Strategic Proportionality: Limitations on the Use of Force in Modern Armed Conflicts

The nature of modern armed conflicts, combined with traditional interpretations of proportionality, poses serious challenges to the jus ad bellum goal of limiting and controlling wars. In between the jus ad bellum focus on decisions to use force, and the international humanitarian law (IHL) regulation of specific attacks, there is a far-reaching space in which the regulatory role of international law is bereft of much needed clarity. Perhaps the most striking example is in relation to overall casualties of war. If the jus ad bellum is understood as applying to the opening moments of the conflict, then it cannot provide a solution to growing numbers of casualties later in the conflict. Moreover, if it does not apply to non-international armed conflicts, then it is of little use in relation to alleviating the suffering of war for a vast proportion of conflicts in the past half a century and more. IHL is equally unsuited for dealing with overall casualties, as it may be the case that each individual attack is proportionate, but the cumulative number of civilians being killed is slowly rising to intolerable figures. A similar problem arises with regard to assessing other forms of accumulated destruction. This article sets out a new approach to proportionality in armed conflict and the regulation of war. It advocates for a principle of “strategic proportionality,” stemming from general principles of international law and reflected in state practice, and which requires an ongoing assessment throughout the conflict balancing the overall harm against the strategic objectives. The article traces the historical development and aims of the principle of proportionality in war, sets out the scope and aims of strategic proportionality, and provides an analysis of how such a principle can be operationalized in practice

War is Governance: Explaining the Logic of the Laws of War From a Principal-Agent Perspective

What is the purpose of the international law on armed conflict, and why would opponents bent on destroying each other’s capabilities commit to and obey rules designed to limit their choice of targets, weapons, and tactics? Traditionally, answers to this question have been offered on the one hand by moralists who regard the law as being inspired by morality and on the other by realists who explain this branch of law on the basis of reciprocity. Neither side’s answers withstand close scrutiny. In this Article, we develop an alternative explanation that is based on the principal–agent model of domestic governance. We pry open the black box of “the state” and examine the complex interaction between the civilian and military apparatuses seething beneath them veil of sovereignty. Our point of departure is that military conflicts raise significant intrastate conflicts of interest that result from the delegation of authority to engage in combat: between civil society and elected officials, between elected officials and military commanders, and within the military chain of command. We submit that the most effective way to reduce domestic agency costs prevalent in war is by relying on external resources to monitor and discipline the agents. Even though it may be costly, and reciprocity is not assured, principals who worry that agency slack may harm them or their nation’s interests are likely to prefer that international norms regulate warfare. The Article expounds the theory and uses it to explain the evolution of the law and its specific doctrines, and it outlines the normative implications of this new understanding of the purpose of the law. Ultimately, our analysis suggests that as a practical matter, international law enhances the ability of states to amass huge armies because it lowers the costs of controlling them. Therefore, although at times compliance with the law may prove costly in the short run, in the long run states with massive armies are its greatest beneficiaries

War is Governance: Explaining the Logic of the Laws of War From a Principal-Agent Perspective

What is the purpose of the international law on armed conflict, and why would opponents bent on destroying each other’s capabilities commit to and obey rules designed to limit their choice of targets, weapons, and tactics? Traditionally, answers to this question have been offered on the one hand by moralists who regard the law as being inspired by morality and on the other by realists who explain this branch of law on the basis of reciprocity. Neither side’s answers withstand close scrutiny. In this Article, we develop an alternative explanation that is based on the principal–agent model of domestic governance. We pry open the black box of “the state” and examine the complex interaction between the civilian and military apparatuses seething beneath them veil of sovereignty. Our point of departure is that military conflicts raise significant intrastate conflicts of interest that result from the delegation of authority to engage in combat: between civil society and elected officials, between elected officials and military commanders, and within the military chain of command. We submit that the most effective way to reduce domestic agency costs prevalent in war is by relying on external resources to monitor and discipline the agents. Even though it may be costly, and reciprocity is not assured, principals who worry that agency slack may harm them or their nation’s interests are likely to prefer that international norms regulate warfare. The Article expounds the theory and uses it to explain the evolution of the law and its specific doctrines, and it outlines the normative implications of this new understanding of the purpose of the law. Ultimately, our analysis suggests that as a practical matter, international law enhances the ability of states to amass huge armies because it lowers the costs of controlling them. Therefore, although at times compliance with the law may prove costly in the short run, in the long run states with massive armies are its greatest beneficiaries

Social Media and Depressive Symptoms in Childhood and Adolescence: A Systematic Review

Concerns are increasingly raised in academic and lay literature about the impact of the internet on young people’s well-being. This systematic review examined empirical research on the relationship between social media use and depressive symptoms in the child and adolescent population. A systematic search of Medline, PsycInfo and Embase databases yielded eleven eligible studies. Relevant results were extracted from each study, with a total sample of 12,646. Analysis revealed a small but statistically significant correlation between social media use and depressive symptoms in young people. However, studies varied widely in methods, sample size and results, making the clinical significance of these findings nuanced. Over half of the studies were cross-sectional, while those of longitudinal design were of limited duration. This review justifies further investigation of this phenomenon, with a need for consensus on variables and measurement

Co-rumination buffers the link between social anxiety and depressive symptoms in early adolescence

Objectives: We examined whether co-rumination with online friends buffered the link between social anxiety and depressive symptoms over time in a community sample. Methods: In a sample of 526 participants (358 girls; Mage = 14.05) followed at three time points, we conducted a latent cross-lagged model with social anxiety, depressive symptoms, and co-rumination, controlling for friendship stability and friendship quality, and adding a latent interaction between social anxiety and co-rumination predicting depressive symptoms. Results: Social anxiety predicted depressive symptoms, but no direct links between social anxiety and co-rumination emerged. Instead, co-rumination buffered the link between social anxiety and depressive symptoms for adolescents with higher but not lower levels of social anxiety. Conclusions: These findings indicate that co-rumination exerted a positive influence on interpersonal relationships by diminishing the influence from social anxiety on depressive symptoms over time

Robust estimation of bacterial cell count from optical density

Optical density (OD) is widely used to estimate the density of cells in liquid culture, but cannot be compared between instruments without a standardized calibration protocol and is challenging to relate to actual cell count. We address this with an interlaboratory study comparing three simple, low-cost, and highly accessible OD calibration protocols across 244 laboratories, applied to eight strains of constitutive GFP-expressing E. coli. Based on our results, we recommend calibrating OD to estimated cell count using serial dilution of silica microspheres, which produces highly precise calibration (95.5% of residuals <1.2-fold), is easily assessed for quality control, also assesses instrument effective linear range, and can be combined with fluorescence calibration to obtain units of Molecules of Equivalent Fluorescein (MEFL) per cell, allowing direct comparison and data fusion with flow cytometry measurements: in our study, fluorescence per cell measurements showed only a 1.07-fold mean difference between plate reader and flow cytometry data

Post-populist Populism

Good news for democracy from Poland? It appears that in the recent general elections, the right-wing populist Law and Justice party (PiS), won most seats but not enough to allow it to form a coalition. Donald Tusk's Civic Coalition has a better chance of forming a coalition, which might put an end to PiS' eight years of rule. This, prima facie, seems like a victory of democracy over populism. While this is certainly true, in this post we wish to flag certain warning signs that this possible democratic rotation is not the end of the struggle for democracy but merely the beginning of this process. This is because even when populists are voted out of office, their legacy - at least partially - persists