Cut-free Calculi and Relational Semantics for Temporal STIT Logics

We present cut-free labelled sequent calculi for a central formalism in logics of agency: STIT logics with temporal operators. These include sequent systems for Ldm , Tstit and Xstit. All calculi presented possess essential structural properties such as contraction- and cut-admissibility. The labelled calculi G3Ldm and G3Tstit are shown sound and complete relative to irreflexive temporal frames. Additionally, we extend current results by showing that also Xstit can be characterized through relational frames, omitting the use of BT+AC frames

Goal-directed proof theory

This report is the draft of a book about goal directed proof theoretical formulations of non-classical logics. It evolved from a response to the existence of two camps in the applied logic (computer science/artificial intelligence) community. There are those members who believe that the new non-classical logics are the most important ones for applications and that classical logic itself is now no longer the main workhorse of applied logic, and there are those who maintain that classical logic is the only logic worth considering and that within classical logic the Horn clause fragment is the most important one. The book presents a uniform Prolog-like formulation of the landscape of classical and non-classical logics, done in such away that the distinctions and movements from one logic to another seem simple and natural; and within it classical logic becomes just one among many. This should please the non-classical logic camp. It will also please the classical logic camp since the goal directed formulation makes it all look like an algorithmic extension of Logic Programming. The approach also seems to provide very good compuational complexity bounds across its landscape

Focused labeled proof systems for modal logic

International audienceFocused proofs are sequent calculus proofs that group inference rules into alternating positive and negative phases. These phases can then be used to define macro-level inference rules from Gentzen's original and tiny introduction and structural rules. We show here that the inference rules of labeled proof systems for modal logics can similarly be described as pairs of such phases within the LKF focused proof system for first-order classical logic. We consider the system G3K of Negri for the modal logic K and define a translation from labeled modal formulas into first-order polarized formulas and show a strict correspondence between derivations in the two systems, i.e., each rule application in G3K corresponds to a bipole—a pair of a positive and a negative phases—in LKF. Since geometric axioms (when properly polarized) induce bipoles, this strong correspondence holds for all modal logics whose Kripke frames are characterized by geometric properties. We extend these results to present a focused labeled proof system for this same class of modal logics and show its soundness and completeness. The resulting proof system allows one to define a rich set of normal forms of modal logic proofs

Abstract Argumentation / Persuasion / Dynamics

The act of persuasion, a key component in rhetoric argumentation, may be viewed as a dynamics modifier. We extend Dung's frameworks with acts of persuasion among agents, and consider interactions among attack, persuasion and defence that have been largely unheeded so far. We characterise basic notions of admissibilities in this framework, and show a way of enriching them through, effectively, CTL (computation tree logic) encoding, which also permits importation of the theoretical results known to the logic into our argumentation frameworks. Our aim is to complement the growing interest in coordination of static and dynamic argumentation.Comment: Arisaka R., Satoh K. (2018) Abstract Argumentation / Persuasion / Dynamics. In: Miller T., Oren N., Sakurai Y., Noda I., Savarimuthu B., Cao Son T. (eds) PRIMA 2018: Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems. PRIMA 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 11224. Springer, Cha

Reactive models for biological regulatory networks

A reactive model, as studied by D. Gabbay and his collaborators, can be regarded as a graph whose set of edges may be altered whenever one of them is crossed. In this paper we show how reactive models can describe biological regulatory networks and compare them to Boolean networks and piecewise-linear models, which are some of the most common kinds of models used nowadays. In particular, we show that, with respect to the identification of steady states, reactive Boolean networks lie between piecewise linear models and the usual, plain Boolean networks. We also show this ability is preserved by a suitable notion of bisimulation, and, therefore, by network minimisation.ERDF - The European Regional Development Fund through the Operational Programme for Competitiveness and Internationalisation - COMPETE 2020 Programme and by National Funds through the Portuguese funding agency, FCT - Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, within project POCI-01-0145-FEDER-030947. and project with reference UID/MAT/04106/2019 at CIDMA. D. Figueiredo also acknowledges the support given by FCT via the PhD scholarship PD/BD/114186/201

An Imprecise Probability Approach for Abstract Argumentation based on Credal Sets

Some abstract argumentation approaches consider that arguments have a degree of uncertainty, which impacts on the degree of uncertainty of the extensions obtained from a abstract argumentation framework (AAF) under a semantics. In these approaches, both the uncertainty of the arguments and of the extensions are modeled by means of precise probability values. However, in many real life situations the exact probabilities values are unknown and sometimes there is a need for aggregating the probability values of different sources. In this paper, we tackle the problem of calculating the degree of uncertainty of the extensions considering that the probability values of the arguments are imprecise. We use credal sets to model the uncertainty values of arguments and from these credal sets, we calculate the lower and upper bounds of the extensions. We study some properties of the suggested approach and illustrate it with an scenario of decision making.Comment: 8 pages, 2 figures, Accepted in The 15th European Conference on Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning with Uncertainty (ECSQARU 2019

Aristotle’s assertoric syllogistic and modern relevance logic

This paper sets out to evaluate the claim that Aristotle’s Assertoric Syllogistic is a relevance logic or shows significant similarities with it. I prepare the grounds for a meaningful comparison by extracting the notion of relevance employed in the most influential work on modern relevance logic, Anderson and Belnap’s Entailment. This notion is characterized by two conditions imposed on the concept of validity: first, that some meaning content is shared between the premises and the conclusion, and second, that the premises of a proof are actually used to derive the conclusion. Turning to Aristotle’s Prior Analytics, I argue that there is evidence that Aristotle’s Assertoric Syllogistic satisfies both conditions. Moreover, Aristotle at one point explicitly addresses the potential harmfulness of syllogisms with unused premises. Here, I argue that Aristotle’s analysis allows for a rejection of such syllogisms on formal grounds established in the foregoing parts of the Prior Analytics. In a final section I consider the view that Aristotle distinguished between validity on the one hand and syllogistic validity on the other. Following this line of reasoning, Aristotle’s logic might not be a relevance logic, since relevance is part of syllogistic validity and not, as modern relevance logic demands, of general validity. I argue that the reasons to reject this view are more compelling than the reasons to accept it and that we can, cautiously, uphold the result that Aristotle’s logic is a relevance logic

Basic language learning in artificial animals

We explore a general architecture for artificial animals, or animats, that develops over time. The architecture combines reinforcementlearning, dynamic concept formation, and homeostatic decision-making aimed at need satisfaction. We show that thisarchitecture, which contains no ad hoc features for language processing, is capable of basic language learning of three kinds: (i)learning to reproduce phonemes that are perceived in the environment via motor babbling; (ii) learning to reproduce sequences ofphonemes corresponding to spoken words perceived in the environment; and (iii) learning to ground the semantics of spoken wordsin sensory experience by associating spoken words (e.g. the word “cold”) to sensory experience (e.g. the activity of a sensor forcold temperature) and vice versa