Returns to Mobility in the Transition to a Market Economy

In spite of ongoing dramatic changes in labor market structure, transitional economies display rather low worker flows across sectors and occupations. Such low mobility can be explained by low returns to job changes as well as by market segmentation in the allocation of job offers. We develop an econometric model which enables us to characterize intertemporal changes in probabilities of dismissal, remuneration, and offer arrival rates on the basis of information on observed transitions and wage payments. The model is estimated using data from the Polish Labor Force Survey. Our results indicate a significant degree of segmentation in the allocation of job offers and more stability in public sector versus private sector jobs. Our model can also be used for policy experiments. In particular, we infer that reductions of 10 per cent in the generosity of unemployment benefits will not significantly boost outflows from the unemployment state. These findings support explanations for low mobility in transitional economies, which are based on informational failures, and high costs of moving from public to private enterprises for those with high levels of job tenure and labor market experience in the public sector.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39604/2/wp217.pd

Returns to Mobility in the Transition to a Market Economy

In spite of ongoing dramatic changes in labor market structure, transitional economies display rather low worker flows across sectors and occupations. Such low mobility can be explained by low returns to job changes as well as by market segmentation in the allocation of job offers. We develop an econometric model which enables us to characterize intertemporal changes in probabilities of dismissal, remuneration, and offer arrival rates on the basis of information on observed transitions and wage payments. The model is estimated using data from the Polish Labor Force Survey. Our results indicate a significant degree of segmentation in the allocation of job offers and more stability in public sector versus private sector jobs. Our model can also be used for policy experiments. In particular, we infer that reductions of 10 per cent in the generosity of unemployment benefits will not significantly boost outflows from the unemployment state. These findings support explanations for low mobility in transitional economies, which are based on informational failures, and high costs of moving from public to private enterprises for those with high levels of job tenure and labor market experience in the public sector.worker flows, returns to mobility, market segmentation

New Methods for Analyzing Structural Models of Labor Force Dynamics

This paper takes a first step toward developing econometric models for the structural analysis of labor force dynamics. Our analysis is presented in continuous time, although most of the points raised here can be applied to discrete time models. We show that in previous attempts to estimate "structural" models of job search, a key source of information necessary to identify certain structural parameters has been neglected. We discuss the conditions under which structural search models can be estimated. In particular, the wage offer distribution must be recoverable -- i.e., it must be the case that the parameters of the untruncated wage offer distribution be estimable from the truncated accepted wage distribution. The wage offer distribution must be assumed to belong to a parametric family. Estimates of structural parameters are shown to be sensitive to the distributional assumption made. A partial equilibrium two state model of employment dynamics is estimated, using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men. We find employment and nonemployment rates implied by the structural parameter estimates to be generally consistent with those observed for the population of young males.

Are Unemployment and Out of the Labor Force Behaviorally Distinct Labor Force States?

This paper formulates and tests the hypothesis that the categories unemployed and out of the labor force are behaviorally distinct labor force states. Our empirical results indicate that they are. In the empirically relevant range the exit rate from unemployment to employment exceeds the exit rate from out of the labor force to employment. This evidence is shown to be consistent with a simple job search model of productive unemployment with log concave wage offer distributions. We prove that if unemployed workers receive job offers more frequently than workers out of the labor force, and if wage offer distributions are log concave, the exit rate from unemployment to employment exceeds the exit rate from out of the labor force to employment.

Modes of Spousal Interaction and the Labor Market Environment

We formulate a model of household behavior in which cooperation is costly and in which these costs vary across households. Some households rationally decide to behave noncooperatively, which in our context is an efficient outcome. An intriguing feature of the model is that, while the welfare of the spouses is continuous in the state variables, labor supply decisions are not. Small changes in state variables may result in large changes in labor supplies when the household switches its mode of behavior. We estimate the model using a nationally representative sample of Italian households and find that the costly cooperation model signfificantly outperforms a noncooperative model. This suggests the possibility of attaining large gains in aggregate labor supply by adopting policies which promote cooperative household behavior.Household Time Allocation, Nash Bargaining, Nash Equilibrium; Maximum Likelihood.

Household Time Allocation and Models of Behavior: A Theory of Sorts

We make the point that a flexible specification of spousal preferences and household production technology precludes the possibility of using revealed preference data on household time allocations to determine the manner in which spouses interact. Under strong, but standard, assumptions regarding marriage market equilibria, marital sorting patterns can be used essentially as "out of sample" information that allows us to assess whether household behavior is cooperative. We use a sample of households drawn from a recent wave of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, and find some evidence supporting the view that households behave in a cooperative manner.Bilateral Matching, Household Time Allocation, Nash Bargaining

Cohort Size and Schooling Choice

Economic models ; schooling ; human resources

Labor Market Structure and Welfare: A Comparison of Italy and the U.S.

labor market dynamics, earnings inequality, search models

On-The-Job Search with Information Obsolescence

On-the-job search, learning, wage dynamics, optimal sampling

Equilibrium Dismissal Without Stigma

Labour market ; job evaluation ; wages ; workers