Prosecute and Punish: Curbing Political and Administrative Corruption in Kenya

Due to the inherent difficulties in curbing corrupt practices within the public sector, several countries in sub-Saharan Africa are today engaged in what can be described as experimentation with diverse and creative strategies. These strategies range from public education and awareness, to institutional and democratic reforms, economic liberalization, and the creation of ad hoc or permanent anticorruption agencies (Robinson 1998). In some countries such agencies are established through the acts of parliaments and in some by presidential decrees (Pillay and Dorasamy 2010). Often the rationale for such agencies are twofold: to investigate claims of corruption and to prosecute the perpetrators and to demonstrate to the general public that the government is acting accountably and responsibly by trying to do something about the vice

Review of protected disclosure procedures: section 60 of the Protected Disclosure Act 2012

A review of the procedures established and implemented by government and local government agencies following the introduction of the Protected Disclosure Act 2012 (the PD Act). Executive summary In Victoria, public bodies that can receive disclosures are required to establish and publish procedures about making, handling and notifying disclosures. All public bodies are required to establish and publish procedures about protecting people from detrimental action taken in reprisal for making a disclosure. The Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission reviewed the procedures established and implemented by government and local government agencies following the introduction of the Protected Disclosure Act 2012 (the PD Act)

Determinants of whistleblowing intention : evidence from the South Korean government

In 2001, the South Korean government passed the Anti-Corruption Act, which provides whistleblower protection in the public sector. The system of protections and rewards was strengthened in 2011 by the Act on the Protection of Public Interest Whistleblowers. Although these laws ensure immunity—and even financial incentives—for whistleblowers, whistleblowing is still not a straightforward task. Based on a survey of 5706 public officials in central government, this study examines how a range of factors influence whistleblowing intention: attitude; knowledge; colleague support; organizational support; and protection against retaliation. A number of demographic variables, relating to gender; marital status; length of tenure; duty; and position type are used as controls. The results of the ordered probit regression analysis show all of the independent variables to have a significant positive effect on whistleblowing intention. However, colleague support and organizational support have the biggest effects, while perceived protection against retaliation has the smallest. This suggests that there is a need for future government efforts to build upon the available legal protections by focusing on creating a supportive culture among colleagues and in the organization more generally

Reducing corruption in a Mexican medical school: impact assessment across two cross-sectional surveys

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>Corruption pervades educational and other institutions worldwide and medical schools are not exempt. Empirical evidence about levels and types of corruption in medical schools is sparse. We conducted surveys in 2000 and 2007 in the medical school of the Autonomous University of Guerrero in Mexico to document student perceptions and experience of corruption and to support the medical school to take actions to tackle corruption.</p> <p>Methods</p> <p>In both 2000 and 2007 medical students completed a self-administered questionnaire in the classroom without the teacher present. The questionnaire asked about unofficial payments for admission to medical school, for passing an examination and for administrative procedures. We examined factors related to the experience of corruption in multivariate analysis. Focus groups of students discussed the quantitative findings.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>In 2000, 6% of 725 responding students had paid unofficially to obtain entry into the medical school; this proportion fell to 1.6% of the 436 respondents in 2007. In 2000, 15% of students reported having paid a bribe to pass an examination, not significantly different from the 18% who reported this in 2007. In 2007, students were significantly more likely to have bribed a teacher to pass an examination if they were in the fourth year, if they had been subjected to sexual harassment or political pressure, and if they had been in the university for five years or more. Students resented the need to make unofficial payments and suggested tackling the problem by disciplining corrupt teachers. The university administration made several changes to the system of admissions and examinations in the medical school, based on the findings of the 2000 survey.</p> <p>Conclusion</p> <p>The fall in the rate of bribery to enter the medical school was probably the result of the new admissions system instituted after the first survey. Further actions will be necessary to tackle the continuing presence of bribery to pass examinations and for administrative procedures. The social audit helped to draw attention to corruption and to stimulate actions to tackle it.</p

