Stakeholder perceptions of policy tools in support of sustainable food consumption in Europe: Policy implications

Transitioning agri-food systems towards increased sustainability and resilience requires that attention be paid to sustainable food consumption policies. Policy-making processes often require the engagement and acceptance of key stakeholders. This study analyses stakeholders' solutions for creating sustainable agri-food systems, through interviews with a broad range of stakeholders including food value chain actors, non-governmental organizations, governmental institutions, research institutions and academic experts. The study draws on 38 in-depth, semi-structured interviews conducted in four European countries: France, Iceland, Italy and the UK, as well as three interviews with high-level EU experts. The interviewees' solutions were analysed according to a five-category typology of policy tools, encompassing direct activity regulations, and market-based, knowledge-based, governance and strategic policy tools. Most of the identified solutions were located in the strategic tools category, reflecting shared recognition of the need to integrate food policy to achieve long-term goals. Emerging solutions-those which were most commonly identified among the different national contexts-were then used to derive empirically-grounded and more universally applicable recommendations for the advancement of sustainable food consumption policies

Keeping Some Skin in the Game: How to Start a Capital Market in Longevity Risk Transfers

The recent activity in pension buyouts and bespoke longevity swaps suggests that a significant process of aggregation of longevity exposures is under way, led by major insurers, investment banks, and buyout firms with the support of leading reinsurers. As regulatory capital charges and limited reinsurance capacity constrain the scope for market growth, there is now an opportunity for institutions that are pooling longevity exposures to issue securities that appeal to capital market investors, thereby broadening the sharing of longevity risk and increasing market capacity. For this to happen, longevity exposures need to be suitably pooled and tranched to maximize diversification benefits offered to investors and to address asymmetric information issues. We argue that a natural way for longevity risk to be transferred is through suitably designed principal-at-risk bonds

Why do UK banks securitize?

Working paper seriesThe eight years from 2000 to 2008 saw a rapid growth in the use of securitization by UK banks. We aim to identify the reasons that contributed to this rapid growth. The time period (2000 to 2010) covered by our study is noteworthy as it covers the pre- nancial crisis credit- boom, the peak of the nancial crisis and its aftermath. In the wake of the nancial crisis, many governments, regulators and political commentators have pointed an accusing nger at the securitization market - even in the absence of a detailed statistical and economic analysis. We contribute to the extant literature by performing such an analysis on UK banks, fo- cussing principally on whether it is the need for liquidity (i.e. the funding of their balance sheets), or the desire to engage in regulatory capital arbitrage or the need for credit risk trans- fer that has led to UK banks securitizing their assets. We show that securitization has been signi cantly driven by liquidity reasons. In addition, we observe a positive link between securitization and banks credit risk. We interpret these latter ndings as evidence that UK banks which engaged in securitization did so, in part, to transfer credit risk and that, in comparison to UK banks which did not use securitization, they had more credit risk to transfer in the sense that they originated lower quality loans and held lower quality assets. We show that banks which issued more asset-backed securities before the nancial crisis su¤ered more defaults after the nancial crisis.The eight years from 2000 to 2008 saw a rapid growth in the use of securitization by UK banks. We aim to identify the reasons that contributed to this rapid growth. The time period (2000 to 2010) covered by our study is noteworthy as it covers the pre-financial crisis credit- boom, the peak of the financial crisis and its aftermath. In the wake of the financial crisis, many governments, regulators and political commentators have pointed an accusing finger at the securitization market - even in the absence of a detailed statistical and economic analysis. We contribute to the extant literature by performing such an analysis on UK banks, fo- cussing principally on whether it is the need for liquidity (i.e. the funding of their balance sheets), or the desire to engage in regulatory capital arbitrage or the need for credit risk trans- fer that has led to UK banks securitizing their assets. We show that securitization has been significantly driven by liquidity reasons. In addition, we observe a positive link between securitization and banks credit risk. We interpret these latter findings as evidence that UK banks which engaged in securitization did so, in part, to transfer credit risk and that, in comparison to UK banks which did not use securitization, they had more credit risk to transfer in the sense that they originated lower quality loans and held lower quality assets. We show that banks which issued more asset-backed securities before the financial crisis suffered more defaults after the financial crisis

Transmission of Hepatitis B Core Antibody and Galactomannan Enzyme Immunoassay Positivity via Immunoglobulin Products: A Comprehensive Analysis

BACKGROUND: Therapeutic immunoglobulins are used as replacement or immunomodulatory therapy, but can transmit clinically important molecules. We investigated hepatitis B virus (HBV) antibodies and galactomannan enzyme immunoassay (GM-EIA) positivity. Detection of HBV core antibody may prompt antiviral prophylaxis when commencing therapy such as rituximab; a positive GM-EIA result prompts investigation or treatment for invasive fungal disease. METHODS: We performed a cross-sectional analysis of HBV serology in 80 patients established (>6 months) on immunoglobulin therapy; prospective analysis of HBV serology in 16 patients commencing intravenous immunoglobulin (IVIG); and pre- and post-infusion analysis of GM-EIA in 37 patients receiving IVIG. RESULTS: Pre-IVIG, 9 of 80 patients tested positive for HBV surface antibody and 1 of 80 tested equivocal for HBV core antibody. On IVIG, 79 of 79 tested positive for surface antibody, 37 of 80 tested positive for core antibody, and 10 of 80 tested equivocal for core antibody. There were significant differences by product, but among patients receiving products that appear to transmit core antibody, negative results correlated with lower surface antibody titers and longer time since infusion, suggesting a simple concentration effect. There was a progressive increase with each infusion in the percentage of patients testing positive for HBV core antibody among patients newly commencing IVIG. Some patients “seroreverted” to negative during therapy. Certain IVIG products tested positive for GM-EIA and there were rises in index values in corresponding patient samples from pre- to post-infusion. Overall, 5 of 37 patient samples pre-infusion and 15 of 37 samples post-infusion tested positive for GM-EIA. CONCLUSIONS: HBV antibodies and GM-EIA positivity are common in patients receiving IVIG and confound diagnostic results

