From the internal lexicon to delusional belief

In this overview, Author presents the development of his approach-the twofactor account of delusions-drawing attention to the neuropsychological research on delusions (the role of brain damage in the formation of delusions), as well as to the differences between explaining monothematic and polythematic delusions (this differentiation is not analyzed in detail in the present volume). He also sketches the most promising issues in the current research on delusions.11 page(s

Psychology is – and should be – central to cognitive science

Abstract: Cognitive science is typically defined as the multidisciplinary study of mind, with the disciplines involved usually listed as philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence, neuroscience, linguistics, and anthropology. Furthermore, these six “core disciplines” are generally regarded as having equal status vis-à-vis cognitive science. In contrast to the latter position, I argue that psychology has a special status here: it is central to cognitive science in a way that none of the other five disciplines is. I support this argument via both theoretical and empirical considerations.Keywords: Psychology; Cognitive Science; Interdisciplinarity/Multidisciplinarity  La psicologia è – e dovrebbe essere – al centro della scienza cognitivaRiassunto: La scienza cognitiva viene definita comunemente come indagine multidisciplinare sulla mente e tra le discipline che vi sono coinvolte vengono solitamente indicate la filosofia, la psicologia, l’intelligenza artificiale, la neuroscienza, la linguistica e l’antropologia. Queste sei “discipline fondamentali” sono generalmente considerate come aventi pari dignità nell’ambito della scienza cognitiva. A dispetto di quest’ultima posizione sosterrò, invece, che alla psicologia vada riconosciuto uno status speciale: la sua importanza per la scienza cognitiva è tale da non poter essere eguagliata da nessuna delle altre cinque discipline. A supporto di questa posizione porterò alcune riflessioni di natura teoretica ed empirica.Parole chiave: Psicologia; Scienza cognitiva; Interdisciplinarità/Multidisciplinarit

Developing hypnotic analogues of clinical delusions : Mirrored-self misidentification

Introduction. Despite current research interest in delusional beliefs, there are no viable models for studying delusions in the laboratory. However, hypnosis offers a technique for creating transient delusions that are resistant to challenge. The aim of this study was to develop an hypnotic analogue of one important delusion, mirrored-self misidentification. Methods. Twelve high hypnotisable participants received an hypnotic suggestion to see either a stranger in the mirror, a mirror as a window, or a mirror as a window with a view to a stranger. Participants' deluded beliefs were challenged, and following hypnosis, Sheehan and McConkey's (1982) Experiential Analysis Technique was used to explore participants' phenomenological experience of the delusion. Results. The majority of participants did not recognise their reflection in the mirror, described the person in the mirror as having different physical characteristics to themselves, and maintained their delusion when challenged. Conclusions. The hypnotic suggestion created a credible, compelling delusion with features strikingly similar to clinical cases of mirrored-self misidentification. Our findings suggest that Factor 2 within Langdon and Coltheart's (2000) two-factor framework may involve a lowering of the criteria used to accept or reject delusional hypotheses.PostprintPeer reviewe

The locus of serial processing in reading aloud:Orthography-to-phonology computation or speech planning?

Dual-route theories of reading posit that a sublexical reading mechanism that operates serially and from left to right is involved in the orthography-to-phonology computation. These theories attribute the masked onset priming effect (MOPE) and the phonological Stroop effect (PSE) to the serial left-to-right operation of this mechanism. However, both effects may arise during speech planning, in the phonological encoding process, which also occurs serially and from left to right. In the present paper, we sought to determine the locus of serial processing in reading aloud by testing the contrasting predictions that the dual-route and speech planning accounts make in relation to the MOPE and the PSE. The results from three experiments that used the MOPE and the PSE paradigms in English are inconsistent with the idea that these effects arise during speech planning, and consistent with the claim that a sublexical serially operating reading mechanism is involved in the print-to-sound translation. Simulations of the empirical data on the MOPE with the dual route cascaded (DRC) and connectionist dual process (CDP++) models, which are computational implementations of the dual-route theory of reading, provide further support for the dual-route account.24 page(s

Ew gross! Recognition of Expressions of Disgust by Children With Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder

There is evidence suggesting that obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) in adults may be associated with an impaired ability to recognise the facial expression of disgust (Sprengelmeyer et al., 1997a; Woody, Corcoran, & Tolin, in press). It has been suggested that this impairment begins in childhood when the recognition of emotional expressions is being learnt (see Spengelmeyer et al., 1997a). This study compared the recognition of facial affect in children aged around 11 years with a diagnosis of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD; n = 11), other anxiety disorders (n = 20), and nonclinical children (n = 19), adapting the methodology of Sprengelmeyer et al. Disgust was most commonly misclassified as anger by children in all three groups. However, children with OCD did not show any evidence of a recognition deficit for disgust in comparison to either control group. Unexpectedly, however, children with OCD recognised expressions of surprise more accurately than nonclinical children. Recognition of disgust or any other emotion was not related to child self-reported anxiety symptoms. Given the observed differences in some studies with adults, future research may benefit by examining older adolescents and young adults to determine when these effects may first be notice

Abductive inference and delusional belief

A special issue of the journal "Cognitive neuropsychiatry", Vol. 15, Issue 1-3. Delusional beliefs have sometimes been considered as rational inferences from abnormal experiences. We explore this idea in more detail, making the following points. First, the abnormalities of cognition that initially prompt the entertaining of a delusional belief are not always conscious and since we prefer to restrict the term “experience” to consciousness we refer to “abnormal data” rather than “abnormal experience”. Second, we argue that in relation to many delusions (we consider seven) one can clearly identify what the abnormal cognitive data are which prompted the delusion and what the neuropsychological impairment is which is responsible for the occurrence of these data; but one can equally clearly point to cases where this impairment is present but delusion is not. So the impairment is not sufficient for delusion to occur: a second cognitive impairment, one that affects the ability to evaluate beliefs, must also be present. Third (and this is the main thrust of our paper), we consider in detail what the nature of the inference is that leads from the abnormal data to the belief. This is not deductive inference and it is not inference by enumerative induction; it is abductive inference. We offer a Bayesian account of abductive inference and apply it to the explanation of delusional belief.27 page(s

Perception, cognition, and delusion:Commentary on Firestone and Scholl

AbstractFirestone &amp; Scholl's (F&amp;S) critique of putative empirical evidence for the cognitive penetrability of perception focuses on studies of neurologically normal populations. We suggest that a comprehensive exploration of the cognition–perception relationship also incorporate work on abnormal perception and cognition. We highlight the prominence of these issues in contemporary debates about the formation and maintenance of delusions.</jats:p