The Individual-Level Dynamics of Bounded Partisanship

Over the past half century, scholars have utilized a variety of theoretical and methodological approaches to study the attachment or identification voters have with political parties. However, models of partisan (in)stability ignore its bounded character. Making use of Mixed Latent Markov Models, we measure the change and stability of individual-level West German partisan identification captured over a 24-year period via the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSEOP). Results suggest that distinctive subpopulations exist that follow different patterns of partisan stability. One party’s loss is not necessarily another party’s gain

Support for Redistribution in Western Europe: Assessing the role of religion

Previous sociological studies have paid little attention to religion as a central determinant of individual preferences for redistribution. In this article we argue that religious individuals, living in increasingly secular societies, differ in political preferences from their secular counterparts. Based on the theory of religious cleavages, we expect that religious individuals will oppose income redistribution by the state. Furthermore, in contexts where the polarization between religious and secular individuals is large, preferences for redistribution will be lower. In the empirical analysis we test our predictions in a multilevel framework, using data from the European Social Survey 2002–2006 for 16 Western European countries. After controlling for a wide range of individual socio-economic factors and for welfare-state policies, religion plays and important explanatory role. We find that both Catholics and Protestants strongly oppose income redistribution by the state. The cleavage between religious and secular individuals is far more important than the difference between denominations. Using a refined measure of religious polarization, we also find that in more polarized context the overall level of support for redistribution is lower

Is biotechnology (more) acceptable when it enables a reduction in phytosanitary treatments? A European comparison of the acceptability of transgenesis and cisgenesis

Reduced pesticide use is one of the reasons given by Europeans for accepting new genetic engineering techniques. According to the advocates of these techniques, consumers are likely to embrace the application of cisgenesis to apple trees. In order to verify the acceptability of these techniques, we estimate a Bayesian multilevel structural equation model, which takes into account the multidimensional nature of acceptability and individual, national, and European effects, using data from the Eurobarometer 2010 73.1 on science. The results underline the persistence of clear differences between European countries and whilst showing considerable defiance, a relatively wider acceptability of vertical gene transfer as a means of reducing phytosanitary treatments, compared to horizontal transfer

Fixed and random effects models: making an informed choice

This paper assesses the options available to researchers analysing multilevel (including longitudinal) data, with the aim of supporting good methodological decision-making. Given the confusion in the literature about the key properties of fixed and random effects (FE and RE) models, we present these models’ capabilities and limitations. We also discuss the within-between RE model, sometimes misleadingly labelled a ‘hybrid’ model, showing that it is the most general of the three, with all the strengths of the other two. As such, and because it allows for important extensions—notably random slopes—we argue it should be used (as a starting point at least) in all multilevel analyses. We develop the argument through simulations, evaluating how these models cope with some likely mis-specifications. These simulations reveal that (1) failing to include random slopes can generate anti-conservative standard errors, and (2) assuming random intercepts are Normally distributed, when they are not, introduces only modest biases. These results strengthen the case for the use of, and need for, these models

The Externalities of Inequality: Fear of Crime and Preferences for Redistribution in Western Europe

Why is the difference in redistribution preferences between the rich and the poor high in some countries and low in others? In this article, we argue that it has a lot to do with the rich and very little to do with the poor. We contend that while there is a general relative income effect on redistribution preferences, the preferences of the rich are highly dependent on the macrolevel of inequality. The reason for this effect is not related to immediate tax and transfer considerations but to a negative externality of inequality: crime. We will show that the rich in more unequal regions in Western Europe are more supportive of redistribution than the rich in more equal regions because of their concern with crime. In making these distinctions between the poor and the rich, the arguments in this article challenge some influential approaches to the politics of inequality