The diminished effect of index rebalances

The author revisits the strategy of trading S&P 500 index re-compositions under the pre- and post-crisis financial environments, proving that the return structure has significantly changed. The results show for the first time, that there are currently no tradable abnormal returns between announcement and event dates in the post-crisis sample period, indicating smoother rebalancing mechanisms by bank’s client facing desks and better services for passive end-investors. The newly added firms inflate the S&P 500 index by less than 10 basis points per year. The results could be attributed to improved execution algorithms used by the banks, and potentially to the new regulatory reforms in the sector, which prevents financial institutions from taking large trading positions with their balance sheets

Aggregate Financial Misreporting and the Predictability of U.S. Recessions

We rely on the theoretical prediction that financial misreporting peaks before economic busts to examine whether aggregate ex ante measures of the likelihood of financial misreporting improve the predictability of U.S. recessions. We consider six measures of misreporting and show that the Beneish M-Score significantly improves out-of-sample recession prediction at longer forecasting horizons. Specifically, relative to leading models based on yield spreads and market returns, M-Score increases the average probability of a recession across forecast horizons of six-, seven-, and eight-quarters-ahead by 56 percent, 79 percent, and 92 percent, respectively. These findings are robust to alternative definitions of interest rate spreads, and to controlling for the federal funds rate, investor sentiment, and aggregate earnings growth. We show that the performance of M-Score likely arises because firms with high M-Scores tend to experience negative future performance. Overall, this study provides novel evidence that accounting information can be useful to forecasters and regulators interested in assessing the likelihood of U.S. recessions a few quarters ahead

Applying Benford’s law to detect accounting data manipulation in the banking industry

We utilise Benford’s Law to test if balance sheet and income statement data broadly used to assess bank soundness were manipulated prior to and also during the global financial crisis. We find that all banks resort to loan loss provisions to manipulate earnings and income upwards. Distressed institutions that have stronger incentives to conceal their financial difficulties resort additionally to manipulating loan loss allowances and non-performing loans downwards. Moreover, manipulation is magnified during the crisis and expands to encompass regulatory capital

Open Problems on Central Simple Algebras

We provide a survey of past research and a list of open problems regarding central simple algebras and the Brauer group over a field, intended both for experts and for beginners.Comment: v2 has some small revisions to the text. Some items are re-numbered, compared to v

Auditor Change Disclosures as Signals of Earnings Management and Risk

Auditor resignations are considered more negative signals than auditor dismissals, but firms’ self-reported distinction between the two may not offer a complete or reliable representation of the nature of the auditor change. 8-K regulations require the disclosure of the adjournment of an audit engagement even if a successor auditor has not yet been named. In compliance with this requirement, some firms file two 8-k’s related to the same auditor change. Exploiting these dual 8-K filings, we create a new measure of the nature of auditor changes and show that 1) both self-reported auditor resignations and dual 8-K filings are related to measures of earnings management and risk; and 2) auditor changes identified as both self-reported resignations and dual 8-K filings are associated with the most negative economic implications (as reflected by the likelihood of financial statement manipulation and bankruptcy risk). We suggest that dual 8-K filings and self-reported resignations are complementary negative signals each capturing unique dimensions of the underlying economic factors

Predicting Extreme Returns and Portfolio Management Implications

We consider which readily observable characteristics of individual stocks (e.g., option implied volatility, accounting data, analyst data) may be used to forecast subsequent extreme price movements. We are the first to explicitly consider the predictive influence of option implied volatility in such a framework, which we unsurprisingly find to be an important indicator of future extreme price movements. However, after controlling for implied volatility levels, other factors, particularly firm age and size, still have additional predictive power of extreme future returns. Furthermore, excluding predicted extreme return stocks leads to a portfolio that has lower risk (standard deviation of returns) without sacrificing performance

The Screening Effect of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act

Prior research shows that the PSLRA increased the significance of merit-related factors, such as the presence of an accounting restatement or insider selling, in determining the incidence and outcomes of securities fraud class actions. (Johnson, Nelson, and Pritchard, 2007). This result, however, is consistent with two possible hypotheses. First, the PSLRA may have reduced solely the incidence of non-meritorious litigation. Second, the PSLRA may have changed the definition of merit, effectively precluding claims that would have survived and produced a settlement pre-PSLRA. This paper tests these alternative hypotheses. We find that pre-PSLRA claims that settled for nuisance value would be less likely to be filed under the PSLRA regime. We also find, however, that pre-PSLRA non-nuisance claims would be less likely to be filed post-PSLRA period. The latter result, which we refer to as the screening effect, is particularly pronounced for claims lacking obvious hard evidence indicia of fraud (an accounting restatement or an SEC investigation). This screening effect is stronger if the claims also lacked evidence of abnormal insider trading. By contrast, we find that pre-PSLRA claims with hard evidence or abnormal insider trading would be no less likely to be filed in the post-PSLRA period. We also examine the likelihood of settlement for pre-PSRLA claims if they had been filed in the post-PSLRA period, and find a similar screening effect for case outcomes. We conclude that Congress effectively changed the definition of merit in adopting the PSLRA, discouraging suits that would have produced a non-nuisance outcome prior to the law’s enactment

The Role of Information and Financial Reporting in Corporate Governance and Debt Contracting

We review recent literature on the role of financial reporting transparency in reducing governance-related agency conflicts among managers, directors, and shareholders, as well as in reducing agency conflicts between shareholders and creditors, and offer researchers some suggested avenues for future research. Key themes include the endogenous nature of debt contracts and governance mechanisms with respect to information asymmetry between contracting parties, the heterogeneous nature of the informational demands of contracting parties, and the heterogeneous nature of the resulting governance and debt contracts. We also emphasize the role of a commitment to financial reporting transparency in facilitating informal multiperiod contracts among managers, directors, shareholders, and creditors