Why do banks promise to pay par on demand?

We survey the theories of why banks promise to pay par on demand and examine evidence about the conditions under which banks have promised to pay the par value of deposits and banknotes on demand when holding only fractional reserves. The theoretical literature can be broadly divided into four strands: liquidity provision, asymmetric information, legal restrictions, and a medium of exchange. We assume that it is not zero cost to make a promise to redeem a liability at par value on demand. If so, then the conditions in the theories that result in par redemption are possible explanations of why banks promise to pay par on demand. If the explanation based on customers’ demand for liquidity is correct, payment of deposits at par will be promised when banks hold assets that are illiquid in the short run. If the asymmetric-information explanation based on the difficulty of valuing assets is correct, the marketability of banks’ assets determines whether banks promise to pay par. If the legal restrictions explanation of par redemption is correct, banks will not promise to pay par if they are not required to do so. If the transaction explanation is correct, banks will promise to pay par value only if the deposits are used in transactions. After the survey of the theoretical literature, we examine the history of banking in several countries in different eras: fourth-century Athens, medieval Italy, Japan, and free banking and money market mutual funds in the United States. We find that all of the theories can explain some of the observed banking arrangements, and none explain all of them

UK and Ireland survey of MPharm student and staff experiences of mental health curricula, with a focus on Mental Health First Aid

Background: One in four people experience a mental health problem every year and improving mental health care is an international priority. In the course of their work, pharmacists frequently encounter people with mental health problems. The experience of mental health teaching, including Mental Health First Aid (MHFA) training, in undergraduate pharmacy (MPharm) students in the UK and Ireland is not well documented. Students’ viewpoints, contextualised with curricular overviews provided by staff, were analysed to understand their experience. Methods: An anonymous, online questionnaire was distributed to MPharm students and staff in the UK and Ireland. Students were asked closed questions regarding their course and exposure to MHFA, which were analysed using descriptive statistics. Open questions were included to enable explanations and these data were used to contextualise the quantitative findings. One member of staff from each university was invited to answer a modified staff version of the questionnaire, to provide a curriculum overview and staff perspective. Results: 232 students and 13 staff, from 22 universities, responded. Three-quarters of students did not agree with the statement that ‘mental health was embedded throughout the MPharm’. Most students (80.6%) stated that they were taught neuropharmacology whilst 44.8% stated that their course included communicating with people about their mental health. One-third (33.2%) of students stated that their degree ‘adequately prepared them to help people with their mental health’. Twenty-six students (11.6%) had completed MHFA training of which 89% would endorse inclusion of this within the MPharm. Of those who had not completed the training, 81% expressed a desire to do so. Those who completed MHFA training self-reported greater preparedness than those who did not, but student numbers were small. Conclusions: Mental health teaching for pharmacy undergraduates is more focussed on theoretical aspects rather than applied skills. MHFA was viewed by students as one way to enhance skill application. The association of the increased self-reported preparedness of those who completed MHFA could be confounded by a positive environmental cultural. MPharm programmes need sufficient focus on real-world skills such as communication and crisis response, to complement the fundamental science

The Cost of Banking Panics in an Age before 'Too Big to Fail'

How costly were the banking panics of the National Banking Era (1861-1913)? I combine two hand-collected data sets - the weekly statements of the New York Clearing House banks and the monthly holding period return of every stock listed on the NYSE - to estimate the cost of banking panics in an era before 'too big to fail'. The bank statements allow me to construct a hypothetical insurance contract which would have allowed investors to insure against sudden deposit withdrawals and the cross-section of stock returns allow us to draw inferences about the marginal utility during panic states. Panics were costly. The cross-section of gilded-age stock returns imply investors would have willingly paid a 14% annual premium above actuarial fair value to insure $100 against unexpected deposit withdrawals The implied consumption of stock investors suggests that the consumption loss associated with National Banking Era bank runs was far more costly than the consumption loss from stock market crashes

Belle II Technical Design Report

The Belle detector at the KEKB electron-positron collider has collected almost 1 billion Y(4S) events in its decade of operation. Super-KEKB, an upgrade of KEKB is under construction, to increase the luminosity by two orders of magnitude during a three-year shutdown, with an ultimate goal of 8E35 /cm^2 /s luminosity. To exploit the increased luminosity, an upgrade of the Belle detector has been proposed. A new international collaboration Belle-II, is being formed. The Technical Design Report presents physics motivation, basic methods of the accelerator upgrade, as well as key improvements of the detector.Comment: Edited by: Z. Dole\v{z}al and S. Un