Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc. and Reverse Payment or Pay-for-Delay Settlements

An imminent US Supreme Court ruling should resolve one of the thorniest legal issues facing pharmaceutical companies today.Ope

Processing and Transmission of Information

Contains research objectives and reports on four research projects.Lincoln Laboratory, Purchase Order DDL-B222Department of the ArmyDepartment of the NavyDepartment of the Air Force under Contract AF19(122)-45

Immunological characterization of chromogranins A and B and secretogranin II in the bovine pancreatic islet

Antisera against chromogranin A and B and secretogranin II were used for analysing the bovine pancreas by immunoblotting and immunohistochemistry. All three antigens were found in extracts of fetal pancreas by one dimensional immunoblotting. A comparison with the soluble proteins of chromaffin granules revealed that in adrenal medulla and in pancreas antigens which migrated identically in electrophoresis were present. In immunohistochemistry, chromogranin A was found in all pancreatic endocrine cell types with the exception of most pancreatic polypeptide-(PP-) producing cells. For chromogranin B, only a faint immunostaining was obtained. For secretorgranin II, A-and B-cells were faintly positive, whereas the majority of PP-cells exhibited a strong immunostaining for this antigen. These results establish that chromogranins A and B and secretogranin II are present in the endocrine pancreas, but that they exhibit a distinct cellular localization

Plasma Dynamics

Contains research objectives and reports on three research projects.National Science Foundation under Grant G-9930Air Force Cambridge Research Center under Contract AF-19(604)-5992WADC Contract AF33(616)-3984, with the Electronic Systems LaboratoryContract AF19(604)-4551 with Air Force Cambridge Research CenterAtomic Energy Commission under Contract AT(30-1)184

Vertical integration, market foreclosure and quality investment

We study incentives to vertically integrate in an industry with verti- cally differentiated downstream firms. Vertical integration by one of the firms increases production costs for the rival. Increased production costs negatively affects quality investment both by the integrated firm and the unintegrated rival. Quality investment by both firms decreases under any (vertical inte- gration) scenario. The decrease in quality invesment by both firms softens competition among downstream firms. By integrating first, a firm always produces the high quality good and earns higher profits. A fully integrated industry, with increased product differentiation, is observed in equilibrium. Due to increase in firm profits, social welfare under this structure is greater than under no integration.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio