Facts, Norms and Expected Utility Functions

In this paper we want to explore an argumentative pattern that provides a normative justification for expected utility functions grounded on empirical evidence, showing how it worked in three different episodes of their development. The argument claims that we should prudentially maximize our expected utility since this is the criterion effectively applied by those who are considered wisest in making risky choices (be it gamblers or businessmen). Yet, to justify the adoption of this rule, it should be proven that this is empirically true: i.e., that a given function allows us to predict the choices of that particular class of agents. We show how expected utility functions were introduced and contested in accordance to this pattern in the 18th century and how it recurred in the 1950s when M. Allais made his case against the neobernoullians.Expected utility;Normative theory;

Adam Smith and the Marquis de Condorcet. Did they really meet?

This article focuses on the alleged direct acquaintanceship between Condorcet and Adam Smith. Mistaken infor-mation about this issue was repeated many times in the literature of the late 1800s and 1900s. It is presumed that they met in France, during Smith’s journey there, chez Sophie de Grouchy. I will attempt to show that the meeting be-tween the two authors was not in fact arranged by Sophie de Grouchy, Condorcet’s wife, even though she was very interested in Smithian theories, especially about the category of “sympathy”, as confirmed by her French translation of the Theory of Moral Sentiments. My purpose is to demonstrate that Madame de Condorcet did never meet Smith and, as a result, she could not have introduced Condorcet to Smith. A greater degree of probability can be attributed to the version that indicates Turgot as the intermediary between Condorcet and Smith. In my opinion, not even this hypothesis is totally convincing, because neither Smith nor Condorcet ever talk about their meeting. Moreover, there is no evidence of correspondence between them.This article focuses on the alleged direct acquaintanceship between Condorcet and Adam Smith. Mistaken infor-mation about this issue was repeated many times in the literature of the late 1800s and 1900s. It is presumed that they met in France, during Smith’s journey there, chez Sophie de Grouchy. I will attempt to show that the meeting be-tween the two authors was not in fact arranged by Sophie de Grouchy, Condorcet’s wife, even though she was very interested in Smithian theories, especially about the category of “sympathy”, as confirmed by her French translation of the Theory of Moral Sentiments. My purpose is to demonstrate that Madame de Condorcet did never meet Smith and, as a result, she could not have introduced Condorcet to Smith. A greater degree of probability can be attributed to the version that indicates Turgot as the intermediary between Condorcet and Smith. In my opinion, not even this hypothesis is totally convincing, because neither Smith nor Condorcet ever talk about their meeting. Moreover, there is no evidence of correspondence between them

Condorcet and I - A Fictional Conversation between Condorcet and Me: on the Outlines of an Historical View of the Progress of the Human Mind

The thesis’ main question is: Has the reality of Condorcet’s Outlines of an Historical View of the Progress of the Human Mind been realized with humanity becoming perfect, as Condorcet indicates? In answering that question, my thesis contention will present the fictional encounter between Condorcet and me in which we debate Condorcet’s essay. The two of us will embark upon our world views of humanism and theism in a dramatic debate, presenting our perspectives and try to get to a resolution

Vie de Monsieur Turgot

Mención de responsabilidad tomado del Catálogo Colectivo de Francia (CCFR)Según el CCFR obra impresa en ParísSign.: []2, A-S8, T6Las pág. manuscritas encartadas al final de la obra corresponden a la tabla de contenidos

GOMES, M. L. M. Quatro visões iluministas sobre a educação matemática: Diderot, D’Alembert, Condillac e Condorcet. Campinas, SP: Editora da Unicamp, 2008.

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¿Como se puede lidiar con la paradoja de Condorcet?

In economic models, one usually assumes rationality by economic agents when three princi- ples are fulfilled: completeness, rationality and transitivity. It has been proved that these assum- ptions are fundamental to have results that follow rationality at the moment of decision making. When one speaks of a voting system by majority and under a certain population distribution, if the assumption of transitivity is not fulfilld at an aggregate level, what is known as the Con- dorcet paradox can occur...En los modelos económicos, se suele asumir racionalidad por parte de los agentes cuando se cumplen tres principios: completitud, racionalidad y transitividad. Se ha comprobado que estos supuestos son fundamentales para obtener resultados que sugieren racionalidad al mo- mento de la toma de decisiones. Cuando se habla de sistemas de votaciones por mayoría y bajo una cierta distribución poblacional, si no se cuenta con el supuesto de transitividad en un ni- vel agregado, puede presentarse lo que se conoce como la paradoja de Condorcet..

A resurrection of the Condorcet Jury Theorem

This paper analyzes the optimal size of a deliberating committee where (i) there is no conflict of interest among individuals and (ii) information acquisition is costly. The committee members simultaneously decide whether to acquire information, and then make the ex-post efficient decision. The optimal committee size, k*, is shown to be bounded. The main result of this paper is that any arbitrarily large committee aggregates the decentralized information more efficiently than the committee of size k*-2. This result implies that oversized committees generate only small inefficiencies.Voting, information aggregation, costly information