Le traducteur comme lecteur. Lecture(s) de Diderot par Tadeusz Boy-Zelenski

Entre les deux guerres mondiales, Tadeusz Boy-Zelenski (1874-1941) a traduit en polonais plus de 100 œuvres d’auteurs français, publiées dans une collection qui a pris le nom de « Bibliothèque de Boy » et qui constitue pour les Polonais le canon de la littérature française. Les traductions de Boy et les paratextes dont il les accompagne ont été régulièrement réédités ; ainsi ont-elles fortement contribué à former l’image polonaise de la littérature française, dont, en partie, celle de l’œuvre de Diderot. En effet, une place importante revient au philosophe dans les travaux de Boy, à commencer par Jacques le Fataliste, dont il a donné une traduction. Dans cet article, les stratégies lectoriales de Boy sont reconstruites à partir de ses traductions de Diderot, et de plusieurs de ses autres écrits.In the inter-war years Tadeusz Boy-Zelenski (1874-1941) translated into Polish more than 100 works by French authors, published in a collection known as ‘The Boy Library’, which for the Poles constitutes the canon of French literature. As Boy’s translations and accompanying paratexts have been regularly republished, they have largely formed the Polish image of French literature, including Diderot’s works. The latter feature prominently, beginning with Jacques le Fataliste. This article reconstructs Boy’s reading strategies, based on his translations of Diderot and several of his other writings

Prime ministerial autonomy and intra-executive conflict under semi-presidentialism

AbstractThis article answers why intra-executive conflict varies across semi-presidential democracies. The literature verifies that intra-executive competition tends to be higher when the president holds less power to dismiss the cabinet, coexists with a minority government, or the president’s party is not represented in the cabinet. This paper, therefore, integrates these factors to construct an index of prime ministerial autonomy, proposing that its relationship with the probability of intra-executive conflict is represented by an inverted U-shaped curve. That is, when the prime minister is subordinated to an elected president, or conversely, enjoys greater room to manoeuvre in the executive affairs of the government, the likelihood of conflict is low. In contrast, significant confrontation emerges when the president claims constitutional legitimacy to rein in the cabinet, and controls the executive to a certain degree. This study verifies hypotheses using data on seventeen semi-presidential democracies in Europe between 1990 and 2015.</jats:p

Polish doctors fall out with new government over pay

Poland's doctors, who will only be required to work a 48 hour week after Jan 1, are demanding better salaries in return for agreeing to work extra hours, causing a political headache for the newly-elected government and potential disruption for the country's hospitals. Jan Cienski reports

Averting the funding-gap crisis: East European pension reforms after 2008

This article analyses pension reforms in Central and East European countries in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. The crisis revealed unresolved problems in the implementation of previous reforms, namely the financing of the transition costs. In their attempts to solve the funding-gap issue, the reforms needed to address legacies of past choices as well as the exceptional circumstances of the crisis. The interaction of fiscal constraints and political conditions shaped the variety of these reform outcomes