1,774 research outputs found
Determinism and inevitability
In Freedom Evolves, Dan Dennett embarks on his second book-length attempt to lay to rest the deep metaphysical concerns that many philosophers have expressed about the possibility of human freedom.One of his main objectives in the earlier chapters of the book is to make determinism appear less threatening to our prospects for free agency than it has sometimes seemed, by attempting to show that a deterministic universe would not necessarily be a universe of which it could truly be said that everything that occurs in it is inevitable. In this paper, I want to consider Dennettâs striking argument for this conclusion in some detail. I shall begin by suggesting that on its most natural interpretation, the argument is vulnerable to a serious objection. I shall then develop a second interpretation which is more promising than the first, but will argue that without placing more weight on etymological considerations than they can really bear, it can deliver, at best, only a significantly qualified version of the conclusion that Dennett is seeking. However, although I shall be arguing that his central argument fails, it is also part of the purpose of this paper to build on what I regard as some rather insightful and suggestive material which is developed by Dennett in the course of elaborating his views. His own development of these ideas is hampered, so I shall argue, by a framework for thinking about possibility that is too crude to accommodate the immense subtlety and complexity which is exhibited by the workings of the modal verb âcanâ and its past tense form, âcouldâ; and also, I believe, by the mistaken conviction, on Dennettâs part, that any naturalistically respectable solution to the problem of free will would have to be of a compatibilist stripe. I shall attempt, in the second half of the paper, to explain what seems to me to be wrong with the framework, and to make some points about the functioning of âcanâ and âcouldâ, which I believe any adequate replacement for Dennettâs framework must respect. Ironically, though, I shall argue that it is the rejection of Dennettâs own framework which holds the key to understanding how to defend the spirit (if not the letter) of his thoughts about the invulnerability of our ordinary modal thinking to alleged threats from determinism
Personal and sub-personal: a defence of Dennett's early distinction
Since 1969, when Dennett introduced a distinction between personal and subâpersonal levels of explanation, many philosophers have used âsubâpersonalâ very loosely, and Dennett himself has abandoned a view of the personal level as genuinely autonomous. I recommend a position in which Dennett's original distinction is crucial, by arguing that the phenomenon called mental causation is on view only at the properly personal level. If one retains the commitââ ments incurred by Dennett's early distinction, then one has a satisfactory antiâphysicalistic, antiâdualist philosophy of mind. It neither interferes with the projects of subâpersonal psychology, nor encourages ; instrumentalism at the personal level.
People lose sight of Dennettâs personal/sub-personal distinction because they free it from its philosophical moorings. A distinction that serves a philosophical purpose is typically rooted in doctrine; it cannot be lifted out of context and continue to do its work. So I shall start from Dennettâs distinction as I read it in its original context. And when I speak of âthe distinctionâ, I mean to point not only towards the terms that Dennett first used to define it but also towards the philosophical setting within which its work was cut out
The evolution of misbelief
From an evolutionary standpoint, a default presumption is that true beliefs are adaptive and misbeliefs maladaptive. But if humans are biologically engineered to appraise the world accurately and to form true beliefs, how are we to explain the routine exceptions to this rule? How can we account for mistaken beliefs, bizarre delusions, and instances of self-deception? We explore this question in some detail. We begin by articulating a distinction between two general types of misbelief: those resulting from a breakdown in the normal functioning of the belief formation system (e.g., delusions) and those arising in the normal course of that system's operations (e.g., beliefs based on incomplete or inaccurate information). The former are instances of biological dysfunction or pathology, reflecting "culpableâ limitations of evolutionary design. Although the latter category includes undesirable (but tolerable) by-products of "forgivablyâ limited design, our quarry is a contentious subclass of this category: misbeliefs best conceived as design features. Such misbeliefs, unlike occasional lucky falsehoods, would have been systematically adaptive in the evolutionary past. Such misbeliefs, furthermore, would not be reducible to judicious - but doxastically1 noncommittal - action policies. Finally, such misbeliefs would have been adaptive in themselves, constituting more than mere by-products of adaptively biased misbelief-producing systems. We explore a range of potential candidates for evolved misbelief, and conclude that, of those surveyed, only positive illusions meet our criteri
Can biological quantum networks solve NP-hard problems?