An inter-country comparison of unofficial payments: results of a health sector social audit in the Baltic States

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>Cross-country comparisons of unofficial payments in the health sector are sparse. In 2002 we conducted a social audit of the health sector of the three Baltic States.</p> <p>Methods</p> <p>Some 10,320 household interviews from a stratified, last-stage-random, sample of 30 clusters per country, together with institutional reviews, produced preliminary results. Separate focus groups of service users, nurses and doctors interpreted these findings. Stakeholder workshops in each country discussed the survey and focus group results.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>Nearly one half of the respondents did not consider unofficial payments to health workers to be corruption, yet one half (Estonia 43%, Latvia 45%, Lithuania 64%) thought the level of corruption in government health services was high. Very few (Estonia 1%, Latvia 3%, Lithuania 8%) admitted to making unofficial payments in their last contact with the services. Around 14% of household members across the three countries gave gifts in their last contact with government services.</p> <p>Conclusion</p> <p>This social audit allowed comparison of perceptions, attitudes and experience regarding unofficial payments in the health services of the three Baltic States. Estonia showed least corruption. Latvia was in the middle. Lithuania evidenced the most unofficial payments, the greatest mistrust towards the system. These findings can serve as a baseline for interventions, and to compare each country's approach to health service reform in relation to unofficial payments.</p

Corruption in Public projects and Megaprojects: There is an elephant in the room!

Despite the relevance of corruption in project selection, planning and delivery, the project management literature pays little attention to this crucial phenomenon. This paper sets the background to foster the discussion concerning how to select, plan and deliver infrastructure in corrupt project contexts. It presents the different types of corruptions and the characteristics of projects that are more likely to suffer from it. Corruption is particularly relevant for large and uncommon projects where the public sector acts as client/owner or even as the main contractor. Megaprojects are “large unique projects” where public actors play a key role and are very likely to be affected by corruption. Corruption worsens both cost and time performance, and the benefits delivered. This paper leverages the institutional theory to introduce the concept of “corrupt project context” and, using the case study of the Italian high-speed railways, shows the impact of a corrupt context on megaprojects

The culture variable vis-à-vis anti-bribery law: a grey area in transnational corporate criminal liability

Cross-border transactions are generating corresponding globalisation of law enforcement efforts. Culture has significantly influenced the legal analysis of anti-bribery law. With the increase of transnational bribery, benefits from globalisation will be undermined unless an effective legal regime can mitigate the harm of bribery. It is perceived that corruption in China is more prevalent than in the West given its embedded place in Chinese culture. It is further alleged that Chinese multinational companies (MNCs) are taking advantage of an unlevel playing field, as they are not subject to stringently-enforced anti-bribery laws. This hypothesis creates a myriad of anti-bribery problems in terms of legislation and enforcement, which particularly manifest in China’s perceived cultural toleration of bribery. Cultural assumptions undermine the global anti-bribery regime and compromise potential collaborative anti-bribery efforts across jurisdictions in a rapidly globalizing world. The Chinese culture does not necessarily impede China’s criminalisation of paying bribes to foreign officials. It is argued that the cultural role should not be overestimated, otherwise the hazard of the ethnocentric engagement with the Chinese culture would affect the ability of foreign MNCs to integrate their global compliance programmes. Multinationals can only mitigate their exposure to criminal liability globally, provided that they comply robustly with anti-bribery laws of both home and host jurisdictions

Organised crime and international aid subversion: evidence from Colombia and Afghanistan

Scholarly attempts to explain aid subversion in post-conflict contexts frame the challenge in terms of corrupt practices and transactions disconnected from local power struggles. Also, they assume a distinction between organised crime and the state. This comparative analysis of aid subversion in Colombia and Afghanistan reveals the limits of such an approach. Focusing on relations that anchor organised crime within local political, social and economic processes, we demonstrate that organised crime is dynamic, driven by multiple motives, and endogenous to local power politics. Better understanding of governance arrangements around the organised crime-conflict nexus which enable aid subversion is therefore required