Gender quotas or girls’ networks? Towards an understanding of recruitment in the research profession in Italy

This article investigates the role of the gender composition of selection committees and networks in promoting women in research activities. We exploit a novel data set on recruitment processes at entry-level research positions in a leading Italian research centre that mainly operates in hard science. We find some evidence of discrimination against women at non-tenured entry levels, which is attenuated (or even reversed) by the presence of a woman on the selection committee. However, the most important predictor for recruitment seems to be previous connections with the research centre, which also serves as an important mechanism for women to enter the research profession. We conclude that quotas could be a solution for gender-biased preferences towards same-sex candidates in selection committees for non-tenure-track positions. Moreover, more gender-neutral networks would be another mechanism to bring more equality between men and women in research

Social Influence Bias in Online Ratings: A Field Experiment

The aim of this paper is to study the empirical phenomenon of rating bubbles, i.e. clustering on extremely positive values in e-commerce platforms and rating web sites. By means of a field experiment that exogenously manipulates prior ratings for a hotel in an important Italian tourism destination, we investigate whether consumers are influenced by prior ratings when evaluating their stay (i.e., social influence bias). Results show that positive social influence exists, and that herd behavior is asymmetric: information on prior positive ratings has a stronger influence on consumers’ rating attitude than information on prior mediocre ratings. Furthermore, we are able to exclude any brag-or-moan effect: the behavior of frequent reviewers, on average, is not statistically different from the behavior of consumers who have never posted ratings online. Yet, non-reviewers exhibit a higher influence to excellent prior ratings, thus lending support to the social influence bias interpretation. Finally, also repeat customers are affected by prior ratings, although to a lesser extent with respect to new customers

Social influence bias in ratings: A field experiment in the hospitality sector

We investigate the empirical phenomenon of rating bubbles, that is, the presence of a disproportionate number of extremely positive ratings in user-generated content websites. We test whether customers are influenced by prior ratings when evaluating their stay at a hotel through a field experiment that exogenously manipulates information disclosure. Results show the presence of (asymmetric) social influence bias (SIB): access to information on prior ratings that are above the average positively influences the consumers’ rating of the hotel. In contrast, information on ratings that are below the average does not affect reviewers. Furthermore, customers who have never been to the hotel before the intervention are more susceptible to prior ratings than customers who have repeatedly been to the hotel before. Finally, customers who are not used to writing online reviews are more prone to SIB than customers who frequently write online reviews. Our findings suggest that online rating systems should be adjusted to mitigate this bias, especially as these platforms become more relevant and widespread in the hospitality sector

Community projects: an experimental analysis of a fair implementation process

We define and experimentally test a public provision mechanism that meets three basic ethical requirements and allows community members to influence, via monetary bids, which of several projects is implemented. For each project, participants are assigned personal values, which can be positive or negative. We provide either public or private information about personal values. This produces two distinct public provision games, which are experimentally implemented and analyzed for various projects. In spite of the complex experimental task, participants do not rely on bidding their own personal values as an obvious simple heuristic whose general acceptance would result in fair and efficient outcomes. Rather, they rely on strategic underbidding. Although underbidding is affected by projects’ characteristics, the provision mechanism mostly leads to the implementation of the most efficient project

Three essays in experimental and labor economics

This thesis collects three independent essays. Two of them relate to experimental economics, and one to labor economics. The first essay explores through a laboratory experiment the relationship between cognitive costs and imitation dynamics. The second essay investigates in an experimental setting information aversion towards bad/good news about ones’ own condition, and tests the effect of the possibility of exerting effort, which may improve one’s own condition, on the willingness to acquire more detailed personal information. The third essay proposes an empirical application aiming at studying gender discrimination in a research context, and in particular whether the gender composition of evaluating commissions affects the hiring of women in research activities