modified protocol utilizes Verifiable Oblivious Transfer which does not require the commitments to outputs which improves its efficiency significantly
Privacy Enhanced Access Control for Outsourced Data Sharing
Traditional access control models often assume that the entity enforcing access control policies is also the owner of data and resources. This assumption no longer holds when data is outsourced to a third-party storage provider, such as the cloud. Existing access control solutions mainly focus on preserving confidentiality of stored data from unauthorized access and the storage provider. However, in this setting, access control policies as well as users' access patterns also become privacy sensitive information that should be protected from the cloud. We propose a two-level access control scheme that combines coarse-grained access control enforced at the cloud, which allows to get acceptable communication overhead and at the same time limits the information that the cloud learns from his partial view of the access rules and the access patterns, and fine-grained cryptographic access control enforced at the user's side, which provides the desired expressiveness of the access control policies. Our solution handles both read and write access control
Crowd Verifiable Zero-Knowledge and End-to-end Verifiable Multiparty Computation
Auditing a secure multiparty computation (MPC) protocol entails the validation of the protocol transcript by a third party that is otherwise untrusted. In this work, we introduce the concept of end-to-end verifiable MPC (VMPC), that requires the validation to provide a correctness guarantee even in the setting that all servers, trusted setup primitives and all the client systems utilized by the input-providing users of the MPC protocol are subverted by an adversary. To instantiate VMPC, we introduce a new concept in the setting of zero-knowlegde protocols that we term crowd verifiable zero-knowledge (CVZK). A CVZK protocol enables a prover to convince a set of verifiers about a certain statement, even though each one individually contributes a small amount of entropy for verification and some of them are adversarially controlled. Given CVZK, we present a VMPC protocol that is based on discrete-logarithm related assumptions. At the high level of adversity that VMPC is meant to withstand, it is infeasible to ensure perfect correctness, thus we investigate the classes of functions and verifiability relations that are feasible in our framework, and present a number of possible applications the underlying functions of which can be implemented via VMPC
Black-Box Transformations from Passive to Covert Security with Public Verifiability
In the context of secure computation, protocols with security against covert adversaries ensure that any misbehavior by malicious parties will be detected by the honest parties with some constant probability.
As such, these protocols provide better security guarantees than passively secure protocols and, moreover, are easier to construct than protocols with full security against active adversaries.
Protocols that, upon detecting a cheating attempt, allow the honest parties to compute a certificate that enables third parties to verify whether an accused party misbehaved or not are called publicly verifiable.
In this work, we present the first generic compilers for constructing two-party protocols with covert security and public verifiability from protocols with passive security.
We present two separate compilers, which are both fully blackbox in the underlying protocols they use.
Both of them only incur a constant multiplicative factor in terms of bandwidth overhead and a constant additive factor in terms of round complexity on top of the passively secure protocols they use.
The first compiler applies to all two-party protocols that have no private inputs.
This class of protocols covers the important class of preprocessing protocols that are used to setup correlated randomness among parties.
We use our compiler to obtain the first secret-sharing based two-party protocol with covert security and public verifiability.
Notably, the produced protocol achieves public verifiability essentially for free when compared with the best known previous solutions based on secret-sharing that did not provide public verifiability
Our second compiler constructs protocols with covert security and public verifiability for arbitrary functionalities from passively secure protocols.
It uses our first compiler to perform a setup phase, which is independent of the parties\u27 inputs as well as the protocol they would like to execute.
Finally, we show how to extend our techniques to obtain multiparty computation protocols with covert security and public verifiability against arbitrary constant fractions of corruptions
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