There is a widespread view that the human brain is so complex that it cannot
be efficiently simulated by universal Turing machines. During the last decades
the question has therefore been raised whether we need to consider quantum
effects to explain the imagined cognitive power of a conscious mind.
This paper presents a personal view of several fields of philosophy and
computational neurobiology in an attempt to suggest a realistic picture of how
the brain might work as a basis for perception, consciousness and cognition.
The purpose is to be able to identify and evaluate instances where quantum
effects might play a significant role in cognitive processes.
Not surprisingly, the conclusion is that quantum-enhanced cognition and
intelligence are very unlikely to be found in biological brains. Quantum
effects may certainly influence the functionality of various components and
signalling pathways at the molecular level in the brain network, like ion
ports, synapses, sensors, and enzymes. This might evidently influence the
functionality of some nodes and perhaps even the overall intelligence of the
brain network, but hardly give it any dramatically enhanced functionality. So,
the conclusion is that biological quantum networks can only approximately solve
small instances of NP-hard problems.
On the other hand, artificial intelligence and machine learning implemented
in complex dynamical systems based on genuine quantum networks can certainly be
expected to show enhanced performance and quantum advantage compared with
classical networks. Nevertheless, even quantum networks can only be expected to
efficiently solve NP-hard problems approximately. In the end it is a question
of precision - Nature is approximate.Comment: 38 page
Collaboration between Science and Religious Education teachers in Scottish Secondary schools
The article reports on quantitative research that examines: (1) the current practice in collaboration; and (2) potential for collaboration between Science and Religious Education teachers in a large sample of Scottish secondary schools. The authors adopt and adapt three models (conflict; concordat and consonance) to interrogate the relationship between science and religion (and the perceived relation between these two subjects in schools) (Astley and Francis 2010). The findings indicate that there is evidence of limited collaboration and, in a few cases, a dismissive attitude towards collaboration (conflict and concordat and very weak consonance). There is, however, evidence of a genuine aspiration for greater collaboration among many teachers (moving towards a more robust consonance model). The article concludes by discussing a number of key factors that must be realised for this greater collaboration to be enacted
Higher-order thoughts in action : Consciousness as an unconscious re-description process
Peer reviewedPostprin
Conceptual design study for heat exhaust management in the ARC fusion pilot plant
The ARC pilot plant conceptual design study has been extended beyond its
initial scope [B. N. Sorbom et al., FED 100 (2015) 378] to explore options for
managing ~525 MW of fusion power generated in a compact, high field (B_0 = 9.2
T) tokamak that is approximately the size of JET (R_0 = 3.3 m). Taking
advantage of ARC's novel design - demountable high temperature superconductor
toroidal field (TF) magnets, poloidal magnetic field coils located inside the
TF, and vacuum vessel (VV) immersed in molten salt FLiBe blanket - this
follow-on study has identified innovative and potentially robust power exhaust
management solutions.Comment: Accepted by Fusion Engineering and Desig
Seeing motion and apparent motion
In apparent motion experiments, participants are presented with what is in fact a succession of two brief stationary stimuli at two different locations, but they report an impression of movement. Philosophers have recently debated whether apparent motion provides evidence in favour of a particular account of the nature of temporal experience. I argue that the existing discussion in this area is premised on a mistaken view of the phenomenology of apparent motion and, as a result, the space of possible philosophical positions has not yet been fully explored. In particular, I argue that the existence of apparent motion is compatible with an account of the nature of temporal experience that involves a version of direct realism. In doing so, I also argue against two other claims often made about apparent motion, viz. that apparent motion is the psychological phenomenon that underlies motion experience in the cinema, and that apparent motion is subjectively indistinguishable from real motion
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