Common Sense as a Political Weapon: Populism, Science Skepticism, and Global Crisis‐Solving Motivations

This research examines the relationship between populist thinking and global crisis-solving motivations concerning climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic. Using data from five European countries (Switzerland, France, Finland, Greece, and Italy), we test a model where crisis-related science skepticism—understood as the defense of commonsense knowledge against scientific expertise—mediates the association between populist thinking and crisis-mitigation attitudes. The results show considerable convergence across national contexts. Relative deprivation predicts endorsement of two core components of populism’s thin ideology, people sovereignty and antielitism. These subdimensions of populism are linked to science skepticism, although variably across contexts. Science skepticism then leads to a lower sense of personal responsibility for climate change mitigation and to negative attitudes towards a governmental measure to contain the COVID-19 pandemic. Findings further show that under specific conditions, the populist request for greater democratic participation may mobilize individuals to get involved in crisis mitigation. Overall, our results highlight the role of politicized common sense in motivating and justifying opposition to measures and policies based on scientific expertise. We conclude that science skepticism, rather than populism per se, explains cynical and dismissive attitudes towards global crises

Factor Structure, Gender Invariance, Measurement Properties, and Short Forms of the Spanish Adaptation of the Big Five Inventory-2

<jats:p> Abstract. After the publication of the Big Five Inventory-2 (BFI-2) and its short versions, many validations in other languages have been published. Three studies (total N = 1,673) were conducted to validate a Spanish version of the BFI-2, BFI-2-S and BFI-2-XS). Study 1 first tested the structural validity at both the domain and facet levels of 60 BFI-2 item translations and tested measurement invariance across gender. Study 2 established the temporal stability of the BFI-2 using two data collection waves. Study 3 evaluated in a new sample the generalizability of the measurement properties of the Spanish BFI-2 obtained in Study 1 and the measurement properties of its abbreviated versions. The findings of these studies show that the Spanish BFI-2 is a valid and reliable measure of personality with psychometric properties corresponding to the original in English. The preliminary results of the short forms' measurement properties are promising and should encourage further replication. </jats:p&gt

Spanish Adaptation of the BFI-2

The Spanish translation and validation of the BFI-2 and its abbreviated forms, as well as all the materials used in the manuscrip

Not lost in translation: Successfully replicating Prospect Theory in 19 countries

Kahneman and Tversky’s 1979 article on Prospect Theory is one of the most influential papers across all of the behavioural sciences. The study tested a series of binary financial (risky) choices, ultimately concluding that judgments formed under uncertainty deviate significantly from those presumed by expected utility theory, which was the prevailing theoretical construct at the time. In the forty years since publication, this study has had a remarkable impact on science, policy, and other real-world applications. At the same time, a number of critiques have been raised about its conclusions and subsequent constructs that were founded on it, such as loss aversion. In an era where such presumed canonical theories have increasingly drawn scrutiny for inability to replicate, we attempted a multinational study of N = 4,099 participants from 19 countries and 13 languages. The same methods and procedures were used as in the original paper, adjusting only currencies to make them relative to current values, and requiring all participants to respond to all items. Overall, we found that results replicated for 94% of the 17 choice items tested. At most, results from the 1979 study were attenuated in our findings, which is most likely due to a more robust sample. Twelve of the 13 theoretical contrasts presented by Kahneman and Tversky also replicated, with a further 89% replication rate of the total contrasts possible when separating by location, up to 100% replication in some countries. We conclude that the principles of Prospect Theory replicate beyond any reasonable thresholds, and provide a number of important insights about replications, attenuation, and implications for the study of human decision-making at population-level

The general fault in our fault lines

Pervading global narratives suggest that political polarization is increasing, yet the accuracy of such group meta-perceptions has been drawn into question. A recent US study suggests that these beliefs are inaccurate and drive polarized beliefs about out-groups. However, it also found that informing people of inaccuracies reduces those negative beliefs. In this work, we explore whether these results generalize to other countries. To achieve this, we replicate two of the original experiments with 10,207 participants across 26 countries. We focus on local group divisions, which we refer to as fault lines. We find broad generalizability for both inaccurate meta-perceptions and reduced negative motive attribution through a simple disclosure intervention. We conclude that inaccurate and negative group meta-perceptions are exhibited in myriad contexts and that informing individuals of their misperceptions can yield positive benefits for intergroup relations. Such generalizability highlights a robust phenomenon with implications for political discourse worldwide

The general fault in our fault lines

A pervading global narrative suggests that political polarisation is increasing in the US and around the world. Beliefs in increased polarisation impact individual and group behaviours regardless of whether they are accurate or not. One driver of polarisation are beliefs about how members of the out-group perceive us, known as group meta-perceptions. A 2020 study by Lees and Cikara in US samples suggests that not only are out-group meta-perceptions highly inaccurate, but informing people of this inaccuracy reduces negative beliefs about the out-group. Given the importance of these findings for understanding and mitigating polarisation, it is essential to test to what extent they generalise to other countries. We assess that generalisability by replicating two of the original experiments in 10,207 participants from 26 countries in the first experiment and 10 in the second. We do this by studying local group divisions, which we refer to as fault lines. In line with our hypotheses, results show that the pattern found in the US broadly generalises, with greater heterogeneity explained by specific policies rather than between-country differences. The replication of a simple disclosure intervention in the second experiment yielded a modest reduction in negative motive attributions to the out-group, similar to the original study. These findings indicate first that inaccurate and negative group meta-perceptions are exhibited in a large number of countries, not only the US, and that informing individuals of their misperceptions can yield positive benefits for intergroup relations. The generalisability of these findings highlights a robust phenomenon with major implications for political discourse worldwide

The general fault in our fault lines

Ruggeri et al. tested perceptions of opposing political party members in 10,207 participants from 26 countries. Results show that beliefs about others are overly negative but could be more realistic with transparency about actual group beliefs. Pervading global narratives suggest that political polarization is increasing, yet the accuracy of such group meta-perceptions has been drawn into question. A recent US study suggests that these beliefs are inaccurate and drive polarized beliefs about out-groups. However, it also found that informing people of inaccuracies reduces those negative beliefs. In this work, we explore whether these results generalize to other countries. To achieve this, we replicate two of the original experiments with 10,207 participants across 26 countries. We focus on local group divisions, which we refer to as fault lines. We find broad generalizability for both inaccurate meta-perceptions and reduced negative motive attribution through a simple disclosure intervention. We conclude that inaccurate and negative group meta-perceptions are exhibited in myriad contexts and that informing individuals of their misperceptions can yield positive benefits for intergroup relations. Such generalizability highlights a robust phenomenon with implications for political discourse worldwide